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Resumen	  
El	  proceso	  de	  convergencia	  que	  había	  caracterizado	  la	  historia	  de	  la	  integración	  económica	  europea	  comenzó	  a	  
revertirse	   desde	   las	   primeras	   etapas	   del	   proyecto	   de	   unificación	   monetaria.	   En	   particular,	   el	   proceso	   de	  
convergencia	  económica	  pasó	  de	  los	  países	  y	  regiones	  del	  sur	  de	  Europa	  a	  Europa	  del	  Este.	  Por	  lo	  tanto,	  durante	  
las	   últimas	   dos	   décadas,	   los	   países	   y	   regiones	   de	   Europa	   del	   Este	   han	   estado	   reduciendo	   la	   brecha	   con	   las	  
regiones	  más	  ricas,	  mientras	  que	  las	  brechas	  de	  ingresos	  y	  productividad	  entre	  los	  miembros	  "occidentales"	  de	  la	  
UEM	  se	  ampliaron.	  
Esta	  tesis	  tiene	  el	  objetivo	  general	  de	  analizar	  y	  explicar	  empíricamente	  la	  evolución	  del	  proceso	  de	  convergencia	  
en	   la	   Unión	   Europea	   desde	   la	   introducción	   de	   la	   moneda	   única	   desde	   diferentes	   perspectivas	   económicas.	  
Mediante	   la	   aplicación	   de	   diferentes	   técnicas	   de	   econometría,	   individualizaré	   tres	   "fuerzas"	   económicas	  
relevantes	  que	  contribuyeron	  al	  surgimiento	  de	  un	  camino	  bifurcado	  de	  convergencia	  en	  el	  ingreso	  per	  cápita	  y	  
la	  productividad	  laboral	  en	  la	  Unión	  Europea.	  
La	  primera	   "fuerza"	   está	  directamente	   relacionada	   con	   la	   adopción	  de	   la	  moneda	  única	   que	   conllevaba	   reglas	  
fiscales	  demasiado	  estrictas	  para	  los	  países	  que	  optaron	  por	  unirse	  al	  club.	  Algunos	  países	  periféricos	  resultaron	  
particularmente	  penalizados	  por	  estas	  normas	   fiscales	  que	   también	   se	   aplicaron	  después	  de	  2008	  a	  pesar	  del	  
brote	  de	  la	  Crisis	  Financiera	  Global.	  
La	   segunda	   fuerza	   está	   relacionada	   con	   la	   	   movilidad	   de	   los	   factores	   productivos	   que	   conllevó	   la	   progresiva	  
reubicación	  de	  la	  industria	  manufacturera	  dentro	  y	  alrededor	  de	  las	  regiones	  europeas	  más	  ricas.	  La	  movilidad	  
de	   factores	  productivos	  dentro	  del	  Mercado	  Común	  benefició	  notablemente	  a	   las	   regiones	  de	  Europa	  del	  Este,	  
cuya	  posición	  geográfica	  es	  más	  estratégica	  para	  la	  inversión	  en	  la	  actividad	  de	  la	  industria	  manufacturera	  a	  fin	  
de	  explotar	   los	  rendimientos	  crecientes.	  Simétricamente,	  el	  peso	  de	   la	   industria	  manufacturera	  se	  redujo	  en	   la	  
mayoría	  de	  las	  regiones	  de	  los	  países	  periféricos	  de	  la	  Unión	  Económica	  y	  Monetaria.	  	  
La	   tercera	   "fuerza"	   está	   representada	   por	   la	   calidad	   de	   las	   instituciones	   gubernamentales.	   Las	   regiones	   de	  
Europa	  occidental	  con	  instituciones	  gubernamentales	  de	  menor	  calidad	  son	  las	  regiones	  que	  también	  registraron	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Abstract	  
The	   Convergence	   process	   that	   had	   characterized	   the	   history	   of	   the	   European	   economic	   integration	   started	   to	  
reverse	   since	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   the	   project	   of	   monetary	   unification.	   In	   particular	   the	   process	   of	   economic	  
convergence	  shifted	  from	  Southern	  European	  countries	  and	  regions	  to	  Eastern	  Europe.	  Therefore	  during	  the	  last	  
two	  decades	  Eastern	  European	  countries	  and	  regions	  have	  been	  reducing	  the	  gap	  with	  the	  richer	  regions	  while	  
the	  income	  and	  productivity	  gaps	  between	  the	  “Western”	  members	  of	  the	  EMU	  widened.	  
This	   thesis	   has	   the	   general	   objective	   to	   empirically	   analyse	   and	   explain	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   process	   of	  
convergence	   in	   the	   European	   Union	   since	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   single	   currency	   from	   different	   economic	  
perspectives.	   Through	   the	   application	   of	   different	   econometrics	   techniques	   I	   will	   individuate	   three	   relevant	  
economic	  “forces”	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  emergence	  a	  bifurcated	  path	  of	  convergence	  in	  income	  per	  capita	  and	  
labour	  productivity	  the	  European	  Union.	  
The	  first	  “force”	  is	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  single	  currency	  that	  entailed	  too	  stringent	  fiscal	  rules	  for	  
countries	   that	  opted	   to	   join	   the	  club.	  Some	  peripheral	   countries	   resulted	  particularly	  penalized	  by	   these	   fiscal	  
rules	  that	  were	  also	  applied	  after	  2008	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Global	  Financial	  crisis.	  
The	  second	  force	  is	  related	  to	  the	  mobility	  of	  the	  factors	  of	  production	  that	  entailed	  a	  progressive	  relocation	  of	  
the	   manufacturing	   industry	   within	   and	   around	   the	   richer	   core	   European	   regions.	   Factor	   mobility	   within	   the	  
Common	   Market	   remarkably	   benefited	   Northern	   and	   Central-­‐Eastern	   European	   regions	   whose	   geographical	  
position	  is	  more	  strategic	  for	  investment	  rate	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  and	  increasing	  returns.	  Symmetrically	  
the	   size	   of	  manufacturing	   industry	   shrank	   in	  most	   of	   the	   regions	   of	   the	  peripheral	   countries	   of	   the	  European	  
Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union.	  
The	  third	  “force”	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  quality	  of	  government	  institutions.	  Western	  European	  regions	  with	  lower	  
quality	  of	  government	  institutions	  are	  actually	  the	  regions	  that	  recorded	  the	  worst	  economic	  performances	  after	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During	  the	  preparation	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  of	  1991,	  most	  of	  the	  academics	  shared	  the	  point	  of	  view	  that	  a	  
sufficient	  similarity	  between	  the	  economies	  was	  necessary	  so	   that	  all	   the	  member	  states	  could	  prosper	  within	  
the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union.	  	  
However	  what	  many	  countries	  considered	  essential	  for	  the	  access	  –	  e.g.	  fiscal	  discipline	  –	  was	  far	  from	  being	  a	  
set	  of	  sufficient	  conditions	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  EMU	  would	  have	  worked	  as	  it	  was	  supposed	  to	  (Stiglitz,	  
2017).	  As	  matter	  of	  facts,	  the	  Maastricht	  criteria	  focused	  extensively	  on	  nominal	  aspects	  of	  convergence	  such	  as	  
monetary	  stability	  (price	  and	  exchange	  rate)	  and	  sound	  public	  finances	  while	  reserving	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  
of	   the	   real	   economic	   conditions	   such	   as	   labour	   productivity,	   institutions,	   economic	   structures	   and	  
competitiveness.	  	  As	  a	  consequence,	  real	  convergence	  in	  income	  per	  capita	  has	  not	  occurred	  since	  the	  advent	  of	  
the	  common	  currency	  (Franks	  et	  al,	  2018).	  
As	  Ridao-­‐Cano	   and	  Bodewig	   (2018)	   remark	   in	   a	   joint	   report	   published	   by	   the	  World	  Bank	   and	   the	  European	  
Bank	   for	   Reconstruction	   and	   Development,	   since	   the	   early	   2000s	   the	   European	   “convergence	   machine”	   has	  
broken	  and	  an	  income	  and	  productivity	  divide	  is	  emerging	  across	  countries	  and	  regions	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  
Although	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  directly	  attribute	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  single	  currency	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  weak	  
economic	   performances	   and	   the	   slowdown	   in	   convergence	   between	   the	   countries	   that	   firstly	   have	   joined	   the	  
EMU,	   recent	   empirical	   evidences	   suggest	   that	   after	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   Single	   Currency	   the	   convergence	  
process	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  has	  bifurcated.	  The	  new	  Member	  States	  from	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  (CEE)	  
have	   been	   catching	   up	   in	   terms	   of	   income	   per	   capita	   and	   productivity.	   Within	   the	   Euro	   Area	   the	   South	   has	  
diverged	   from	   the	  North,	   also	  due	   to	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis	   (Gros,	   2018).	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   “richer”	  
Northern	  European	  members	  of	  the	  EMU	  have	  outperformed	  the	  “poorer”	  Southern	  members	  represents	  exactly	  
the	  opposite	  of	  what	  the	  standard	  economic	  theory	  predicts.	  	  
Such	  a	   “bifurcation”	   in	   the	  patterns	  of	   growth	  and	   convergence	  between	   countries	   in	   the	  European	  Union	  has	  
proceeded	  in	  parallel	  to	  a	  process	  of	  divergence	  observed	  between	  the	  core	  regions	  of	  Northern	  Europe	  and	  the	  
peripheral	   regions	  of	  Southern	  Europe.	   Indeed,	   the	  path	  of	   regional	  growth	  and	  convergence	  between	  regions	  
has	   followed	   the	   same	   path	   of	   the	   one	   observed	   between	   countries.	   As	   matter	   of	   facts,	   Alcidi	   et	   al	   (2018)	  
estimate	   regional	   absolute	   beta-­‐convergence	   in	   the	   period	   2000-­‐2015	   and	   they	   show	   that	   the	   process	   of	  
catching-­‐up	   can	   be	   referred	   to	   as	   “a	   tale	   of	   two	   speeds”.	   While	   most	   of	   the	   Eastern	   European	   regions	   have	  
reduced	  to	  different	  extents	  their	  income	  gap	  with	  the	  EU-­‐28	  average	  income	  levels,	  many	  “Western”	  European	  
regions	  within	  the	  EMU	  underperformed	  the	  EU-­‐28.	  These	  underperforming	  regions	  are	  located	  in	  Spain,	  Italy,	  
Portugal	  and	  Greece	  and	  remained	  poor	  or	  became	  even	  poorer	  relative	  to	  the	  EU-­‐28	  income	  per	  capita	  in	  2001.	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Therefore	   the	   general	   hypothesis	   of	   the	   doctoral	   research	   is	   that	   the	   group	   of	   countries	   that	   first	   joined	   the	  
single	  currency	  no	  longer	  constitutes	  a	  “convergence	  club”	  as	  it	  did	  until	  the	  mid	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  its	  purpose	  is	  
to	   empirically	   study	   the	   relevant	   determinants	   of	   the	   economic	   performances	   observed	   across	   European	  
countries	  and	  regions	  since	  creation	  of	  the	  EMU,	  whose	  current	  members	  collectively	  add	  up	  the	  73%	  of	  the	  GDP	  
of	  the	  whole	  European	  Union	  (Eurostat	  data	  in	  2019).	  	  
The	   thesis	   is	   structured	   in	   five	   chapters	   in	   which	   the	   different	   aspects	   conditioning	   economic	   growth	   and	  
convergence	   across	   countries	   and	   regions	   within	   the	   EMU	   will	   be	   analysed	   with	   different	   econometric	  
techniques	  and	  from	  different	  economic	  perspectives.	  	  
The	  results	  of	  this	  dissertation	  seem	  to	  be	  informative	  and	  capable	  to	  stimulate	  further	  empirical	  research,	  while	  
promoting	   policy	   debate	   about	   the	   future	   of	   convergence	   across	   countries	   and	   regions	   in	   the	   Economic	   and	  
Monetary	  Union.	  	  
As	   will	   appear	   clear,	   weak	   economic	   performances	   and	   the	   slowdown	   in	   convergence	   process	   are	   not	  
theoretically	  directly	  and	  simply	  imputable	  to	  adoption	  of	  the	  Single	  Currency	  “per	  se”	  but	  rather	  such	  observed	  
economic	  trends	  are	  the	  consequence	  of	  a	  mix	  of	  factors	  that	  will	  be	  widely	  explored	  in	  the	  body	  of	  this	  doctoral	  
research.	  These	  factors	  encompass	  the	  government’s	  permanent	  pursuit	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  or	  contractionary	  
fiscal	  policy	  since	  the	  signature	  of	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  to	  nowadays	  (especially	  in	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  UEM	  after	  
the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis),	   the	   tendency	   of	   manufacturing	   industrial	   activity	   to	   concentrate	  
around	  the	  core	  European	  regions	  and	  weak	  quality	  of	  government	  institutions	  in	  most	  of	  peripheral	  countries.	  
The	  dissertation	  is	  structured	  as	  follows.	  	  In	  the	  1st	  chapter	  I	  will	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  since	  the	  intensification	  
of	   the	   process	   of	   European	   economic	   and	   monetary	   integration	   and	   the	   EU	   enlargement	   towards	   East,	   the	  
process	  of	  convergence	  has	  gradually	  shifted	  from	  Southern	  Europe	  to	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.	  First,	  I	  will	  
provide	  an	  informative	  literature	  review	  about	  convergence	  and	  convergence	  clubs.	  Then	  I	  will	  conduct	  a	  long-­‐
term	  analysis	  of	  growth	  and	  convergence	  between	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  EU-­‐15,	  most	  of	  which	  have	  joined	  the	  EMU	  
during	   the	   period	   1999-­‐2001.	   	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	   will	   show	   that	   the	   Neoclassical	   Growth	   Model	   is	   capable	   to	  
explain	  long-­‐run	  economic	  performances	  observed	  in	  the	  “old”	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  since	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  process	  of	  European	  integration	  during	  the	  1950s	  up	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s.	  In	  this	  overview	  
about	   long-­‐term	  convergence,	   I	  will	   show	  that	   in	  coincidence	  with	   the	   introduction	  of	   the	  Single	  Currency	   the	  
process	   of	   “absolute”	   beta-­‐convergence,	   that	   had	   characterised	   the	   story	   of	   the	   European	   integration,	   has	  
completely	   reversed.	   Indeed	   the	  actual	  process	  of	   convergence	   in	   the	  EMU	  and	   in	   the	  EU	  after	   the	  mid	  of	   the	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1990s	   has	   been	   driven	   mainly	   by	   the	   New	   Member	   States	   (henceforth	   NMS)1.	   This	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   of	  
convergence	  in	  the	  EU	  serves	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  further	  research	  developments	  in	  the	  next	  chapters	  of	  this	  
doctoral	  thesis.	  
In	  the	  2nd	  chapter	  I	  will	  restrict	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  study	  on	  the	  period	  comprised	  between	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  
Maastricht	  Treaty	  nominal	  convergence	  criteria	  in	  1995	  and	  the	  year	  2018	  (last	  available	  data).	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  
will	  analyse	  the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  monotonic	  budget	  discipline	  entailed	  by	  the	  EMU	  membership	  in	  the	  reversal	  
of	   the	   convergence	  observed	   in	   the	  1st	   chapter.	   In	  particular	   I	  will	   address	   the	  hypothesis	   that	  EU	   fiscal	   rules	  
have	   been	   detrimental	   for	   growth	   in	   the	   “poorer	   economies”	   and	   thus	   for	   convergence	   within	   the	   group	   of	  
countries	  under	  analysis.	  The	  results	  will	  be	  estimated	  with	  a	  Fixed	  Effect	  Model	  on	  a	  longitudinal	  panel	  dataset.	  
The	  originality	  of	   this	  chapter	  relies	  on	  the	  fact	   that	   in	  the	  model	   I	   include	  an	   interaction	  term	  between	  initial	  
GDP	   per	   Capita	   and	   the	   primary	   government	   balance	   in	   each	   time	   interval	   in	   order	   to	   verify	   the	   tight	   fiscal	  
discipline	  entailed	  by	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  and	  the	  EMU	  membership	  has	  actually	  contributed	  to	  undermine	  the	  
process	  of	  convergence.	  
The	   results	   of	   this	   chapter	   have	   twofold	   relevance.	   On	   the	   one	   hand	   I	   empirically	   demonstrate	   that	   fiscal	  
consolidation	   and	   austerity	   through	   the	  period	  1995-­‐2018	  have	   exerted	  negative	   effects	   on	   economic	   growth	  
and	   convergence	  within	   the	  Economic	   and	  Monetary	  Union	  whose	   actual	  member	   states	   long	   configured	   as	   a	  
convergence	   club	   before	   the	   entry	   into	   force	   of	  Maastricht	   Treaty	   and	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Single	   Currency	   in	  
1999.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  these	  empirical	  results	  confute	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  “expansionary	  austerity”	  according	  to	  
which	  fiscal	  consolidation	  is	  expected	  to	  have	  positive	  “non-­‐keynesian”	  effects	  on	  economic	  growth	  and	  recovery	  
through	  the	  expectations	  channel.	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  the	  budget	  rules	  entailed	  by	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  
Single	  Currency	  have	  been	  detrimental	  for	  economic	  growth	  and	  convergence	  within	  the	  EU-­‐15	  explains	  also	  the	  
observed	  reversal	  in	  the	  process	  of	  convergence	  since	  1999	  described	  in	  the	  1st	  Chapter.	  
In	  the	  3rd	  chapter	  I	  will	  analyse	  the	  effect	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  on	  regional	  economic	  growth	  and	  convergence	  
within	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  EMU-­‐12	  during	  period	  2007-­‐2015.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  Multilevel	  Mixed	  Effects	  Model	  
confirm	   the	   results	   of	   the	   2nd	   chapter.	   Fiscal	   consolidation	   after	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis	  
exerted	   “keynesian”	   effects	   on	   regional	   economic	   growth	   and	   the	   drop	   in	   regional	   output	   associated	   to	   a	  
percentage	  point	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  for	  peripheral	  economies	  is	  generally	  larger	  than	  the	  one	  estimated	  for	  
the	  richer	  economies.	  Thus	  fiscal	  adjustment	  in	  the	  “Western”	  countries	  of	  the	  EMU	  during	  the	  period	  2007-­‐2015	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  By	  New	  Member	  states	  it	  is	  meant	  the	  group	  of	  countries	  that	  comprises	  the	  Slovenia,	  Slovakia,	  Hungary,	  Poland,	  Czech	  Republic,	  Estonia,	  
Latvia,	  Lithuania,	  Malta	  and	  Cyprus	  that	  accessed	  the	  EU	  in	  2004	  plus	  Bulgaria,	  Romania	  and	  Croatia	  that	  accessed	  between	  2007	  and	  2013.	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is	  a	  determinant	  of	  the	  shift	  of	  regional	  convergence	  from	  Southern	  Europe	  to	  Eastern	  Europe	  observed	  since	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  2000s.	  
Besides	   the	   strict	   fiscal	   discipline	   for	   government,	   the	   process	   of	   monetary	   and	   economic	   integration	   also	  
implied	  the	  complete	   liberalization	  of	   the	  production	   factors	  (capital	  and	   labour)	  across	  countries	  and	  regions	  
within	  a	  framework	  a	  progressive	  globalisation	  of	  the	  world	  economy.	  The	  process	  of	  monetary	  integration	  was	  
also	  accompanied	  by	  the	  progressive	  enlargement	  of	  the	  EU	  that	  entailed	  the	  accession	  in	  the	  Common	  Market	  of	  
10	  low	  income	  countries	  form	  Eastern	  Europe.	  
Therefore,	   starting	   from	   a	   Kaldorian	   theoretical	   framework	   in	   the	   4th	   chapter	   I	   will	   analyse	   the	   process	   of	  
industrial	   concentration	   that	   has	   followed	   the	   completion	   of	   the	  Common	  Market	   and	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	  
single	  currency	  and	  lead	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  core-­‐periphery	  pattern	  as	  envisaged	  by	  Krugman	  (1991a).	  	  
In	  particular	  I	  will	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  shift	  of	  convergence	  process	  form	  Southern	  countries	  of	  the	  EMU	  
to	  CEE	  countries	  is	  also	  due	  to	  the	  shift	  of	  industrial	  manufacturing	  activity	  from	  the	  former	  to	  the	  latter	  regions.	  
As	  matter	  of	   facts	   I	  will	  also	  show	  that	   regions	   that	  actually	  converged	   in	   terms	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  and	   labour	  
productivity	  during	  the	  period	  2001-­‐2015	  are	  those	  regions	  that	  recorded	  convergence	  in	  output	  per	  worker	  in	  
manufacturing	  industry.	  
Three	  spatial	  econometric	  models	  developed	  in	  this	  chapter	  will	  show	  that	  investment	  rate	  in	  manufacturing	  is	  
one	  of	  the	  driving	  forces	  of	  economic	  growth	  but,	  as	  showed	  by	  Álvarez	  López	  et	  all	  (2011),	  since	  the	  early	  2000s	  
the	   geographical	   distribution	   of	  manufacturing	   activity	   in	   Europe	   has	   been	   influenced	   by	   location	  effects	   that	  
benefited	   regions	   with	   more	   market	   potential.	   Therefore	   the	   location	   effect	   of	   the	   agglomeration	   of	   the	  
manufacturing	  activity	  can	  fully	  explain	  the	  bifurcation	  of	  economic	  growth	  both	  at	  country	  and	  regional	  level	  as	  
mentioned	  above.	  This	  chapter	  contributes	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  regional	  studies	  by	  showing	  that,	  despite	  the	  shift	  
from	  manufacturing	  industry	  to	  market	  services	  sector	  observed	  in	  all	  the	  advanced	  economies,	  manufacturing	  
industry	   is	   still	   the	   engine	   of	   income	   and	   labour	   productivity	   growth.	   The	   results	   are	   very	   relevant	   also	   for	  
policy-­‐makers	   because	   confirm,	   among	   others,	   the	   analysis	   of	   Myro	   (2019)	   that	   urges	   a	   wider	   and	   more	  
proactive	   industrial	   policy	   in	   the	   European	   countries,	   especially	   the	   Southern	   European	   ones,	   in	   order	   to	  
contribute	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  and	  more	  inclusive	  programme	  of	  economic	  growth.	  
Finally,	  in	  the	  5th	  chapter	  I	  will	  analyse	  another	  aspect	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  convergence/divergence	  paths	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	   a	  post-­‐2000	  body	  of	   literature	  on	  economic	  growth	  and	  economic	  development	  as	  elaborated,	   among	  
others,	  by	  Rodrik	  (2007	  and	  2004)	  and	  Chang	  (2010	  and	  2003).	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  provide	  an	  “institutional”	  
explanation	  of	  the	  jeopardized	  regional	  economic	  performances	  observed	  in	  the	  “Western”	  European	  Union.	  The	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results	   of	   the	   analysis	  will	   show	   that	   quality	   of	   government	   institutions	   is	   a	   remarkably	   relevant	   variable	   to	  
explain	   the	   economic	   performances	   observed	   in	   the	   regions	   located	   in	   the	   “richer”	  members	   of	   the	   EU.	   This	  
chapter	   contributes	   to	   the	   literature	   by	   analysing	   the	   relationship	   between	   economic	   growth	   and	   institutions	  
with	  an	  “ex-­‐post”	  approach	  based	  on	  a	  binary	  response	  model.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  analysis	  are	  also	  remarkably	  
relevant	   from	   the	   policy-­‐making	   point	   of	   view	   because	   show	   that	   one	   of	   the	   principal	   (and	   free	   of	   costs)	  
structural	  reforms	  for	  the	  troubled	  regions	  to	  achieve	  economic	  growth	  and	  restore	  convergence	  would	  consist	  
in	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  government	  institutions.	  
As	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   deduce,	   explaining	   rigorously	   the	   emergence	   of	   processes	   of	   convergence	   and	   divergence	  
across	  countries	  and	  regions	  of	  the	  EU	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  single	  currency	  it	   is	  neither	  a	  simple	  nor	  a	  
straightforward	   task.	   The	   processes	   of	   convergence/divergence	   cannot	   even	   be	   analysed	   and	   explained	   by	  
focusing	  on	  a	  single	  economic	  policy	  aspect	  because	  they	  are	  necessarily	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  causes.	  
Therefore	  the	  relevance	  of	  this	  doctoral	  research	  lies	  on	  its	  comprehensive	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  approach	  to	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1.1	  Introduction	  
	  
After	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  that	  evolved	  in	  a	  “Euro”	  crisis,	  many	  studies	  have	  questioned	  the	  possibility	  to	  
observe	  convergence	  between	  the	  member	  states	  of	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	  (EMU).	  	  
As	  Gros	  (2018:1)	  remarks,	  while	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  that	  euro	  area	  membership	  has	  had	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  
convergence	  between	  the	  “old”	  members,	  each	  of	  the	  11	  new	  member	  states	  form	  Eastern	  Europe,	  which	  joined	  
the	   euro	   after	   2004,	   have	   been	   converging	   at	   a	   slightly	   faster	   rate	   than	   one	  would	   have	   expected	   given	   their	  
starting	  level	  of	  income	  per	  capita.	  	  
As	  already	  mentioned	  in	  the	  general	  introduction	  to	  this	  doctoral	  thesis,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  
that	  after	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  and	  the	  progressive	  stages	  of	  Enlargement	  towards	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  
economic	  convergence	  shifted	  from	  Southern	  European	  countries	  of	  the	  EMU	  to	  the	  New	  Member	  States.	  
In	  particular	  I	  will	  put	  in	  evidence	  the	  relationship	  between	  turning	  points	  of	  the	  European	  economic	  monetary	  
integration	  and	  the	  evolution	  convergence	  within	  the	  club	  of	  countries	  under	  analysis.	  
The	  theoretical	  framework	  to	  analyse	  convergence	  and	  economic	  growth	  here	  is	  the	  Neoclassical	  growth	  model	  
as	  introduced	  by	  Solow	  (1956)	  and	  further	  developed	  in	  the	  literature	  (Mankiw	  et	  al,	  1992;	  and	  Barro	  and	  Sala-­‐i-­‐
Martin,	  1992;	  Sala-­‐i-­‐Martin,	  1996).	  	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  will	  show	  that	  convergence	  within	  the	  group	  of	  the	  
“old”	   member	   states	   gradually	   faded	   away	   with	   intensification	   of	   the	   process	   of	   European	   integration	   until	  
disappearing	   in	   coincidence	  of	   the	   introduction	  of	   the	  Single	  Currency	  and	   the	  progressive	   inglobation	  of	  CEE	  
economies	  into	  the	  European	  Union.	  
	  
1.2	  Neoclassical	  Growth	  model	  and	  Convergence	  Clubs.	  A	  Review	  of	  the	  Literature	  
The	  argument	  of	   the	  neoclassical	  model	   that	  predicts	   that	   initial	  poor	   countries	  will	   grow	   faster	   than	   initially	  
rich	  ones	   relies	  heavily	  on	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	  only	  difference	   across	   countries	   lies	   in	   their	   initial	   capital	  
endowment	  per	  worker	  (Sala-­‐i-­‐Martin,	  1992:1026).	  	  
This	   argument	   together	  with	   the	   assumption	  of	   diminishing	   return	   to	   physical	   capital	   forms	   the	  basis	   for	   the	  
hypothesis	   “global	   convergence”	   in	   income	   per	   capita	   or	   output	   per	   worker	   when	   countries	   have	   access	   to	  
identical	  technologies	  (Rodrik,	  2013).	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  the	  long	  run	  countries	  are	  expected	  to	  convergence	  to	  a	  
common	  steady	  state	  income	  or	  output	  per	  worker.	  
However,	  such	  strong	  conclusion	  derived	  from	  the	  theoretical	  model	  finds	  no	  empirical	  confirmation	  in	  the	  real	  
world.	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As	  matter	  of	  facts	  Baumol	  (1986)	  argued	  that	  convergence	  is	  not	  “ubiquitous”	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  can	  be	  found	  
only	  within	  given	  groups	  of	  countries.	  By	  analysing	  the	  evolution	  of	  growth	  in	  output	  per	  worker	  on	  Maddison’s	  
data	  he	  found	  substantial	  output	  per	  worker	  convergence	  between	  the	  industrialized	  economies	  between	  1870	  
and	  1970.	  Furthermore	  by	   restricting	   the	  period	  of	  analysis	   from	  1950	   to	  1980,	  he	  documented	   that	  within	  a	  
large	  sample	  of	  countries	  convergence	  had	  been	  taking	  place	  only	  between	  the	  richer	  economies.	  In	  a	  comment	  
about	   the	   Baumol’s	   paper,	   DeLong	   (1988)	   argued	   somehow	   pessimistic	   that	   convergence	   between	   countries	  
could	  be	  observed	  only	  within	  samples	  constructed	  on	  a	  selection	  bias	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  convergence	  regression	  
is	  run	  “ex	  post”	  for	  groups	  of	  counties	  that	  have	  actually	  converged.	  
At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990s	  Chatterji	  (1992)	   found	  out	  that,	  with	  the	  exclusion	  of	   few	  successful	  cases,	  after	  
two	   decades	   from	   decolonization	   most	   of	   the	   economic	   disparities	   between	   rich	   and	   poor	   countries	   had	  
remained	  unchanged.	   	  Also	  Sachs	  and	  Warner	   (1995)	   find	  no	   tendency	   to	   convergence	   in	   the	  world	  economy	  
from	  1970	  to	  1989.	  The	  absence	  of	  “global”	  absolute	  beta	  convergence	  is	  also	  verified	  by	  Durlauf	  et	  al	  (2005)	  in	  a	  
large	  cross-­‐section	  sample	  of	  OECD,	  Asian,	  Latin	  American	  and	  African	  economies	  during	  the	  period	  1960-­‐2000.	  
Convergence	  is	  also	  absent	  within	  the	  subsamples	  of	  developing	  economies.	  As	  matter	  of	  facts	  the	  authors	  within	  
the	  sample	  also	  find	  out	  a	  tight	  positive	  correlation	  between	  initial	  income	  per	  capita	  (GDP	  per	  Worker	  in	  1960)	  
levels	   and	   income	   per	   capita	   levels	   (GDP	   per	  worker)	   in	   2000.	   This	   essentially	  means	   that	  most	   of	   the	   poor	  
countries	  had	  not	  reduced	  the	  income	  gaps	  with	  the	  richer	  ones	  during	  the	  period	  under	  analysis.	  	  
Given	  the	  lack	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  global	  convergence,	  Durlauf	  and	  Johnson	  (1992)	  argue	  that	  cross-­‐country	  
growth	   is	   better	   explained	  with	   a	  model	   of	   local	   versus	   global	   convergence.	   Countries	   converge	   locally	   in	   the	  
sense	   that	   “Western”	  economies	  with	  similar	   initial	   conditions	   tend	   to	  converge	   to	  one	  another	  while	   there	   is	  
little	  evidence	  of	  convergence	  between	  economies	  with	  substantially	  different	  initial	  condition.	  	  
Therefore,	   while	   convergence	   within	   the	   group	   of	   OECD	   economies	   may	   be	   considered	   a	   realistic	   economic	  
perspective,	   convergence	   of	   African	   or	   South	   American	   economies	   towards	   the	   OECD	   income	   levels	   may	   be	  
considered	   unrealistic	   (Temple,	   1999).	   Also	   Ben-­‐David	   (1998	   and	   1997)	   finds	   out	   that	   convergence	   is	  
observable	  only	  within	  the	  group	  of	  the	  richer	  economies	  that	  are	  member	  of	  the	  OECD.	  
For	  example	  Dowrik	  and	  Nguyen	  (1989)	  find	  evidence	  of	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  systematic	  process	  of	  convergence	  
within	  the	  group	  of	  the	  OECD	  economies	  during	  the	  period	  1950-­‐1985.	  	  Convergence	  is	  also	  observable	  during	  
the	  1970s	  despite	  the	  occurrence	  of	   the	  two	  oil	  shocks	  with	  their	  destabilizing	  macroeconomic	  effects.	  Similar	  
empirical	   evidences	   are	   found	   out	   by	   Mankiw	   et	   al	   (1992),	   which	   verify	   a	   significant	   tendency	   towards	  
convergence	  is	  the	  sample	  of	  OECD	  economies	  over	  the	  period	  1960-­‐1985.	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Also	   Larre	   and	   Torres	   (1991)	   confirm	   the	   evidence	   of	   convergence	   between	   the	  OECD	   economies	   during	   the	  
period	   1960-­‐1990	   and	   conclude	   that	   the	   accession	   in	   the	   European	   Community	   spurred	   economic	   growth	   in	  
Spain	  and	  Portugal	  that	  remarkably	  reduced	  the	  income	  gap	  with	  the	  richer	  countries	  during	  the	  1980s.	  
However,	   since	   the	   1980s	   the	   convergence	   process	  within	   the	   OECD	   has	   slowed	   down	  with	   a	   few	   countries,	  
including	   the	   US,	   experiencing	   acceleration	   in	   GDP	   per	   Capita	   growth	   and	   other	   countries	   lagging	   behind	  
(Bassanini	  and	  Scarpetta,	  2001).	  	  
Given	  this	  evident	  slowdown,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  assert	  that	  long-­‐run	  convergence	  observed	  within	  the	  group	  of	  the	  
OECD	  is	  mainly	  the	  product	  of	  fast	  convergence	  rates	  observed	  during	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s.	  
In	   order	   to	   address	   this	   empirical	   evidence	   of	   the	   slowdown	   in	   convergence	   process,	   Godea	   Rivas	   and	   Sanz	  
Villaroya	   (2017)	  estimate	  a	  quantile	   regression	  model	  on	   the	  sample	  of	   the	  OECD	  economies	  and	   find	  out	   the	  
evidence	   that	   the	  parameter	  representing	   the	  convergence	  hypothesis,	  despite	  being	  negative	   in	  every	  case,	   is	  
higher	  in	  value	  and	  more	  significant	  as	  they	  advance	  to	  higher	  quantiles.	  
Restricting	  the	  convergence	  analysis	  to	  the	  “club”	  of	  original	  members	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  since	  the	  mid	  of	  
the	  1950s,	  it	   is	  possible	  to	  observe	  a	  gradual	  slowdown	  in	  the	  convergence	  process	  started	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  
the	  1990s	  and	  culminated	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  process	  of	  divergence	  at	  the	  end	  of	  that	  decade.	  	  
Borsi	  and	  Metiu	  (2015)	  analyse	  convergence	  during	  the	  period	  1970-­‐2010	  and	  their	  findings	  can	  be	  summarized	  
as	  follows.	  First	  of	  all,	  there	  is	  no	  overall	  real	  per	  capita	  income	  convergence	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  this	  result	  is	  robust	  to	  
any	   time	  horizon	   considered.	  Rather	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   individuate	   subgroups	   that	   converge	   to	  different	   steady-­‐
state	  equilibria.	  The	  authors	  also	  provide	  strong	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  relative	  convergence	  but	  little	  evidence	  
of	  absolute	  convergence	  within	  each	  cluster,	  pointing	  to	  the	  transitional	  nature	  of	  the	  period	  under	  analysis.	  
Shortening	  the	  period	  of	  analysis	  and	  focusing	  on	  the	  EMU,	  Croci	  Angelini	  and	  Farina	  (2016)	  test	  “absolute”	  beta	  
convergence	  on	  a	  cross	   section	  of	  12	  countries	   in	   the	  period	  1993-­‐2012	  and	   find	  out	   that	   the	  adoption	  of	   the	  
Single	  Currency	  has	  not	  promoted	  convergence	  within	  the	  Euro	  Area.	  
Similar	   evidences	   of	   the	   absence	   of	   convergence	   between	   the	   original	   member	   states	   of	   the	   Economic	   and	  
Monetary	   Union	   since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1990s	   are	   also	   outlined	   by	  Marelli	   et	   al	   (2019),	   Alcidi	   et	   al	   (2018)	   and	  
Marelli	  and	  Signorelli	  (2016).	  
	  
	  
1.3	  Testing	  the	  Human	  Capital	  Augmented	  Solow	  Model	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  
	  
Taking	  the	  rates	  of	  saving	  and	  population	  growth	  as	  exogenous,	  the	  Solow	  model	  shows	  that	  the	  two	  variables	  
determine	   a	   country’s	   steady-­‐state	   level	   of	   income	   per	   capita.	   As	   saving	   and	   population	   growth	   vary	   across	  
	   14	  
countries,	   different	   countries	   approach	   different	   steady	   states.	   The	   Model	   provides	   testable	   predictions.	   The	  
higher	  the	  saving	  rate,	  the	  richer	  a	  country	  is.	  The	  higher	  the	  rate	  of	  population	  growth,	  the	  poorer	  the	  country	  is	  
in	  terms	  of	  per	  capita	  GDP	  (Mankiw	  et	  al,	  1992:407,	  henceforth	  MRW).	  
MRW	  extend	  the	  Solow	  Model	  to	  include	  human	  capital	  stock	  in	  the	  Cobb-­‐Douglas	  production	  function	  and	  in	  its	  
empirical	  estimation:	  
Y (t) = K (t)α  H (t)β (A (t) L (t))1- α- β    
(1.1) 
 
Where	   Y	   is	   output,	   K	   is	   capital,	   L	   is	   labour	   and	   A	   the	   level	   of	   technology	   as	   in	   conventional	   Cobb-­‐Douglas	  
production	  function.	  H	  is	  the	  stock	  of	  human	  capital	  (for	  the	  sake	  of	  brevity	  we	  directly	  consider	  these	  variables	  
in	  per	  capita	  or	  per	  worker	  terms	  without	  showing	  the	  intermediate	  algebraic	  steps).	  	  
In	  MRW’s	  version	  of	  the	  Solow	  Model,	  output	  per	  worker	  depends	  on	  the	  stock	  of	  physical	  capital,	  labour	  and	  the	  
stock	   of	   human	   capital.	   In	   such	   a	   production	   function	   human	   capital	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   the	   level	   of	  
professional	   knowledge	   and	   technical	   competences	   that	   can	   be	   acquired	   by	   the	   labour	   force	   through	   formal	  
higher	  education	  and	  professional	  training.	  Given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  model	  allows	  for	  decreasing	  returns	  to	  capital,	  
the	  condition	  α+β<1	  is	  assumed.	  
MWR	   essentially	   estimate	   the	   following	   log-­‐linearized	   equation	   derived	   from	   the	   Solow	   Model	   based	   on	  




= ln𝐴   0 + 𝑔𝑡 −   !!!
!!!!!
ln 𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + !
!!!!!
ln 𝑠 + !
!!!!!
  ln  (ℎ)+ ε 
(1.2) 
	  
Where	  n	   denotes	  population	  growth,	  𝛿  denotes	   the	  depreciation	  of	   capital	   and	  𝑔	  denotes	   advancements	   in	   the	  
level	   of	   knowledge.	   S	   and	   h	   denote	   saving	   to	   GDP	   and	   stock	   of	   human	   capital	   respectively.	   MRW	   assume	  
polynomial	  𝑔 + 𝛿	  to	  be	   the	   same	  across	   countries	   and	  equal	   to	  0.05	  and	  use	   the	  OLS	  estimator	   relying	  on	   the	  
assumption	  that	  ε	  is	  uncorrelated	  with	  s	  and	  n.	  	  	  
Here	   I	   estimate	   the	  model	   for	   the	   samples	  of	   the	  EU-­‐15	  and	  EU-­‐28	   (excluding	   Ireland	  and	  Luxembourg)	  with	  
cross	  sectional	  annual	  averages	  from	  1970	  to	  2018	  and	  from	  1995	  to	  2018	  respectively23.	  
I	  assume	  natural	  logarithm	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  (and	  not	  the	  GDP	  per	  working	  age	  population	  as	  in	  MRW)	  in	  2018	  
as	  the	  steady	  state	  or	  equilibrium	  income	  per	  capita.	  Given	  the	  fact	  that	  Eastern	  European	  countries	  started	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Luxemburg	   and	   Ireland	   are	   not	   included	   because	   their	   GDP	   levels	   in	   2018	   configures	   as	   outliers	   that	   can	   distort	   the	   output	   of	   OLS	  
estimation	  
3	  In	  Appendix	  1.1	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  description	  of	  the	  data	  utilized	  in	  this	  chapter	  and	  the	  source	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transition	   to	   market	   economy	   only	   during	   the	   1990s,	   remarkable	   differences	   in	   income	   per	   capita	   between	  
Eastern	  and	  Western	  countries	  still	  persist	  despite	  the	  impressive	  rates	  of	  growth	  recorded	  by	  those	  economies.	  
Therefore	  in	  model	  (b)	  I	  also	  add	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  the	  EU-­‐15	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  control	  for	  this	  West-­‐East	  
divide	  that	  characterized	  the	  enlarged	  EU4,5.	  
The	  results	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  1.1.	  
 
Table	  1.1	   	   	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  Log	  of	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  in	  2018	  




Sample:	  EU-­‐28	  1995-­‐2018(exc.	  
Luxembourg)	  
(b)	  












EU-­‐15	   -­‐	   .96***	  
[.11[	  






.84	   .90	  
	   	   	  
***	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  
Standard	  Errors	  in	  Parentheses	  [	  ]	  
	   	  
	  
As	   it	   possible	   to	   note	   the	   coefficient	   estimates	   for	   saving	   and	   human	   capital	   are	   very	   similar	   in	   both	   the	  
estimations.	   In	   the	   shorter-­‐run	   analysis	   with	   the	   New	  Member	   states	   included	   in	   the	   sample,	   the	   coefficient	  
estimate	  for	  the	  dummy	  variable	  EU-­‐15	  works	  as	  a	  watershed	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  countries	  and	  shows	  
that	  the	  average	  income	  per	  capita	  in	  the	  EU-­‐15	  is	  96%	  higher	  than	  the	  average	  income	  per	  capita	  in	  the	  NMS.	  
Both	  the	  estimations	  confirm	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  Human	  Capital-­‐Augmented	  Solow	  Model.	  Indeed,	  in	  both	  the	  
groups	  of	  countries	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  either	  in	  the	  long-­‐run	  or	  in	  the	  shorter-­‐run,	  saving	  and	  human	  capital	  
explain	  the	  more	  than	  the	  80%	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  income	  per	  capita	  across	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  samples6.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  EU-­‐15	   is	   the	   notation	  utilised	  by	   the	  OECD	   to	   denote	   group	  of	   countries	   in	   the	  European	  Union	  prior	   to	   the	   accession	   of	   ten	   candidate	  
countries	  on	  1	  May	  2004	  and	  the	  further	  enlargements.	  The	  group	  comprises	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Denmark,	  Finland,	  France,	  Germany,	  Greece,	  
Ireland,	  Italy,	  Luxembourg,	  Netherlands,	  Portugal,	  Spain,	  Sweden	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  
5	  When	  I	  refer	  to	  the	  group	  of	  EU-­‐15	  Luxembourg	  is	  always	  excluded	  by	  the	  sample	  because	  its	  income	  per	  capita	  represents	  a	  statistical	  
outlier	  given	  also	  the	  rates	  of	  growth	  generally	  higher	  than	  the	  EU	  average	  recorded	  by	  the	  country	  
6	  Contrary	   to	  MRW	   in	   the	   regression	   I	  use	   saving	   rate	   and	  not	   investment	   rate,	   because	   in	  open	  economies	  high	   investment	   rates	   can	  be	  
temporarily	   financed	  by	   the	   accumulation	   of	   foreign	   liabilities	   that	   can	   engine	   severe	   and	  destabilizing	   economic	   crises	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
Greece	  whose	  GDP	  drop	  cumulative	  by	  25%	  after	  the	  Global	  Financial	  crisis.	  As	  matter	  of	   facts,	  during	  the	  most	  of	  the	  period	  analysed	  by	  
MRW	   (1960-­‐1985)	   capital	   movements	   across	   the	   countries	   were	   not	   completely	   liberalized	   neither	   in	   the	   OECD	   nor	   in	   the	   European	  
Community.	  	  Furthermore,	  according	  to	  the	  empirical	  findings	  of	  Fendstein	  and	  Bacchetta	  (1991)	  and	  Feldstein	  and	  Horioka	  (1980),	  despite	  
the	  progressive	  liberalization	  of	  international	  capital	  mobility,	  an	  increase	  in	  domestic	  saving	  is	  primary	  reflected	  in	  an	  increase	  in	  domestic	  
investment	   in	   physical	   capital.	   Such	   a	   usually	   observable	   correlation	   is	   commonly	   known	   in	   macroeconomics	   as	   the	   “Feldstein-­‐Horioka	  
Puzzle”.	   As	   also	   Deaton	   (1999:33)	   remarks,	   despite	   in	   an	   international	   economy	   investment	   in	   one	   country	   can	   be	   financed	   by	   saving	  
elsewhere	  in	  the	  world,	  as	  matter	  of	  facts	  there	  is	  very	  high	  correlation	  between	  domestic	  saving	  and	  domestic	  investment.	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Here	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  observe	  that	  elasticity	  of	  steady	  state	  GDP	  to	  human	  capital	  is	  higher	  than	  its	  elasticity	  with	  
respect	  to	  saving	  rates	  (that	  in	  a	  Solow	  Model	  closed	  economy	  determines	  the	  accumulation	  of	  physical	  capital).	  	  
Also	  MRW	  empirically	  observe	  that	  the	  steady	  state	  output	  is	  more	  elastic	  to	  human	  capital	  stock	  than	  physical	  
capital	  in	  two	  of	  the	  three	  samples	  they	  analyse.	  	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  coefficient	  estimate	  for	  polynomial	  (n	  +g+	  δ)	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant	  despite	  taking	  on	  
the	   sign	   predicted	   by	   the	   Solow	   Model	   and	   empirically	   confirmed	   in	   MRW.	   	   This	   strong	   positive	   linear	  






1.4	   The	   Evolution	   of	   Absolute	   beta	   convergence	   since	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   process	   of	   European	  
Integration	  
Starting	  from	  the	  assumption	  of	  decreasing	  returns	  to	  physical	  capital	  within	  closed	  economies,	  the	  Solow	  Model	  
predicts	   convergence	   conditional	   on	   a	   set	   of	   exogenous	   factors	   that	   hold	   constant	   the	   steady	   state,	   such	   as	  
human	  capital,	  saving	  rates	  and	  population	  growth	  (Barro	  and	  Sala-­‐i-­‐Martin,	  1992).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  In	  figure	  1.2,	  the	  notation	  EU-­‐17	  denotes	  the	  group	  of	  EU-­‐15	  countries	  plus	  Cyprus	  and	  Malta	  that	  joined	  the	  EU	  in	  2004	  but	  had	  a	  much	  
higher	  income	  per	  capita	  than	  most	  of	  the	  CEE	  countries	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Besides	  adding	  control	  variables	  in	  the	  right-­‐hand	  side	  of	  the	  regression	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  log	  of	  initial	  income	  
per	  capita	  (or	  output	  per	  worker),	  another	  way	  to	  hold	  constant	  the	  steady	  state	  is	  to	  restrict	  the	  convergence	  
study	   to	   sets	   of	   economies	   for	  which	   the	   assumption	   of	   similar	   steady	   states	   is	   not	   unrealistic	   (Sala-­‐i-­‐Martin,	  
1996).	  In	  other	  words	  this	  means	  to	  test	  convergence	  after	  an	  “ex	  post”	  selection	  of	  economies	  that	  have	  actually	  
partially	  converged	  and	  configure	  as	  a	  convergence	  club	  as	  in	  Baumol	  (1986).	  In	  this	  framework,	  the	  farther	  an	  
economy	  is	  from	  the	  common	  steady	  state,	  the	  faster	  is	  the	  rate	  of	  growth.	  
Therefore,	  absolute	  beta	  convergence	  occurs	  when,	  within	  a	  group	  of	  countries,	  poorer	  economies	  grow	  faster	  
than	   the	   richer	   ones,	   thus	   experiencing	   a	   process	   of	   catching	   up	   in	   terms	   of	   income	  per	   capita	   or	   output	   per	  
worker	  (del	  Hoyo	  et	  al,	  2017).	  	  
From	  the	  econometric	  point	  of	  view,	  absolute	  beta	  convergence	  is	  detected	  when	  economic	  growth	  is	  regressed	  
on	   the	   initial	   GDP	   per	   capita	  without	   controlling	   for	   any	   other	   variable	   and	   the	   coefficient	   estimate	   “beta”	   is	  
negative	  and	  statistically	  significant.	  
The	  equation	  is	  usually	  specified	  as	  follows:	  
	  
yi	  =	  α+β	  ln(X0)	  +	  ε	  
(1.3)	  
	  
Where	   y	   denotes	   the	   average	   rate	   of	   economic	   growth	   observed	   in	   each	   country	   i	   during	   the	   period	   under	  
analysis,	  X	  always	  denotes	  the	  GDP	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  period	  and	  α	  and	  ε	  denote	  respectively	  the	  intercept	  and	  
the	  random	  disturbance.	  
Assuming	  that	  the	  EU-­‐15	  countries	  configure	  as	  a	  convergence	  club	  or	  as	  a	  set	  of	  economies	  with	  similar	  steady	  
states,	  I	  apply	  the	  model	  to	  the	  sample	  of	  EU-­‐15	  countries	  over	  different	  time	  intervals	  since	  1951,	  the	  year	  in	  
which	   the	   six	   Founding	   Members	   joined	   the	   ECSC8.	   As	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   note	   that	   average	   convergence	   rate	  
between	  the	  European	  economies	  has	  gradually	  decreased,	  especially	  in	  coincidence	  of	  the	  turning	  points	  of	  the	  
European	  economic	  and	  monetary	  integration	  occurred	  since	  the	  early	  1990s.	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The	  European	  Community	  of	  Steel	  and	  Carbon	  (ECSC)	  was	  established	  in	  1951	  with	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Paris	  signed	  by	  governments	  of	  Belgium,	  
the	  Netherlands,	  Luxembourg,	  Germany,	  France	  and	  Italy	  
9	  In	  Appendix	  2	  I	  will	  provide	  the	  mathematical	  explanation	  of	  how	  Implied	  λ	  and	  the	  years	  needed	  to	  close	  half	  of	  the	  income	  gap	  (HD)	  are	  
calculated	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Table	  1.2	  
Sample	  size:14	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  Growth	  
	   Natural	  
Logarithm	  of	  





Intercept	   R-­‐Squared	   Implied	  λ	   HD	   HD	  excluding	  




































































***Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  
	  





As	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  note	  both	  in	  the	  regression	  output	  in	  Table	  1.2	  and	  in	  the	  Figure	  1.3,	  the	  convergence	  fitted	  
line	  has	  gradually	   flattened	  since	  the	  signature	  of	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  and	  the	  convergence	  rate	  detected	  during	  
the	  period	  1951-­‐1992	  is	  almost	  the	  double	  of	  the	  convergence	  rate	  estimated	  during	  the	  period	  1951-­‐2018..	  
Indeed,	  convergence	  rate	  observed	  before	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  implied	  a	  quarter	  of	  century	  for	  a	  poor	  economy	  
to	  close	  half	  of	  the	  income	  gap	  with	  the	  richer	  economies,	  while	  the	  convergence	  speed	  observed	  until	  2018,	  thus	  
comprising	  the	  period	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  euro,	  implies	  that	  it	  would	  take	  roughly	  half	  a	  century	  for	  a	  poor	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economy	   to	   close	   half	   of	   the	   income	   gap	   with	   the	   common	   steady	   state	   income	   per	   capita	   of	   the	   richer	  
economies.	  
Furthermore,	   when	   working	   on	   cross	   sectional	   data,	   OLS	   estimator	   cannot	   capture	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   variables	   over	   time	   and	   it	   is	   therefore	   obvious	   that	   the	   detection	   of	   absolute	   beta	  
convergence	  over	  the	  period1951-­‐2018	  is	  essentially	  determined	  by	  the	  high	  rates	  of	  growth	  experienced	  by	  the	  
poorer	  economies	  from	  the	  1950s	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s.	  
	  
	  
1.5	  Has	  convergence	  definitely	  reversed	  in	  the	  EU-­‐15	  since	  1999?	  
	  
Given	   the	   limitation	   implied	   by	   the	  OLS	   estimator	   on	   long-­‐run	   cross	   sectional	   data,	   in	   this	   section	   I	  will	   first	  
analyse	  absolute	  beta	  convergence	  in	  the	  EU-­‐15	  across	  seven	  sub-­‐periods	  of	  10	  years	  each	  form	  1950	  to	  2018.	  
Then	   I	   will	   estimate	   on	   a	   longitudinal	   panel	   dataset	   whether	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   Single	   Currency	   has	  
coincided	  with	  a	  reversal	  of	  the	  convergence	  process	  within	  the	  EU-­‐15	  group.	  	  
Results	  reported	  in	  Table	  1.3	  show	  that	  after	  three	  decades	  of	  sustained	  convergence,	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s	  
convergence	  gradually	  disappeared.	  	  
Table	  1.3	   Sample	  size:	  14	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***Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  **	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  5%	  *	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  10%	  
Standard	  Error	  in	  Parentheses	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Indeed,	  during	  the	  period	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  nominal	  convergence	  criteria	  (1989-­‐1998)	  a	  
fast	   and	   statistically	   significant	   rate	  of	   convergence	   is	  detected	  only	  because	  of	   the	  presence	  of	   Ireland	   in	   the	  
sample	   of	   countries.	   Indeed,	   if	   Ireland	   is	   excluded	   from	   the	   sample,	   the	   coefficient	   of	   convergence	   reduces	  
remarkably	  both	  its	  “speed”	  and	  its	  statistical	  significance.	  Also	  during	  the	  period	  that	  goes	  from	  the	  adoption	  of	  
the	   Single	   currency	   in	   1999	   to	   the	   spread	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   in	   2008,	   no	   convergence	   is	   detected	  
between	   the	   countries	   of	   the	  EU-­‐15.	  Convergence	   is	  detected	  within	   a	   confidence	   interval	   of	   5%	  only	   if	   three	  
countries	  of	   the	  EMU	  (Ireland,	  Portugal	  and	   the	  Netherlands)	  and	  one	  country	  outside	   the	  EMU	  (Sweden)	  are	  
excluded	  from	  the	  sample	  (Fig.	  1.5).	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In	   addition	   to	   the	   slowdown	   or	   disappearance	   of	   absolute	   beta	   convergence	   within	   the	   whole	   EU-­‐15	   group	  
during	  the	  decade	  2009-­‐2018	  beta	  “convergence”	  coefficient	  takes	  on	  even	  a	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  
value,	  meaning	  that	  there	  was	  a	  statistically	  significant	  tendency	  of	  richer	  economies	  to	  outperform	  the	  poorer	  
ones.	   Positive	   and	   statistically	   significant	   beta	   coefficient	   is	   also	   detected	  when	   Ireland	   is	   excluded	   from	   the	  
sample,	  meaning	  that	  cross	  sectional	  divergence	  was	  not	  driven	  only	  by	  the	  uncommon	  rates	  of	  growth	  observed	  
in	  a	  rich	  country	  like	  Ireland	  but	  was	  a	  generalized	  process	  of	  asymmetric	  growth	  that	  has	  emerged	  between	  the	  
countries	  of	  the	  EU-­‐15.	  	  Therefore	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  assert	  that,	  while	  the	  EU-­‐15	  configured	  as	  a	  convergence	  clubs	  
in	   the	   Baumol’s	   sense	   from	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1950s	   to	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1980s,	   after	   the	   Maastricht	   Treaty	   and	  
adoption	  of	  the	  single	  currency	  a	  process	  of	  gradual	  divergence	  has	  started.	  
In	   order	   to	   further	   study	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   Single	   Currency	   has	   coincided	  with	   the	  
emergence	  of	  a	  period	  of	  divergence	  within	  the	  EU-­‐15,	  I	  specify	  the	  following	  longitudinal	  panel	  data	  model	  on	  
10-­‐year	  non-­‐overlapping	  averages:	  
	  
	  




(t-­‐T=1950,	  1959,…,	  2009)	  
	  
Where	   y	   denotes	   average	   per	   capita	  GDP	   growth	  during	   the	   time	   interval	   t=10.	  With	   this	   sampling	   strategy	   I	  
obtain	  seven	  observations	  per	  sampling	  unit	  during	  the	  period	  1950-­‐201810.	  
Symbol	  α	  denotes	  the	  intercept	  of	  the	  regression.	  X	  denotes	  the	  GDP	  per	  capita	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  10-­‐year	  
time	   interval.	  EMU	   is	   a	  dummy	  variable	   that	   takes	  on	  value	  1	   in	   the	   last	   two	  decades	   that	   coincided	  with	   the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  single	  currency	  (1999-­‐2008,	  2009-­‐2018)	  and	  takes	  on	  value	  0	  in	  the	  previous	  decades	  from	  
1950	  to	  1999	  or	  if	  a	  country	  in	  the	  sample	  has	  not	  joined	  the	  EMU	  after	  1999.	  	  	  CRISIS	  denotes	  a	  dummy	  variable	  
that	   takes	   on	   value	   1	   during	   the	   time	   interval	   (2009-­‐2018)	   and	   0	   in	   the	   previous	   time	   intervals.	   Symbol	   μ	  
denotes	  the	  error	  term	  of	  the	  regression.	  The	  interaction	  term	  (X	  i,t-­‐T)*	  (EMUit	  )	  is	  supposed	  to	  confirm	  if	  since	  the	  
introduction	   of	   the	   single	   currency	   the	   process	   of	   convergence	   has	   been	   undermined	   or	   reversed	   as	   already	  
estimated	  on	  cross	  sectional	  data	  over	  different	  decades.	  	  
Indeed	   if	   β2	   coefficient	   estimate	   is	   negative	   and	   β3	   coefficient	   estimate	   is	   positive	   it	   means	   that	   since	   the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  single	  currency	  the	  poorer	  economies,	  that	  were	  supposed	  to	  catch	  up,	  actually	  lagged	  behind	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  In	  the	  first	  10-­‐year	  interval	  I	  calculate	  average	  growth	  in	  the	  period	  1950-­‐1958	  (9	  years)	  and	  I	  use	  the	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  in	  1950	  given	  the	  
unavailability	  of	  data	  for	  the	  year	  1948-­‐49.	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the	  richer	  ones.	  The	  Hasuman	  test	  suggests	  that	  random	  effect	  estimator	  is	  more	  appropriate	  than	  fixed	  effects	  
estimator	  to	  infer	  the	  data	  in	  the	  sample.	  Table	  1.4	  reports	  the	  output	  to	  the	  model.	  
	  
Table	  1.4	  
Sample	  size:14	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  R-­‐sq:	  
Within	  	  =	  0.57	  
Between	  =	  0.67	  
Overall	  =	  0.58	  
	  
Log	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  at	  t-­‐T	   -­‐1.69***	  
[.20]	  
EMU	   -­‐35.66***	  
[.16]	  
EMU*	  Log	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  at	  t-­‐T	   	  	  	  3.33***	  
[1.23]	  
CRISIS	   -­‐1.22***	  	  	  	  
[.36]	  
*Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  
Standard	  Errors	  in	  Parentheses	  [	  ]	  
Hausman	  test	  
Chi2=	  0.49	  
Prob>	  Chi2=	  0.83	  
	  
	  
As	  the	  regression	  output	  shows,	  beta	  convergence	  conditional	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Single	  Currency	  at	  a	  rate	  of	  
1.69%	  a	  year	  is	  observed	  overall	  within	  the	  sample	  since	  1950.	  Thus	  around	  values	  similar	  to	  the	  absolute	  beta	  
convergence	  (-­‐1.5%)	  estimated	  on	  cross	  sectional	  data	  before	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Single	  currency	  as	  reported	  in	  
Table	  1.2.	   	  However	   if	   the	   focus	   is	   restricted	   to	   the	  variable	   “EMU”	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  observe	  striking	  empirical	  
evidence.	  If	  dummy	  variable	  EMU	  takes	  on	  value	  1,	  GDP	  growth	  decreases	  by	  35.6%	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  
and	   the	   coefficient	   of	   convergence	   is	   reversed	   from	   -­‐1.60%	   to	   +1,64%	   (=β1	  +	   β3	  =-­‐1.69+3.33).	   	   A	   positive	   and	  
statistically	  significant	  “beta	  convergence”	  coefficient	  for	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  means	  that	  after	  the	  adoption	  of	  
the	  singe	  currency	  richer	  countries	  have	  grown	  faster	  on	  average	  than	  the	  poorer	  ones	  or	  can	  alternatively	  mean	  
that,	  since	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Single	  Currency,	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  “poorer”	  countries	  has	  been	  undermined.	  
The	   reversal	   from	   convergence	   to	   divergence	   can	   be	   also	   shown	   graphically	   by	   plotting	   the	   relation	   with	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1.6	  Convergence	  in	  the	  Enlarged	  EU	  
Since	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Single	  Currency,	  convergence	  between	  the	  original	  member	  states	  has	  not	  occurred.	  
Rather	  convergence	  has	  been	  observed	  between	  the	  “old”	  member	  states	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  NMS	  that	  accessed	  
the	  EU	  after	  200411.	  As	  Cabral	  and	  Castellano-­‐Sosa	  (2018)	  point	  out,	  while	  the	  financial	  crisis	  was	  undoubtedly	  
harmful	   to	   growth	   in	   Europe,	   it	   reduced	   the	   gap	   in	   income	   per	   capita	   between	   the	   EU’s	   members.	   This	   is	  
explained	  mainly	  by	  the	  economic	  performances	  of	  richer	  members	  in	  the	  EMU	  like	  Italy	  who	  were	  not	  just	  the	  
most	  affected	  but	  also	  the	  ones	  that	  recovered	  less	  rapidly.	  	  
In	  this	  framework,	  during	  the	  period	  1995-­‐2018	  NMS	  drove	  the	  process	  of	  absolute	  beta-­‐convergence	  in	  Europe	  
both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union.	  
Table	   1.5	   reports	   the	   regression	   output	   of	   the	   absolute	   beta	   convergence	   estimated	   within	   the	   different	  
subsamples	  of	  countries	  of	  the	  EU-­‐2812	  during	  the	  period	  1995-­‐2018.	  
	  
Table	  1.5	   	   	   	   	   	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  










EMU-­‐19	  exc.	  Ireland	  
(d)	  
Log	  of	  GDP	  per	  
Capita	  in	  1995	  
.55	  
[1.34]	  








Constant	   -­‐4.25	  
[13.89]	  








R2	   0.01	   0.006	   0.60	   0.64	   0.66	  
Implied	  λ	   -­‐	   -­‐	   .01813	   .02498	   .02738	  
HD	   -­‐	   -­‐	   38.12	   27.75	   25.31	  
***	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  
	  
Also	  the	  output	  of	  the	  absolute	  beta	  convergence	  regression,	  estimated	  on	  data	  related	  to	  the	  period	  1995-­‐2018,	  
confirms	  the	  previous	  finding	  about	  the	  absence	  of	  convergence	  within	  the	  EU-­‐15	  since	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Single	  
Currency.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  beta	  convergence	  coefficient	  takes	  on	  positive	  and	  not	  statistically	  significant	  values	  
within	  the	  groups	  EMU-­‐12	  and	  EU-­‐15	  (1.5a	  and	  1.5b).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  absolute	  beta	  convergence	  is	  observed	  
in	  the	  EU-­‐28	  and	  in	  the	  enlarged	  EMU	  in	  particular,	  where	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  observe	  a	  convergence	  rate	  equal	  to	  	  
-­‐2.08%.	  A	  convergence	  rate	  equal	  to	  -­‐2.08%	  a	  year	  means	  that	  it	  will	  take	  only	  25	  years	  for	  a	  poorer	  economy	  
from	  Eastern	  Europe	  to	  close	  half	  of	  the	  income	  gap	  with	  the	  richer	  economies	  of	  the	  EMU.	  
Figure	  1.6	  (section	  b)	  shows	  the	  fitted	  convergence	  line	  in	  the	  EMU-­‐19	  (all	  member	  states	  of	  the	  Economic	  and	  
Monetary	  Union)	  and	  in	  the	  EMU-­‐12	  (original	  member	  states).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
12	  EMU-­‐12	  denotes	  the	  group	  of	  countries	  that	  adopted	  the	  Single	  Currency	  in	  1999	  plus	  Greece	  that	  was	  allowed	  to	  join	  the	  club	  in	  2001.	  
EMU-­‐19	  denotes	  the	  group	  of	  EMU-­‐12	  countries	  plus	  the	  Baltic	  States,	  Slovenia,	  Slovak	  Republic,	  Cyprus	  and	  Malta	  that	   joined	  the	  EMU	  at	  
different	  stages	  after	  the	  first	  enlargement	  of	  2004.	  EU-­‐28	  denotes	  the	  group	  of	  all	  the	  member	  states	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  Luxembourg	  is	  
always	  excluded	  from	  the	  samples.	  
	   24	  
	  
	  
As	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   note	   during	   the	   period	   1995-­‐2018	   Baltic	   States	   recorded	   impressive	   rates	   of	   growth,	  
outperforming	  all	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  EU-­‐28,	  comprising	  Ireland.	  Also	  Slovakia	  (SVK)	  recorded	  remarkably	  high	  
rates	   of	   economic	   growth.	   Symmetrically	   within	   the	   EMU-­‐12	   group	   Spain,	   Greece,	   Portugal,	   and	   Cyprus	  
underperformed	   Finland	   and	   the	   Netherlands	   that	   in	   1995	   had	   much	   higher	   incomes	   per	   capita.	   Italy	  
underperformed	  all	  the	  European	  countries	  in	  the	  sample.	  
	  
1.7	  Conclusions	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  applied	  the	  empirical	  strategy	  of	  MRW	  to	  test	  the	  Solow	  Model	  (augmented	  with	  Human	  Capital)	  
on	  two	  samples	  of	  European	  countries,	  EU-­‐15	  and	  EU-­‐28.	  The	  empirics	  confirm	  that	  the	  higher	  is	  the	  saving	  rate	  
(or	  investment	  rate),	  the	  higher	  is	  the	  steady	  state	  GDP	  per	  Capita.	  The	  higher	  is	  the	  human	  capital,	  the	  higher	  is	  
the	  GDP	  per	  Capita13.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  The	  relevance	  of	  human	  capital	  for	  economic	  growth	  will	  be	  also	  confirmed	  in	  the	  next	  chapters	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Then,	   relying	  on	   the	  strong	  assumption	   that	   the	  countries	  of	   the	  EU-­‐15	  have	  similar	   steady	  state	   incomes	  per	  
capita,	  I	  analysed	  the	  evolution	  of	  absolute	  beta	  convergence	  since	  1950	  to	  nowadays.	  Empirical	  evidence	  shows	  
three	  important	  facts.	  
First	   I	  showed	  that	  since	  the	  end	  of	   the	  1950s	  to	  the	  end	  of	   the	  1980s	  the	  EU-­‐15	  configured	  as	  a	  convergence	  
club	   in	  which	   the	  hypothesis	  of	   a	  progressive	   convergence	   towards	  a	   common	  steady	  state	   income	  per	   capita	  
was	  not	  unrealistic	  (Table	  1.4).	  	  	  
Second	   I	   showed	   that	   since	   the	   intensification	   of	   the	   process	   of	   European	   economic	   integration,	   convergence	  
speed	  has	  gradually	  reduced	  until	  disappearing	  (Table	  1.3).	  Indeed	  during	  the	  period	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  
the	   Maastricht	   nominal	   convergence	   criteria	   (time	   interval	   1989-­‐1998),	   the	   rate	   of	   convergence	   remarkably	  
drops	  if	  Ireland	  is	  not	  included	  in	  the	  sample.	  Indeed,	  when	  Ireland	  is	  excluded	  from	  the	  sample,	  despite	  keeping	  
a	  negative	  sign,	  beta	  coefficient	  increases	  from	  -­‐3.99%	  to	  -­‐1.12%	  reduces	  its	  statistical	  significance	  at	  10%.	  	  
The	  same	  tendency	  with	  negative	  but	  not	  statistically	  significant	  (neither	  at	  1%	  nor	  at	  5%)	  beta	  coefficient	  can	  
be	  observed	  during	  the	  period	  1999-­‐2008,	  that	  is,	  during	  period	  of	  “stability”	  in	  the	  EMU	  before	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  
Global	  Financial	  Crisis.	  	  
Convergence	  can	  be	  observed	  only	  when	  Sweden,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Ireland	  and	  Portugal	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  
sample	  (Fig	  1.5).	  In	  this	  case	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  note	  that	  Spain	  and	  Greece	  have	  been	  the	  economies	  that	  actually	  
converged	  towards	  the	  remaining	  rich	  members	  of	  the	  club	  in	  the	  time	  interval	  1999-­‐2008.	  
Then	  during	  the	  period	  between	  2009	  and	  2018	  that	  comprises	  the	  double-­‐dip	  recession	  in	  Europe,	  the	  process	  
of	  convergence	  completely	  reversed.	  As	  the	  output	  of	  Equation	  4	  shows	  (Table	  1.4)	  after	  1999	  there	  has	  been	  a	  
statistically	  significant	  strong	  tendency	  for	  the	  richer	  economies	  to	  outperform	  the	  poorer	  ones.	  
Third,	   I	   verified	   that	   within	   the	   EMU	   another	   convergence	   club	   has	   emerged	   between	   the	   rich	   countries	  
(Benelux,	   Austria,	   Germany,	   France	   and	   Finland)	   and	   the	  New	  Member	   States	   that	   joined	   the	   single	   currency	  
after	   their	   acceptance	   into	   the	   European	   Union	   (EMU-­‐19).	   In	   this	   framework	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   assert	   that	   the	  
catching	  up	  tendency	  shifted	  from	  peripheral	  countries	  of	  the	  EMU-­‐12	  (Italy,	  Spain,	  Portugal	  and	  Greece)	  to	  CEE	  
countries	  that	  actually	  drove	  the	  process	  of	  convergence	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  Economic	  
and	  Monetary	  Union	  since	  the	  mid	  of	  the	  1990s.	  
These	   empirical	   evidences	   leads	   to	   suppose	   that	   in	   the	   next	   future	   convergence	   inside	   the	   Economic	   and	  
Monetary	  Union	  will	  be	  driven	  by	   the	  NMS	  from	  Eastern	  Europe,	  especially	   the	  Baltic	  States	  and	  Slovakia	   that	  
recorded	  average	  rates	  of	  growth	  between	  4	  and	  6%	  during	  the	  period	  1995-­‐2018.	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Appendix	  1.1:	  Description	  of	  the	  Data	  
Paragraph	  1.3:	  The	  data	  to	  estimate	  the	  MRW	  model	  (Equation	  2)	  are	  sourced	  from	  World	  Bank	  Database	  (GDP	  
per	  Capita	  in	  2018	  and	  Average	  Saving	  Rates	  1970-­‐2018	  and	  1995-­‐2018	  and	  average	  population	  growth	  1970-­‐
2018	   and	   1995-­‐2018).	   Data	   for	   human	   capital	   are	   sourced	   from	   the	   Penn	   World	   Tables,	   the	   sole	   long	   run	  
database	  for	  human	  capital	  available	  for	  all	  the	  countries.	  	  
Given	  the	  fact	  that	  data	  for	  2018	  were	  not	  available	  yet,	  I	  approximated	  the	  average	  1970-­‐2018	  (and	  1995-­‐2018)	  
as	  the	  averages	  of	  the	  period	  1970-­‐2017	  (and	  1995-­‐2017).	  	  
I	   chose	   the	  World	   Bank	   database	   in	   order	   to	   build	   and	  work	   on	   a	   dataset	   in	  which	   at	   least	   three	   of	   the	   four	  
variables	  used	  in	  the	  model	  were	  collected	  from	  the	  same	  source.	  GDP	  per	  capita	  is	  calculated	  and	  expressed	  in	  
2010	  constant	  US$.	  
	  
Paragraph	  1.4	  and	  Paragraph	  1.5:	   	  Data	   for	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  and	  Rate	  of	  Growth	  of	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  are	  sourced	  
from	  the	  Total	  Economy	  Database	  (TED)	  made	  available	   from	  the	  Conference	  Board.	  The	  choice	  of	   this	  source	  
depends	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  makes	  available	  data	  from	  1950	  for	  all	  the	  EU-­‐15	  countries	  in	  the	  sample	  because	  the	  
objective	  of	  these	  two	  paragraphs	  was	  to	  study	  the	  evolution	  of	  absolute	  beta	  convergence	  since	  the	  1950s.	  GDP	  
per	  capita	  is	  calculated	  and	  expressed	  in	  2018	  constant	  US$.	  
	  
Paragraph	  1.4:	  Also	  in	  this	  case,	  data	  for	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  and	  Rate	  of	  Growth	  of	  GDP	  are	  sourced	  from	  the	  Total	  
Economy	   Database	   (TED)	   made	   available	   from	   the	   Conference	   Board.	   GDP	   per	   capita	   is	   calculated	   in	   2018	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Appendix	  1.2.	  Mathematical	  Steps	  to	  Calculate	  HD	  from	  β	  coefficient	  of	  Convergence	  
In	  Table	  1.2,	  the	  Greek	  symbol	  Lambda	  (λ)	  denotes	  an	  nonlinear	  estimation	  of	  the	  speed	  of	  convergence	  linked	  to	  
the	  time	  dimension	  t	  and	  it	  can	  be	  calculated	  following	  the	  mathematical	  steps	  proposed	  by	  Mankiw	  et	  all	  (1992)	  
and	  	  Feldkircher	  (2006):	  	  
	  
λ=	  (-­‐log	  (1+βt)/t)	  	  	  
(1)	  
	  
Here	  equation	  1	  shows	  the	  linkages	  between	  the	  time	  dimension	  t	  with	  the	  coefficient	  of	  convergence	  β	  that	  has	  
been	  estimated	  with	  OLS	  linear	  technique.	  	  
Once	  λ	  is	  calculated,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  obtain	  the	  number	  of	  years	  needed	  for	  a	  “poorer”	  economy	  to	  close	  half	  of	  
the	   gap	   to	   a	   common	   steady	   state	   income	   per	   capita	   with	   the	   richer	   countries	   through	   the	   following	  
mathematical	  steps.	  	  
	  
e-­‐λt	  =1/2	  	  	  
(2)	  
	  
-­‐λt	  =	  𝑙𝑛 !
!
	  	  	  	  	  
(3)	  
	  
By	   dividing	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   equation	   by	   –λ,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   obtain	   t	   as	   the	   number	   of	   years	   needed	   for	   an	  





	  or	  t	  =	  !"(!)
!
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2.1	  Introduction	  
Regression	  output	  in	  Table	  1.5	  (Chapter	  1)	  shows	  that	  no-­‐convergence	  has	  been	  observed	  within	  the	  EMU-­‐12	  or	  
EU-­‐15	  since	  the	  mid	  of	  the	  1990s.	  	  Given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  mid	  of	  the	  1990’s	  coincided	  with	  the	  period	  of	  the	  entry	  
into	   force	   of	   the	   Maastricht	   Treaty,	   in	   this	   chapter	   I	   will	   test	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   the	   strict	   fiscal	   discipline	  
entailed	   both	   by	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   Maastricht	   criteria	   of	   public	   finance	   and	   then	   the	   EMU	   membership	   have	  
contributed	  to	  reverse	  the	  process	  of	  convergence	  between	  the	  countries	  that	  joined	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  
Union	  between	  1999	  and	  2001.	  
This	   chapter	   contributes	   to	   the	   literature	   in	   two	  ways.	   First,	   I	   show	   that	   permanent	   fiscal	   consolidation	   and	  
austerity,	  that	  in	  some	  countries	  got	  harsher	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis,	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  
the	  major	   cause	   behind	   the	   divergence	   in	   income	   per	   capita	   observed	   since	   the	  mid	   of	   the	   1990s	  within	   the	  
Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union.	  Second,	   I	  empirically	  confute,	  at	   least	   for	   the	  EMU	  countries,	   the	  hypothesis	  of	  
“expansionary	  austerity”	  developed	  in	  a	  vast	  body	  of	  empirical	   literature	  that	   includes	  Alesina	  et	  al	  (2018	  and	  
2015),	  Alesina	  and	  Perotti,	  (1996)	  and	  Giavazzi	  and	  Pagano	  (1996	  and	  1990).	  	  
Indeed	   during	   the	   period	   1995-­‐2018	   the	   weakest	   economic	   performances	   among	   peripheral	   countries	   were	  
observed	   in	  countries	   like	  Italy	  that	  recorded	  an	  average	  positive	  government	  primary	  balance	  (2.32%)	   larger	  
than	   the	  ones	  observed	   in	  Germany	  (0.78%),	   the	  Netherlands	  (0.65%)	  and	  Austria	   (0.55%).	  Conversely,	  Spain	  
and	  Portugal	  that	  during	  the	  same	  period	  recorded	  on	  average	  negative	  primary	  balances	  (-­‐0.77%	  and	  -­‐1.12%	  
respectively)	   outperformed	   Italy.	   	   The	   empirical	   evidence	   extracted	   from	   the	   model	   confirms	   that	   European	  
strict	  fiscal	  rules	  and	  austerity	  per	  se	  are	  harmful	  to	  economic	  growth	  and	  convergence.	  	  
	  
2.2	  Literature	  Review	  
Since	   Robert	   Barro’s	   formulation	   of	   the	   “Ricardian	   Equivalence”	   in	   1974,	   an	   extensive	   body	   of	   literature	  
contrasted	   the	   “Keynesian”	   approach	   to	   fiscal	   policy	   and	   provided	   the	   empirical	   evidence	   that	   fiscal	  
consolidation	  may	  have	  positive	  or	  “non-­‐Keynesian”	  effects	  on	  income	  growth.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  an	  expansionary	  
budget	  policy	  may	  have	  negative	  or	  neutral	  effects	  on	  economic	  growth.	  Indeed,	  if	  private	  sector	  regards	  budget	  
deficit	   simply	   as	   taxes	   delayed	   it	   may	   increase	   its	   own	   savings	   to	   neutralize	   future	   taxation	   implied	   by	   the	  
increased	  stock	  of	  public	  debt,	  thus	  offsetting	  government	  “Keynesian”	  budget	  policy	  (Tanzi	  and	  Zee,	  1997).	  
For	  example	  Giavazzi	  and	  Pagano	  (1990),	   focusing	  on	  analysis	  of	   the	  cases	  of	   Ireland	  and	  Denmark	  during	  the	  
1980s,	   find	   out	   that	   when	   the	   consolidation	   of	   public	   finances	   is	   pursued	   through	   cuts	   to	   government	  
expenditures	  it	  can	  have	  expansionary	  effects	  on	  the	  economy.	  Indeed,	  if	  fiscal	  consolidation	  is	  perceived	  by	  the	  
	   30	  
private	   sector	   as	   a	   signal	   that	   the	   share	   of	   government	   spending	   to	   GDP	   is	   being	   permanently	   reduced,	  
households	  will	  revise	  upwards	  their	  estimate	  of	  their	  permanent	  income,	  and	  will	  raise	  currency	  and	  planned	  
consumption	  (p.1)	  
Based	  on	  a	  panel	  dataset	  of	  19	  OECD	  countries	  with	  annual	  data	  collected	  for	  the	  period	  1970-­‐1994,	  Giavazzi	  and	  
Pagano	  (1996)	  finds	  out	  also	  that	  a	  sharp	  cut	  in	  government	  consumption	  tends	  to	  be	  positively	  associated	  with	  
an	   increase	   in	  private	  consumption	  when	  budget	  deficit	  or	  government	  consumption	   is	  very	  high.	   In	   the	  same	  
paper	   the	   authors	   also	   find	   out	   that	   during	   the	   1980s	   in	   Sweden	   consumption	   boomed	   coinciding	   with	   a	  
substantial	  decline	  of	  government	  debt	  to	  GDP	  ratio.	  
Indeed	   fiscal	   consolidation	   may	   also	   signal	   that	   there	   will	   be	   substantial	   tax	   cuts	   in	   the	   future.	   By	   raising	  
households’	   expected	   future	   disposable	   income	   and	   by	   increasing	   the	   confidence	   of	   investors,	   fiscal	  
consolidation	   can	   thus	   stimulate	   private	   consumption	   and	   investment	   even	   in	   the	   short	   term,	   a	   phenomenon	  
known	  as	  “expansionary	  fiscal	  contraction”	  or	  “expansionary	  austerity”	  (Guajardo	  et	  all,	  2011:3).	  
Also	  Alesina	  and	  Perotti	  (1997)	  find	  out	  that	  government	  deficit	  and	  debt	  reductions	  in	  the	  OECD	  countries	  are	  
“expansive”	   under	   certain	   conditions.	   The	   authors	   individuate	   two	   types	   of	   fiscal	   consolidation	   that	   exert	  
opposite	   effects	   on	   economic	   growth.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   a	   first	   type	   of	   fiscal	   consolidation	   is	   achieved	  mainly	  
through	  cuts	  on	  government	  expenditures	  on	  transfers,	  social	  security	  and	  wages	  and	  employment	  in	  the	  public	  
sector.	  This	  type	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  has	  always	  an	  expansionary	  effect	  on	  economic	  growth	  for	  an	  economy.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  second	  type	  of	   fiscal	  consolidation	  is	  pursued	  mainly	  through	  tax	   increases	  and	  it	  always	  
has	  negative	  effects	  on	  economic	  growth.	  These	  empirical	  findings	  about	  the	  opposite	  outcomes	  of	  the	  different	  
strategies	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  on	  economic	  growth	  are	  also	  confirmed	  in	  other	  studies.	  For	  example	  Alesina	  et	  
al	  (2013)	  question	  the	  “conventional	  wisdom”	  according	  to	  which	  fiscal	  consolidation	  was	  the	  main	  culprit	   for	  
the	  recessions	  experienced	  by	  many	  countries,	  especially	  in	  Europe.	  	  Analysing	  the	  response	  of	  economic	  growth	  
to	   fiscal	   austerity	   in	   a	   sample	   of	   OECD	   economies	   (mostly	   from	   the	   European	  Union	   plus	   the	   US)	   during	   the	  
period	  2009-­‐2013,	   the	   authors	   find	   out	   that	   there	   is	   a	   big	   difference	  between	   “tax	   based”	   and	   “expenditures-­‐
based”	  austerity.	  While	   former	  has	  always	  a	  negative	   impact	  on	  economic	  growth,	   the	   latter	   is	  at	   least	  always	  
less	  costly.	  	  
Alesina	  at	  al	  (2014)	  further	  confirm	  these	  empirical	  findings	  by	  simulating	  the	  response	  of	  16	  OCED	  economies	  
to	  different	  fiscal	  consolidation	  plans	  over	  a	  30-­‐years	  period.	  Adjustments	  based	  on	  expenditures	  cuts	  are	  much	  
more	  durable	  and	  much	  less	  costly,	  in	  terms	  of	  output	  losses,	  than	  tax-­‐based	  adjustment.	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When	  some	  member	  states	  of	  the	  EMU	  started	  to	  experience	  solvency	  problems	  after	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  
because	  of	  speculative	  attacks	  on	   their	  sovereign	  bonds,	   Jürgen	  Stark	  as	   the	  German	  member	  of	   the	  Executive	  
Board	   of	   the	   European	   Central	   Bank	   advocated	   against	   the	   ECB’s	   sovereign	   bonds	   purchase	   and	   in	   favour	   of	  
fiscal	   austerity	   (Reuters,	   2011).	   Indeed,	   the	   long-­‐run	   benefits	   of	   austerity	  measures	   could	   offset	   negative	   the	  
demand	   effects	   via	   the	   channel	   expectations.	   In	   particular,	   the	   decline	   in	   the	   real	   interest	   rate	   induced	   by	  
consolidation	  increases	  wealth	  by	  increasing	  the	  net	  present	  value	  of	  future	  income	  streams	  (Atkins	  et	  al,	  2011).	  
However,	  literature	  remains	  divided	  regarding	  the	  short-­‐term	  and	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  budget	  deficit	  reduction,	  
and	   standard	   implication	   of	   Keynesian	   models	   is	   that	   cutting	   government	   spending	   or	   raising	   taxes	   has	  
contractionary	  effects	  on	  aggregate	  demand	  and	  therefore	  on	  GDP	  growth	  (Guajardo	  et	  all,	  2011).	  	  
Already	   in	   early	   1992	   after	   the	   signature	   of	   the	   Maastricht	   Treaty	   some	   concerns	   were	   raised	   about	   the	  
compatibility	   of	   the	   stringent	   fiscal	   programs	   embedded	   in	   its	   rules	   with	   economic	   growth	   in	   most	   of	   the	  
countries	   of	   the	  European	  Union14.	   	   Buiter	   et	   al	   (1992)	   in	  particular	   raised	   some	   issues	   about	   fiscal	   rules	   the	  
countries	  had	  to	  comply	  with	  in	  order	  to	  be	  admitted	  into	  the	  EMU	  on	  the	  1st	  January	  1999.	  First,	   if	  the	  norms	  
concerning	  public	  finance	  were	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  by	  governments	  (in	  particular	  the	  ones	  in	  the	  countries	  in	  
with	  public	  debts	  and	  deficits	  above	  the	  Maastricht’s	  implied	  limits),	  fiscal	  policy	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  (at	  time	  
still	  named	  European	  Community)	  would	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  contractionary	  bias.	  In	  fact,	  the	  compliance	  of	  the	  
norm	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  would	  have	  implied	  a	  multi-­‐year	  sequence	  of	  tax	  increases	  and	  spending	  cuts	  for	  
the	   European	   Community	   as	   a	   whole.	   Second,	   it	   seemed	   very	   likely	   that	   the	   impact	   effect	   on	   the	   level	   of	  
economic	  activity	  of	  attempts	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  Maastricht	  convergence	  criteria	  would	  have	  been	  negative.	  	  
Among	   the	   costs	   of	   joining	   the	   EMU,	   also	   Obstfeld	   (1997:277)	   mentioned	   the	   likelihood	   that	   the	   EMU	  
membership	  would	  have	  forced	  countries	  to	  cut	  their	  budgets	  in	  time	  of	  recessions	  or	  rising	  unemployment.	  In	  
this	   aspect	   the	  EMU	  membership	  would	  have	  been	  destabilizing	   for	   the	   economies.	   Still	   during	   the	   transition	  
from	  the	  Stage	  Two	  to	  Stage	  Three	  of	  the	  Monetary	  Union	  in	  1998,	  Obstfeld	  (1998)	  observed	  that	  the	  deficit	  and	  
debt	  limits	  established	  by	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty,	  and	  reinforced	  by	  the	  Growth	  and	  Stability	  Pact	  (SGP)	  of	  1997	  
to	  preserve	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  EMU	  financial	  markets,	  would	  have	  posed	  substantial	  difficulties	  on	  governments	  
for	  economic	  policy	  and	  economic	  growth.	  
In	  fact,	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  when	  the	  process	  of	  implementation	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  criteria	  started,	  the	  EMU	  as	  a	  
whole	  has	   recorded	   lower	  economic	  performance	   than	   the	  US	  both	  before	  and	  after	   the	  2008	  global	   financial	  
crisis.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  fact,	  in	  the	  same	  period	  it	  has	  been	  possible	  to	  observe	  also	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  process	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The	  Article	  104c	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  two	  rules	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  to	  allow	  a	  country	  to	  join	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	  on	  the	  1st	  
January	  1999:(a)	  Government	  budget	  deficit	  below	  3%	  of	  GDP	  (b)	  Government	  debt	  below	  60%	  of	  the	  GDP	  
	   32	  
of	   divergence	   in	   terms	   of	   GDP	   per	   capita	   among	   the	   countries	   within	   the	   monetary	   union.	   Also	   Marelli	   and	  
Signorelli	   (2016),	   that	   analyse	   absolute	  beta	   convergence	  during	   the	  period	  2001-­‐2014	  on	   the	   same	  group	  of	  
countries,	  show	  that	  in	  the	  Euro	  Area	  there	  has	  not	  been	  convergence.	  Absolute	  beta	  convergence	  in	  the	  EMU	  can	  
be	   observed	   only	   if	   the	  most	   recent	  members	   from	   Eastern	   Europe	   (Baltic	   states,	   Slovenia	   and	   Slovakia)	   are	  
included	  in	  the	  sample.	  
De	  Grauwe	  and	  Ji	  (2013a)	  argue	  that	  such	  observed	  divergence	  between	  the	  “old”	  members	  of	  the	  EMU	  and	  the	  
slow	  recovery	  of	  the	  Euro	  Area	  after	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  are	  mainly	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  contractionary	  
budgetary	   policies	   adopted	   in	   the	   European	   Union	   in	   compliance	   with	   the	   Growth	   and	   Stability	   Pact	   and	   its	  
extension	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   Treaty	   on	   Stability,	   Coordination	   and	   Governance	   in	   the	   Economic	   and	  
Monetary	  Union15.	  	  According	  to	  the	  authors’	  calculations	  on	  a	  cross	  section	  of	  11	  “Western”	  EMU	  economies,	  one	  
per	  cent	  fiscal	  contraction16	  has	  been	  cumulatively	  associated	  to	  a	  reduction	  of	  1.38%	  in	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  growth	  
during	  the	  period	  2009-­‐2012.	  	  
In	  an	  analysis	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  in	  advanced	  economies	  during	  the	  crisis,	  also	  Blanchard	  and	  Leigh	  (2016),	  
find	  out	  that	  stronger	  plans	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  have	  been	  associated	  with	  rates	  of	  economic	  growth	  (or	  larger	  
economic	   contractions)	   much	   lower	   than	   the	   ones	   expected	   by	   forecasters	   in	   the	   spring	   2010	   IMF	   World	  
Economic	  Outlook,	  especially	  at	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  
Fatás	  and	  Summers	  (2016)	  extend	  the	  analysis	  of	  Blanchard	  and	  Leigh	  (2016)	  over	  a	  longer	  horizon	  and	  confirm	  
the	  negative	  relation	  between	   fiscal	  consolidation	  and	  both	  economic	  growth	  and	  potential	  output	   forecast.	   In	  
addition	   the	   authors	   provide	   the	   evidence	   of	   strong	   hysteresis	   effects	   of	   fiscal	   policy,	   meaning	   that	   fiscal	  
consolidation	  may	  exert	  permanent	  negative	  effects	  on	  economic	  growth	  in	  certain	  economies.	  	  
	  
2.3	  Data	  and	  Methodology	  
In	   this	   chapter	   I	   use	   both	   descriptive	   and	   inferential	   statistics.	   Descriptive	   statistics	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	  
paragraph	  2.5	  where	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  brief	  comparison	  of	  the	  economic	  performances	  between	  the	  Euro	  Area	  and	  
the	  US	  and	  in	  chapter	  2.6	  where	  I	  will	  show	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  relevant	  economic	  variables	  in	  the	  countries	  of	  
the	  European	  Monetary	  Union	  during	  the	  period	  1995-­‐2018.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  underlying	  budgetary	  position:	  the	  Stability	  and	  Growth	  Pact	  focuses	  more	  on	  improving	  public	  finances	  in	  
structural	  terms	  (taking	  into	  account	  the	  effects	  of	  an	  economic	  downturn	  or	  one-­‐off	  measures	  on	  the	  deficit).	  Member	  States	  set	  their	  own	  
medium-­‐term	  budgetary	  objectives.	  The	  Commission	  checks	  that	  the	  chosen	  medium-­‐term	  budgetary	  objectives	  comply	  with	  the	  
requirements	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Stability	  and	  Growth	  Pact.	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  improve	  the	  structural	  balance	  and	  converge	  towards	  the	  medium-­‐term	  
budgetary	  objective,	  by	  0.5%	  of	  GDP	  a	  year	  as	  a	  benchmark.	  This	  provides	  a	  safety	  margin	  against	  breaching	  the	  3%	  headline	  deficit	  target,	  
with	  Member	  States,	  particularly	  those	  with	  debt	  levels	  over	  60%	  of	  GDP,	  urged	  to	  do	  more	  in	  economically	  good	  times	  and	  less	  in	  bad	  times	  
16	  Here	  fiscal	  contraction	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  cumulative	  change	  in	  the	  structurally	  adjusted	  primary	  government	  budget	  from	  2009-­‐12	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In	  paragraph	  2.7	  I	  will	  estimate	  a	  model	  on	  longitudinal	  panel	  data	  to	  quantify	  the	  effects	  of	  fiscal	  discipline	  on	  
economic	  growth	  and	  understand	  whether	  the	  budget	  rules	   imposed	  by	  the	  Euro	  membership	  are	  harmful	  for	  
convergence.	   The	   data	   are	   organized	   in	   the	   form	   of	   longitudinal	   panel	   dataset	   built	   on	   three	   years	   non-­‐
overlapping	  averages	  from	  1995	  to	  2015,	  thus	  obtaining	  8	  observations	  for	  sampling	  unit.	  
Data	  related	  to	  economic	  growth	  and	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  utilized	  both	  in	  descriptive	  statistics	  and	  in	  the	  inferential	  
model	  are	  sourced	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  database.	  Data	  related	  to	  “fiscal	  consolidation”	  for	  European	  countries,	  
namely	  primary	  balance	  as	  percentage	  of	  trend	  GDP,	  are	  sourced	  from	  AMECO	  database	  while	  the	  same	  indicator	  
for	  the	  US	  is	  sourced	  from	  the	  OECD	  database.	  Given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  data	  related	  to	  US	  federal	  primary	  balance	  
are	  utilized	  only	  for	  descriptive	  statistics	  in	  the	  paragraph	  2.5	  and	  not	  for	  inferential	  statistics,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  
source	  data	  for	  the	  same	  variable	  from	  different	  databases	  for	  comparison	  purposes.	  In	  the	  Appendix	  2.1,	  data	  
related	  to	  general	  government	  debt	  from	  1992	  to	  2018	  are	  sourced	  from	  the	  database	  FRED	  Economic	  Database	  
made	  available	  from	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  St.	  Louis.	  
The	  rest	  of	  the	  data	  (population	  growth	  and	  labour	  force	  education)	  utilized	  in	  the	  inferential	  model	  is	  sourced	  
from	  World	  Bank	  database	  with	  exception	  of	  the	  already	  mentioned	  data	  for	  to	  primary	  balance	  (AMECO).	  
The	  longitudinal	  panel	  model	  is	  built	  with	  data	  collected	  from	  1995	  to	  2018	  for	  two	  reasons.	  The	  first	  is	  related	  
to	  the	  availability	  of	  data	  for	  the	  variable	  of	  interest.	  Indeed,	  data	  for	  primary	  balance	  in	  the	  European	  countries	  
in	  AMECO	  database	   are	   available	   from	  1995.	   Second,	   1995	   represents	   the	   year	   in	   the	  mid	  between	   signature	  
Maastricht	   Treaty	   in	   1992	   and	   1st	   January	   1999,	   the	   date	   by	  which	   countries	   had	   to	   satisfy	   the	   convergence	  
criteria	   in	   order	   to	   qualify	   for	   the	   EMU	   membership.	   As	   also	   the	   data	   show,	   1995	   was	   the	   year	   in	   which	  
government	   debt	   to	   GDP	   ratio	   started	   to	   decrease	   in	   most	   of	   the	   candidate	   countries,	   especially	   the	   most	  
indebted	  ones.	  	  
Primary	  balance	  as	  percentage	  of	  trend	  GDP	  is	  chosen	  as	  a	  variable	  to	  indicate	  government	  fiscal	  policy	  stance	  as	  
in	  almost	  all	   the	  most	  papers	  about	   fiscal	   consolidation	  and	  growth	   (Giavazzi	   et	   al,	   1999;	  Alesina	  and	  Perotti,	  
1997	  and	  1996;	  Giavazzi	  and	  Pagano,	  1997;	  McDermott	  and	  	  Wescott,	  1996).	  
	  
2.4	  The	  Rationale	  for	  Tight	  Budget	  Policies	  in	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	  
When	  the	  Euro	  was	  started	  a	  fundamental	  stabilizing	  force	  that	  existed	  at	  national	  level	  was	  taken	  away	  from	  the	  
countries	   as	   the	   lander	   of	   last	   resort	   function	   of	   the	   central	   bank.	   In	   this	   new	   monetary	   system,	   member	  
countries	  of	  the	  European	  Monetary	  Union	  have	  started	  to	  issue	  government	  bonds	  denominated	  in	  a	  currency	  
they	  exerted	  no	  control	  over.	  As	  a	  result,	  governments	  of	  these	  countries	  could	  no	  longer	  guarantee	  that	  the	  cash	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would	  always	  be	  available	  to	  roll	  over	  the	  government	  debt	  (De	  Grauwe	  and	  Ji,	  2015:2).	  In	  this	  framework,	  the	  
capability	   of	   Euro	   Area	   member	   countries	   to	   withstand	   adverse	   macroeconomic	   and	   financial	   shocks	   was	  
identified	  as	  the	  major	  challenge	  for	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Euro	  (Lane,	  2012).	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  explicitly	  
made	  prohibition	  to	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  and	  the	  central	  banks	  of	  the	  Eurosystem	  to	  grant	  credit	  facilities	  
or	  loans	  to	  “central	  governments,	  local	  or	  regional	  or	  other	  public	  authorities	  and	  other	  bodies	  governed	  by	  public	  
law”	  (Art.	  104.1	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty)17.	  
This	  commitment	  for	  market	  discipline	  for	  government	  was	  also	  reinforced	  by	  the	  no	  bail	  out	  clause	  according	  to	  
which	  a	  country	  in	  financial	  troubles	  could	  not	  be	  granted	  with	  financial	  support	  by	  the	  other	  member	  states	  of	  
the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union.	  	  
These	  rules	  were	  essentially	  asked	  by	  Germany	  and	  Northern	  European	  countries	   in	  order	  make	  sure	  that	   the	  
Economic	   and	   Monetary	   Union	   would	   configure	   as	   an	   anti-­‐inflationary	   area.	   Therefore	   the	   institutional	  
architecture	   of	   the	  Economic	   and	  Monetary	  Union	  had	   essentially	   to	   reflect	  German	  preferences	   about	   “hard-­‐
nosed”	  central	  bank	  over	  	  “wet	  government”	  (De	  Grauwe,	  2016).	  In	  this	  framework,	  sound	  public	  finances	  would	  
have	  preserved	  countries	  from	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  likely	  to	  affect	  the	  other	  economies	  of	  the	  EMU	  through	  the	  
banking	   system	   and	   financial	   markets	   and	   shielded	   the	   European	   Central	   Bank	   from	   national	   governments’	  
pressures	  in	  favour	  of	  accommodative	  monetary	  policy.	  	  	  
In	  this	  kind	  of	  monetary	  system	  large	  positive	  primary	  government	  balances	  become	  the	  major	  determinant	  of	  
public	  debt	  sustainability.	  
The	  budget	  constrain	  of	  government	  can	  be	  expressed	  with	  the	  following	  equation:	  
	  
𝑏 = 𝑔 − 𝑡 + 𝑟 − 𝑥 𝑏 −𝑚	  
(2.1)	  
	  
Where  𝑏  is	  the	  evolution	  of	  debt	  to	  GDP	  ratio	  (b/G),	  g	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  government	  expenditure	  to	  GDP	  (G/Y),	  t	  is	  
the	   tax	   revenue,	   r	   is	   the	   interest	   rate	   on	   government	   debt	   and	   x	   denotes	   the	   rate	   of	   GDP	   growth	  (𝑌/  𝑌).	  𝑚	  
denotes	  the	  growth	  of	  monetary	  base	  (M/Y).	  
The	  equation	  (1)	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  follows.	  In	  a	  context	  of	  negative	  balanced	  primary	  budged	  (𝑔 − 𝑡	  <0),	   if	  
the	   interest	   rate	   on	   government	   debt	   exceeds	   the	   rate	   of	   economic	   growth,	   government	   debt	   increases	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  “Overdraft	  facilities	  or	  any	  other	  type	  of	  credit	  facility	  with	  the	  ECB	  or	  with	  the	  central	  banks	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  (hereinafter	  referred	  to	  
as	  "national	  central	  banks")	  in	  favour	  of	  Community	  institutions	  or	  bodies,	  central	  governments,	  regional,	   local	  or	  other	  public	  authorities,	  
other	  bodies	  governed	  by	  public	  law,	  or	  public	  undertakings	  of	  Member	  States	  shall	  be	  prohibited,	  as	  shall	  the	  purchase	  directly	  from	  them	  
by	  the	  ECB	  or	  national	  central	  banks	  of	  debt	  instruments.”	  (EC	  Treaty,	  Art.	  104)	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indefinitely.	  The	  dynamics	  of	  debt	   accumulation	   can	  be	   stopped	  only	   if	   the	  primary	  budget	  deficit	   is	   reversed	  
into	  a	  sufficiently	  large	  positive	  primary	  balance	  (t-­‐g>0)	  or	  with	  money	  creation	  (De	  Grauwe,	  2016;	  Marelli	  and	  
Signorelli,	   2010).	   Given	   the	   European	   Central	   Bank’s	   strict	   anti	   inflationary	   policy	   mandate	   and	   the	  
“constitutional”	  constraints	  on	  government	  bonds	  purchases	  to	  bring	  down	  interest	  rate	  in	  a	  framework	  of	  “one	  
size	  fits	  all”	  monetary	  policy,	  governments	  in	  the	  EMU	  can	  stabilize	  and	  reduce	  high	  public	  debts	  only	  by	  running	  
suitable	  large	  primary	  surpluses	  (De	  Grauwe,	  2016).	  
	  
2.5	  Economic	  performances	  in	  the	  Euro	  Area	  and	  in	  the	  US	  
From	   1995	   to	   2018	   the	   EMU	   as	   an	   aggregate	   recorded	   an	   average	   primary	   budget	   equal	   to	   0.5%	   while	   for	  
example	  the	  US	  recorded	  an	  average	  primary	  balance	  equal	  to	  -­‐2.51%.	  
This	   difference	   in	   budgetary	   policy	   between	   the	   two	   continental	   economic	   areas	   has	   been	   accompanied	   by	  
relevant	  differences	  in	  economic	  performances	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  As	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  note	  in	  Figure	  2.1,	  the	  




Figure	   2.2	   shows	   the	   annual	   data	   of	   the	   Euro	   Area	   aggregate	   primary	   balance	   and	   the	   one	   of	   the	   US	   federal	  
government	  in	  the	  period	  1995-­‐201818.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  	  The	  variable	  primary	  balance	  is	  the	  government	  balance	  excluding	  interest	  payments	  and	  it	  is	  calculated	  as	  (g-­‐t)/trend	  GDP	  	  




As	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  note	  since	  the	  early	  2000	  US	  governments	  let	  the	  primary	  balance	  progressively	  deteriorate	  
while	   the	   aggregate	   primary	   balance	   in	   the	   Euro	   Area	   remained	   in	   equilibrium	   until	   2007.	  When	   the	   global	  
financial	   crisis	   hit	   the	   economies,	   the	   Euro	  Area	   policy-­‐makers	   opted	   to	   contain	   primary	   deficits	   through	   the	  
imposition	  of	  fiscal	  austerity	  while	  the	  US	  federal	  government	  opted	  to	  pursue	  expansionary	  budget	  policies	  by	  
allowing	   the	   primary	   balance	   to	   drop	   from	   -­‐4.6%	   in	   2009	   to	   -­‐10.2%	   in	   2009.	   In	   2011	   the	   aggregate	   primary	  
balance	  of	  the	  Euro	  Area	  was	  in	  equilibrium	  (equal	  to	  0.1%)	  and	  the	  US	  federal	  primary	  balance	  was	  equal	  to	  	  
-­‐8.4%.	  
The	  speed	  with	  which	  most	  of	  countries	  of	  the	  EMU	  (and	  thus	  the	  aggregate	  Euro	  Area)	  have	  brought	  back	  the	  
primary	  balance	  into	  surplus	  after	  the	  Great	  Recession	  of	  2008-­‐2009	  has	  been	  acknowledged	  as	  the	  main	  cause	  
of	  the	  second	  wave	  of	  economic	  crisis	  experienced	  in	  Europe	  in	  the	  period	  2011-­‐2013.	   	  As	  Heimberger	  (2016)	  
finds	   out,	   the	   depth	   of	   economic	   crisis	   and	   the	   double	   dip	   recession	   in	   the	   Euro	   Area	   economies	   during	   the	  
period	  2011-­‐2013	  have	  been	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  harshness	  of	  fiscal	  austerity.	  
The	  figure	  2.3	  shows	  the	  comparison	  of	  the	  annual	  economic	  performances	  recorded	  in	  the	  Euro	  Area	  and	  the	  US	  
in	  the	  period	  1995-­‐2015.	  




As	   it	   possible	   to	   note,	   the	   economic	   activity	   started	   to	   slow	   down	   in	   the	   US	   where	   the	   financial	   crisis	   was	  
originated.	   However,	   the	   drop	   of	   GDP	   in	   2009	  was	  much	  more	   steeper	   in	   the	   Euro	   Area	   than	   in	   the	   US	   that	  
undertook	  a	  plan	  of	  expansionary	  fiscal	  policy.	  	  Furthermore	  after	  2010	  the	  US,	  that	  implemented	  expansionary	  
budget	  policy,	  came	  back	  to	  stable	  economic	  growth	  while	  the	  Euro	  Area	  economic	  activity	  experience	  another	  
slump	   in	   conjunction	  with	   fiscal	   consolidation	   that	  was	   pursued	  with	   different	   levels	   of	   intensity	   as	   a	   policy	  
objective	  in	  all	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union.	  
Figure	  2.4	  summarizes	  the	  post-­‐2009	  primary	  budget	  policies	  and	  economic	  performances	  occurred	  in	  the	  Euro	  
Area	  and	  in	  the	  US.	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As	  it	  possible	  to	  note,	  cumulative	  growth	  observed	  in	  the	  Euro	  Area	  whose	  primary	  government	  balance	  was	  in	  
equilibrium	  in	  the	  period	  2009-­‐2018,	  was	  roughly	  the	  half	  of	  the	  cumulative	  growth	  observed	  in	  the	  US	  whose	  
negative	  primary	  balance	  was	  on	  average	  equal	  to	  roughly	  -­‐5%	  during	  the	  period	  under	  consideration.	  
	  
2.5	  Primary	  balance,	   economic	   growth	   and	   government	  debt.	   Stylized	   facts	   in	   the	   European	  Monetary	  
Union	  
Butier	  et	  el	  (1992)	  provide	  an	  overview	  on	  the	  government	   finance	  statistics	  across	  the	  signatory	  countries	  of	  
the	  Maastricht	  Treaty.	  
In	   1992,	   the	   year	   of	   the	   Maastricht	   Treaty,	   many	   candidate	   countries	   did	   not	   satisfy	   the	   guidelines	   about	  
government	  deficit	  and	  debt.	  	  
Table	  1	  reports	   the	  descriptive	  statistics	  of	  government	  debts,	  government	  budget	  and	  primary	  balance	   in	   the	  
signatory	  countries	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  at	  the	  end	  of	  199219.	  
	  
Table	  2.1	   	   	   	  
	   Gross	  Public	  Debt	  as	  
share	  of	  GDP	  in	  1992	  
Government	  Budget	  as	  
share	  of	  GDP	  in	  1992	  
Government	  Primary	  
Balance	  as	  share	  of	  GDP	  
in	  1992	  
Belgium	   129.6	   -­‐5.9	   5.4	  
Denmark	   65.8	   -­‐2.1	   5.2	  
Germany	   48.7	   -­‐3.4	   -­‐0.6	  
Greece	   99	   -­‐13.2	   -­‐0.5	  
Spain	   46.4	   -­‐4.3	   -­‐0.5	  
France	   47.5	   -­‐2	   1.3	  
Ireland	   100.4	   -­‐2.5	   5.8	  
Italy	   103.9	   -­‐9.9	   0.7	  
Luxembourg	   6.4	   2.6	   3.1	  
Netherland	   79.5	   -­‐4.0	   2.2	  
Portugal	   62.7	   -­‐5.4	   3.0	  
United	  Kingdom	   45.6	   -­‐4.9	   -­‐1.6	  
	   	   	   	  
Data	  sourced	  in	  Buiter	  et	  
al	  (1992)	  
	   	   	  
	  
As	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  note	  most	  of	  the	  candidate	  countries	  in	  1992	  recorded	  positive	  or	  negligibly	  negative	  primary	  
balances	   (excluding	   the	   UK)	   meaning	   that	   most	   of	   the	   budget	   deficit	   was	   determined	   by	   high	   interest	   rates	  
expenditures	  on	  government	  public	  debt	   in	   the	   framework	  of	   the	  European	  Monetary	  System	  (EMS)	  as	   in	   the	  
case	  of	  Italy,	  Greece,	  Belgium,	  Portugal	  and	  Ireland.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Despite	  signing	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  in	  1992,	  the	  UK	  and	  Denmark	  opted-­‐out	  of	  the	  Single	  Currency	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In	   this	   framework	   candidate	   countries,	   that	   committed	   to	  qualify	   for	   the	  EMU	  membership	  on	   the	  1st	   January	  
1999,	  started	  to	  implement	  a	  mix	  of	  cuts	  to	  government	  expenditures	  and	  tax	  in	  order	  to	  slash	  budget	  deficit	  and	  
satisfy	  the	  Maastricht	  convergence	  criteria	  on	  the	  1st	  January	  1999	  (Savage,	  2001).	  
Figure	   2.5	   shows	   the	   evolution	   of	   annual	   government	   primary	   balance	   in	   four	   largest	   economies	   of	   the	   EMU	  




As	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   note,	   among	   the	   “big	   four”	   Germany	   and	   Italy	   were	   the	   countries	   that	   recorded	   primary	  
balances	  above	  the	  one	  observed	  in	  the	  aggregate	  Euro	  Area.	  Spain	  recorded	  generally	  negative	  primary	  balance	  
below	  the	  aggregate	  Euro	  Area	  primary	  balance	  since	  2008	  onwards	  while	  France	  recorded	  negative	  or	  below	  
Euro	  Area	  primary	  balances	  since	  1995	  
Figure	  2.6	  reports	  the	  bar	  chart	  of	  average	  rates	  of	  growth	  and	  government	  primary	  balances	  observed	  across	  
the	  original	  member	  states	  of	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union.	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As	  it	  possible	  to	  note,	  Italy	  was	  the	  country	  that	  recorded	  the	  larger	  average	  government	  primary	  balance	  of	  the	  
group	  of	  “big	  fours”	  over	  the	  period	  1995-­‐2018.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  France	  recorded	  negative	  average	  government	  
primary	  balance	  as	  Spain,	  Portugal,	  Greece	  and	  Ireland.	  
Given	   the	  determination	   to	   form	  part	  of	   the	   first	  group	  of	  countries	   that	  would	  have	   joined	   the	  Economic	  and	  
Monetary	  Union	  on	  the	  1st	  January	  1999,	  since	  1995	  a	  dramatic	  reduction	  of	  government	  debt	  was	  observed	  in	  
many	  countries,	  especially	  in	  the	  ones	  that	  had	  started	  the	  transition	  with	  very	  large	  debts	  like	  Belgium	  and	  Italy	  
(Fig.	  2.8a	  and	  2.8b).	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Since	  the	  mid	  of	  the	  1990s	  until	  the	  2007/08	  crisis,	  Italy	  and	  Belgium	  (the	  countries	  that	  have	  recorded	  the	  large	  
government	  primary	  surplus	  together	  with	  Finland)	  were	  seriously	  committed	  to	  government	  debt	  reduction.	  As	  
it	  possible	  to	  note	  government	  debt	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s	  had	  dropped	  by	  more	  than	  20	  percentage	  points	  in	  
both	  the	  countries	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  levels	  observed	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  
However	  the	  path	  of	  debt	  reduction	  was	  interrupted	  by	  the	  breakout	  of	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  that	  resulted	  
in	   an	   abrupt	   increase	   in	   government	   debt	   as	   percentage	   of	   GDP,	   especially	   in	   Italy	   where	   the	   ratio	   in	   2013	  
exceeded	  the	   levels	  observed	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  Given	  the	  positive	  or	  generally	  non-­‐negative	  primary	  balance	  
observed	   also	   during	   the	   height	   of	   the	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis	   and	   the	   sovereign	   debt	   crisis	   (2011-­‐2013)	   it	   is	  
possible	  also	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  new	  explosion	  of	  government	  debt	  in	  Italy	  was	  basically	  provoked	  by	  the	  relevant	  
increase	   in	   interest	   rates	   on	   government	   bonds	   and	   the	   consequent	   increase	   in	   the	   expenditures	   for	   debt	  
servicing.	  
Also	  Spain	  and	  Portugal	  recorded	  an	  explosion	  of	  government	  debt	  after	  2007.	  As	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  note	  in	  Figure	  




Contrary	  to	  Italy	  that	  was	  forced	  to	  implement	  austerity	  policies	  until	  abruptly	  bringing	  its	  primary	  surplus	  from	  
0.6%	  in	  2011	  to	  3.2%	  in	  2012	  under	  financial	  market	  pressures,	  Spain	  and	  Portugal	  (whose	  government	  debts	  
was	  much	  lower)	  were	  allowed	  to	  record	  negative	  primary	  government	  balances	  during	  the	  height	  of	  the	  crisis.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  In	  Appendix	  1	  I	  will	  provide	  an	  overview	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  government	  debt	  on	  economic	  growth	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  Economic	  and	  
Monetary	  Union	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Spain	  was	  also	  able	  to	  balance	  its	  primary	  government	  budget	  gradually	  until	  stabilizing	  it	  at	  values	  around	  zero	  




The	   negative	   relationship	   between	   “austerity”	   or	   fiscal	   consolidation	   and	   cumulative	   economic	   growth	   in	   the	  
countries	  of	  the	  Euro	  Area	  is	  shown	  in	  figure	  2.13.	  The	  year	  2011	  is	  chosen	  as	  benchmark	  in	  order	  to	  insulate	  the	  
years	  of	  the	  Global	  Financial	  crisis	  and	  focus	  only	  on	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  double	  dip	  recession	  experienced	  by	  
many	  European	  economies,	  the	  peripheral	  ones	  in	  particular.	  Furthermore	  in	  the	  period	  2011-­‐2012	  the	  crisis	  of	  
sovereign	  debt	  intensified	  Spain,	  Portugal,	  Greece,	  Ireland	  and	  Italy	  were	  forced	  to	  implement	  harsher	  austerity	  
measures.	  Also	  De	  Grauwe	  and	  Ji	  (2013b)	  take	  the	  year	  2011	  as	  a	  reference	  year	  because	  it	  was	  actually	  the	  year	  
during	   which	   the	   interest	   rates	   on	   peripheral	   countries	   government	   bonds	   peaked	   and	   the	   European	   and	  
national	  authorities	  reacted	  with	  a	  “panic-­‐driven	  austerity”.	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According	   to	   the	   OLS	   regression	   output	   estimated	   on	   the	   sample	   of	   countries	   visible	   in	   Figure	   2.11,	   one	  
percentage	  point	   increase	   in	  “austerity”	  or	   fiscal	  consolidation	  has	  been	  associated	  on	  average	  to	  a	  cumulative	  
reduction	  of	  3.14%	  in	  GDP	  growth	  in	  following	  7	  years21.	  As	  matter	  of	  facts,	  Italy	  and	  Greece,	  the	  countries	  have	  
been	   required	   to	   implement	   the	   harsher	   austerity	   measures	   since	   2011,	   were	   actually	   the	   countries	   that	  
recorded	  the	  worst	  economic	  performances.	  Symmetrically	  France	  and	  Spain,	  the	  only	  two	  countries	  of	  the	  “old”	  
EMU	   that	   have	   been	   allowed	   to	   record	   negative	   primary	   balances,	   have	   been	   actually	   amongst	   the	   best	  
performers	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  growth	  during	  the	  period	  2011-­‐2018.	  
	  
2.6	  The	  Estimated	  Model	  
The	   estimations	   reported	   in	   Chapter	   1	   for	   the	   period	   1995-­‐2018	   suggest	   that	   absolute	   beta	   convergence	  
between	  the	  early	  members	  of	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	  is	  unrealistic	  because	  the	  economies	  are	  not	  
converging	  towards	  the	  same	  steady	  state.	  When	  countries	  are	  not	  homogeneous	   in	  their	   initial	   fundamentals,	  
convergence	  can	  be	  found	  only	  in	  “conditional	  terms”,	  that	  is,	  by	  holding	  constant	  a	  set	  of	  conditioning	  variables	  
(Sala-­‐i-­‐Martin,	  1995;	  Barro	  and	  Sala-­‐i-­‐Martin,	  1992).	  	  
In	  order	  to	  test	  convergence	  conditional	  on	  a	  primary	  government	  balance	  and	  a	  set	  of	  other	  variables	  I	  specify	  
the	  following	  fixed	  effects	  regression	  model22:	  
	  
(1/T) ln (yit / yit-T) = αi + β1 ln (yi, t-T ) + β2 (X1, it) + [(ln (yi, t-T ) ⋅ (X1, it)] β3 + Ψ Zi,t +Π+ µit  
 
 




Where	  yi,	  t-­‐T	  	  	  denotes	  the	  per	  capita	  income	  in	  country	  i	  at	  the	  beginning	  time	  interval.	  T	  is	  the	  length	  of	  the	  time	  
interval	   (T=3).	  Symbol	  αi	  (i=1…n)	   is	   the	  unknown	   intercept	   for	  each	  country	   in	   the	  sample	  and	  X2	  denotes	   the	  
variable	  of	   interest	  of	  this	   inferential	  analysis,	  namely	  the	  primary	  government	  balance	  as	  percentage	  of	  trend	  
GDP.	   	   Trend	   GDP	   represents	   the	   potential	   output	   or	   the	   productive	   capacity	   of	   an	   economy	   insulated	   by	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Ireland	  and	  Germany	  are	  not	  included	  in	  this	  cross	  section	  of	  countries	  because	  average	  growth	  observed	  in	  Ireland	  represents	  a	  statistical	  
outlier	  while,	  according	  to	  Bernanke	  (2015),	  Germany	  experienced	  sustained	  economic	  growth	  with	  an	  export-­‐led	  strategy	  that	  allowed	  the	  
country	  to	  offset	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  fiscal	  austerity.	  It	  is	  precisely	  for	  this	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  final	  model	  will	  be	  estimated	  on	  a	  longitudinal	  
panel	  dataset	  that	  allows	  to	  capture	  short-­‐term	  adjustments,	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  variables	  over	  time	  and	  to	  remove	  
the	  drawbacks	  of	  OLS	  regression	  inference	  on	  cross	  sectional	  data	  
22	  The	   model	   will	   be	   estimated	   on	   two	   samples	   of	   countries.	   The	   first	   sample	   called	   of	   “Old	   EMU”	   of	   EMU-­‐12	   contains	   Germany,	   the	  
Netherlands,	   Belgium,	   France,	   Finland,	   Austria,	   Ireland,	   Spain,	   Italy,	   Portugal	   and	   Greece.	   The	   second	   sample	   called	   “Old	   EU”	   or	   EU-­‐15	  
contains	  all	  the	  countries	  included	  in	  the	  first	  sample	  (Old	  EMU)	  plus	  Denmark,	  Sweden	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	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cyclical	  component,	  therefore	  choosing	  the	  “primary	  balance	  as	  percentage	  of	  trend	  GDP”	  is	  a	  strategy	  to	  reduce	  
the	  potential	  endogeneity	  of	  the	  variable.	  
	  Zi,t	   denotes	   is	   a	   vector	   of	   control	   variables	   that	   hold	   constant	   the	   steady	   state,	   commonly	   utilized	   in	   the	  
theoretical	   and	   empirical	   literature	   on	   economic	   growth	   and	   convergence:	   investment	   rate	   as	   share	   of	   GDP,	  
human	   capital	   proxied	   as	   the	   share	   labour	   force	   with	   tertiary	   education	   and	   population	   growth.	   Symbols	  Π	  
denotes	  a	  dummy	  variable	  that	  indicates	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  in	  the	  period	  2011-­‐2013	  in	  the	  four	  Southern	  
European	  countries	  plus	  Ireland.	  Symbol	  μ	  denotes	  the	  error	  term.	  	  	  
The	   polynomial	   	   [(ln	   (yi,	   t-­‐T	   )	   ⋅	   (X1,	   it)]	   denotes	   an	   interaction	   term	   between	   government	   primary	   balance	   as	  
percentage	  of	  GDP	  and	  the	  natural	  logarithm	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  time	  interval.	  	  
The	  use	  of	  interaction	  terms	  in	  convergence	  studies	  is	  an	  econometric	  modelling	  technique	  especially	  common	  in	  
the	   literature	   on	   the	   linkages	   between	   globalization,	   financial	   development	   and	   income	   convergence	   (Gomes	  
Neto	  and	  Veiga,	  2019;	  Abiad	  et	  al,	  2007;	  Aghion	  et	  al,	  2004).	  
In	   this	   case	  with	   this	   technique	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   estimate	  whether	   austerity	  measures	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   fiscal	  
consolidation	   over	   the	   period	   1995-­‐2018	   have	   a	   symmetrical	   negative	   effect	   on	   economic	   growth	   across	   the	  
countries	   or	   it	   especially	   affects	   economic	   growth	   in	   the	   poorer	   economies,	   thus	   undermining	   convergence	  
within	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union.	  
Indeed	  the	  equation	  can	  be	  algebraically	  rearranged	  as	  follows:	  
 
(1/T) ln (yit / yit-T)  = αi  +[β1 + (β3 x2,it )] *ln (yi, t-T ) + β2 (X2, it) + Ψ Zi,t + Π +µit  
(2.3) 
 
If	   coefficient	   estimate	   for	  GDP	  per	   capita	   at	   the	  beginning	   of	   each	   time	   interval	   (β1) is negative and statistically 
significant (implying “beta” convergence) and coefficient estimate for primary government balance (β2) is negative and 
statistically significant (indicating generalized negative effects of fiscal consolidation on growth), a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient estimate for the interaction term (β3) would mean that fiscal consolidation or austerity 
(X2) reduces the “negativity” of β1 coefficient, thus the speed of convergence. This essentially means that fiscal 
consolidation or austerity affects economic growth more in the poorer economies that according to the theory are 
supposed to grow more rapidly than the richer ones. As the Neoclassical Theory predicts, coefficient estimates for 
Investment rate to GDP and percentage of labour force with tertiary education are expected to take on positive signs 
while coefficient estimate for population growth is expected to take on negative sign.   
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Table	  2.2	   	   	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  growth	   Sample	  “Old	  EMU”	  or	  EMU-­‐12	  
(a)	  
Number	  of	  Obs=88	  
Number	  of	  Groups=11	  
Within	  R-­‐sq=	  0.67	  
	  
	  
Sample	  “Old	  EU”	  or	  UE-­‐15	  
(b)	  
Number	  of	  Obs=112	  
Number	  of	  Groups=14	  
Within	  R-­‐sq=	  .62	  
	  
	  
















Log	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.39***	  	  	  	  
[.10]	  
	  
Labour	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Sovereign	  Debt	  crisis	  	  	  (ψ)	  
	  
-­‐2.7***	  	  	  	  
[.83]	  
	  











	   	   	  
***	  Significant	  at	  1%	  **Significant	  at	  5%	  *Significant	  at	  10%	  
	  Standard	  Errors	  in	  brackets	  [	  ]	  
	  
	   Hausman	  Test:	  	  
chi2	  =	  20.93	  
Prob>chi2	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  0.003	  	  
Hausman	  Test:	  
chi2	  =	  40.00	  




2.7	  Considerations	  on	  Panel	  Data	  analysis	  with	  Fixed	  Effects	  or	  “Within	  Group	  Estimator”	  	  
Hsiao	  (2006	  and	  2005)	  underlines	  two	  main	  advantages	  provided	  by	  the	  utilization	  of	  panel	  data	  with	  respect	  to	  
cross	  sectional	  or	  time	  series	  data	  estimations.	  
Firstly,	   panel	   data	   estimations	   have	   greater	   capacity	   for	   capturing	   the	   complexity	   of	   social	   behaviour	   than	   a	  
single	  cross-­‐section	  or	  time	  series	  data	  (Hisiao,	  2003).	  	  
Secondly,	   panel	   data	   estimation	   provides	   more	   accurate	   inference	   of	   model	   parameters.	   Panel	   data	   usually	  
contain	  more	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  and	  can	  also	  help	  to	  relax	  any	  eventual	  presence	  of	  multicollinearity	  between	  
the	  predictors	  than	  cross-­‐sectional	  analysis	  (Hsiao,	  Mountain	  and	  Ho-­‐Illman,	  1995).	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Panel	   data	   combines	   time	   series	   (with	  N=1	   and	   t=	   1,	   2,…..T)	   and	   cross	   section	   (with	   n=1,2,….N	  and	  T=1)	   and	  
allows	  the	  analysis	  of	  whether	  a	  causal	  relationship	  from	  the	  predictors	  to	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  maintained	  	  
over	  time.	  	  
Furthermore	  3	  years	  time	  intervals	  permit	  to	  “insulate”	  the	  period	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  (2007-­‐2009)	  and	  
the	  period	  of	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  (2010-­‐2012).	  The	  time	  interval	  of	  three	  years	  is	  also	  chosen	  because	  of	  the	  
limitation	  of	   the	   availability	   of	   data	   for	   the	   variable	  primary	  balance	   to	  GDP	   that	   represents	   the	   object	   of	   the	  
hypothesis	  of	  this	  chapter.	  Indeed	  data	  for	  government	  primary	  balance	  are	  available	  in	  AMECO	  database	  from	  
1995	  and	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  suitable	  number	  of	  observations	  (and	  capture	  the	  changes	  over	  time)	  the	  choice	  of	  
this	   choice	   seems	   the	  most	   appropriate.	  On	   the	  one	  hand	  using	  4	  or	  5	  years	  non-­‐overlapping	  averages	  would	  
mean	  to	  work	  on	  too	   few	  observation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  working	  on	  2	  years	  non-­‐overlapping	  average	  would	  
not	  allow	  fully	  capture	  the	  changes	  in	  GDP	  growth	  when	  regressed	  on	  the	  log	  GDP	  per	  capita	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  
each	  time	  interval.	  
Besides	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  time	  intervals	  for	  observation,	  a	  common	  issue	  that	  arises	  when	  working	  on	  panel	  data	  
concerns	  the	  choice	  between	  fixed	  effects	  with	  OLS	  Estimator	  or	  random	  effects	  with	  Generalized	  Least	  Squares	  
Estimator	  (GLS).	  
As	   regards	   the	   GLS	   estimator,	   individual	   effects	   of	   each	   entity	   i	   are	   assumed	   to	   be	   uncorrelated	   with	   the	  
exogenous	   variables	   included	   in	   the	   model.	   However,	   these	   estimators	   relying	   on	   such	   assumption	   are	   not	  
suitable	   because	   it	   is	   precisely	   the	   fact	   of	   correlation	   that	   forms	   the	   basis	   in	   favour	   of	   panel	   data	   approach	  
excluding	  cross-­‐section	  (Islam,	  1995:1138).	  	  
Fixed	  effects	  estimator	  allows	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  correlation	  between	  the	  unobserved	  variables	  and	  the	  
regressors	  by	  treating	  each	  country’s	  intercept	  as	  an	  unknown	  intercept	  to	  be	  estimated	  as	  one	  for	  each	  country	  
i	  in	  the	  panel	  in	  order	  to	  control	  for	  heterogeneity	  (Stock	  and	  Watson,	  2014).	  Furthermore,	  sampling	  units	  in	  the	  
panel	   are	   almost	   all	   the	   countries	   belonging	   to	   an	   integrated	   economic	   area	   and	  with	   specific	   characteristics	  
(geographical	   location,	  cultural	  heritages	  and	  structures	  of	  society),	   therefore	  “countries”	  cannot	  be	   treated	  as	  
randomly	   selected	   individuals	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   inferential	   analyses	   conducted	   for	   example	   on	   the	  
determinants	  of	  citizens’	  wage	  in	  different	  districts	  of	  large	  cities.	  
From	  the	  technical	  point	  of	  view,	  also	  the	  output	  of	  the	  Hausman	  Tests	  applied	  to	  the	  model	  estimated	  for	  the	  
two	  samples	  suggests	  the	  suitability	  of	  Fixed	  Effects	  estimator	  to	  infer	  the	  data.	  
However,	  estimations	  on	  panel	  data	  with	  fixed	  effects	  tend	  to	  produce	  much	  larger	  coefficient	  estimates	  for	  the	  
log	   of	   initial	   GDP	   per	   capita	   than	   OLS	   estimations	   on	   cross-­‐section.	   According	   to	   Barro	   and	   Sala-­‐i-­‐Martin	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(2005:495),	   fixed	   effects	   estimations	   of	   speeds	   of	   convergence	   ranging	   from	   12	   to	   20%	   per	   year	   are	   not	  
uncommon	   in	   the	   literature.	   Indeed,	  one	  concern	  with	   fixed	  effects	  arises	   from	  the	  need	  to	   include	  many	  time	  
series	  observations	  in	  the	  panel	  and	  this	  procedure	  can	  be	  carried	  out	  only	  by	  shortening	  the	  time	  periods	  within	  
which	  the	  growth	  rate	  is	  computed.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  dependent	  variable	  tends	  to	  be	  growth	  rates	  over	  two	  to	  
five	   years	   and	   growth	   rates	   tend	   to	   capture	   short-­‐term	   adjustments	   around	   the	   trend	   rather	   than	   long-­‐term	  
convergence.	  
However,	  it	  is	  worth	  to	  remind	  that	  this	  convergence	  is	  “conditional”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  countries	  with	  lower	  GDP	  
per	  capita	  converge	  faster	  towards	  their	  own	  steady	  state	  equilibrium	  and	  not	  towards	  a	  common	  steady	  state.	  
	  
2.8	  Discussion	  of	  the	  Results	  
The	  estimation	  of	  the	  model	  yields	  to	  very	  interesting	  results.	  First	  of	  all	  the	  results	  are	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  
Neoclassical	   Growth	   Model	   and	   the	   traditional	   conditional	   convergence	   studies	   developed	   in	   the	   empirical	  
literature	  by	  Barro	  (1991),	  Barro	  and	  Sala-­‐i-­‐Martin	  (1991)	  and	  Makiw	  et	  al	  (1992).	  In	  fact	  both	  physical	  capital	  
accumulation,	  denoted	  by	  the	  variable	  investment	  rate	  to	  GDP,	  and	  human	  capital	  accumulation,	  denoted	  by	  the	  
educational	   attainment	   of	   the	   labour	   force,	   exert	   a	   statistically	   significant	   effect	   on	   the	   steady-­‐state	   economic	  
growth.	   	  Furthermore,	  as	  predicted	  in	  the	  Solow	  Model	  (1956),	  population	  growth	  negatively	  affects	  growth	  in	  
income	  per	  capita	  in	  the	  sample	  of	  European	  countries	  under	  analysis.	  
As	  expected	  the	  dummy	  variable,	  which	  takes	  on	  value	  1	  if	  a	  country	  experienced	  a	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  (Italy,	  
Spain,	  Greece,	  Portugal	  and	   Ireland)	   in	   the	   time	   interval	  2010-­‐12,	  bears	  a	  negative	  and	  statistically	   significant	  
coefficient	  estimate.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  the	  mentioned	  dummy	  variable	  in	  the	  model	  has	  a	  twofold	  utility.	  First,	  it	  
allows	  differentiate	  between	  countries	   that	  experienced	  troubles	   in	   the	  sovereign	  bonds	  market	  and	  countries	  
that	   did	   not	   experience	   this	   problem.	   Furthermore	   a	   “sovereign	   debt	   crisis”	   commonly	   arises	   in	   advanced	  
economies	  when	  they	  are	  part	  of	  a	  monetary	  union	  (De	  Grauwe,	  2011).	  Therefore	  the	  inclusion	  of	  this	  dummy	  
variable,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   represents	   a	   strategy	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	   fact	   that	   peripheral	   countries	   plus	  
Ireland	  experienced	  a	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  that	  further	  exacerbated	  the	  economic	  downturn	  because	  of	  the	  fact	  
that	   they	   are	  members	   of	   a	  monetary	   union.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   inclusion	   of	   the	   dummy	   variable	   for	   the	  
countries	   that	   experienced	   a	   sovereign	   debt	   crisis	   in	   the	   time	   interval	   2010-­‐2012	   represents	   a	   reasonable	  
econometric	  strategy	  to	  control	   for	  the	  fact	  that	   income	  per	  capita	  dropt	  more	  steeply	   in	  those	  countries,	   thus	  
further	  reducing	  the	  potential	  endogeneity	  of	  the	  variable	  “primary	  government	  balance	  as	  percentage	  of	  trend	  
GDP”.	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Finally,	   coming	   to	   the	   main	   variable	   of	   interest	   of	   this	   analysis,	   that	   is	   “primary	   government	   balance	   as	  
percentage	  of	  trend	  GDP”,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  model	  are	  remarkably	  interesting.	  First,	  the	  effect	  on	  one	  percentage	  
point	  change	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  on	  economic	  growth	  is	  much	  stronger	  in	  absolute	  terms	  than	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  
change	  in	  any	  other	  variable	  included	  in	  the	  model,	  such	  as	  investment	  rate	  and	  human	  capital.	  
Second,	  the	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  coefficient	  estimate	  on	  the	  interaction	  term,	  confirms	  that	  fiscal	  
consolidation	   during	   the	   period	   1995-­‐2018	   has	   produced	   asymmetric	   effects	   on	   economic	   growth	   across	   the	  
countries	  of	  the	  EMU,	  penalizing	  growth	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  “poorer”	  economies	  what	  are	  supposed	  to	  catch-­‐up	  
with	  the	  richer	  ones.	  
	  
2.9	  Conclusions	  
The	  empirical	  results	  of	  this	  analysis	  are	  very	  interesting	  and	  informative	  both	  from	  the	  academic	  point	  of	  view	  
and	  for	  policy-­‐makers	  because	  the	  results	  shed	  a	   light	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  growth	  and	  contractionary	  
budgetary	  policy	   in	   the	  EMU.	  First	  of	   all	   I	   show	   that	   after	   the	  outbreak	  of	   the	  global	   financial	   crisis,	   the	   fiscal	  
adjustment	  programs	  implemented	  in	  may	  countries	  of	  the	  EMU	  countries	  had	  a	  pro-­‐cyclical	  effect.	  This	  findings	  
confirm	   the	   results	   of	   the	   analysis	   of	   Ostry	   at	   al	   (2015)	   according	   to	  which	   the	   costs	   of	   the	   tax	   increases	   or	  
expenditure	  cuts	  required	  to	  bring	  down	  the	  debt	  may	  be	  much	  larger	  than	  the	  reduced	  crisis	  risk	  engendered	  
by	  the	  lower	  debt.	  
The	  empirical	  evidence	  in	  particular	  suggests	  that	  the	  countries	  that	  have	  actually	  been	  forced	  to	  implement	  the	  
harsher	  austerity	  measures	  were	  actually	  the	  ones	  that	  recorded	  the	  worst	  economic	  performances	  during	  the	  
crisis	  under	  the	  speculative	  pressures	  of	   financial	  markets	  as	   in	  the	  case	  of	  Italy	  or	  under	  the	  conditionality	  of	  
financial	  assistance	  from	  international	  creditors	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Greece.	  	  
Italy	  that	  on	  average	  recorded	  a	  rate	  of	  growth	  below	  the	  Greek	  levels	  during	  the	  period	  1995-­‐2018	  was	  also	  the	  
sole	  peripheral	  country	  that	  recorded	  persistent	  primary	  budget	  surpluses	  for	  fiscal	  consolidation	  since	  the	  mid	  
of	  the	  1990s.	  	  
After	   these	   preliminary	   findings	   I	   have	   estimated	   a	   model	   to	   assess	   the	   effects	   of	   “permanent”	   fiscal	  
consolidation	   on	   economic	   growth	   and	   conditional	   convergence	   during	   the	   period	   1995-­‐2018,	   based	   on	   a	  
longitudinal	  panel	  dataset.	   	  According	  to	  the	  results,	   fiscal	  consolidation	   impacts	  economic	  growth	  much	  more	  
than	   any	   other	   variable.	   Indeed	   a	   percentage	   point	   increase	   in	   primary	   government	   balance	   for	   fiscal	  
consolidation	   is	  expected	  to	  reduce	  economic	  growth	  by	  6.43%	  in	   the	   time	   interval	   (Table	  3.2a).	  The	  negative	  
impact	  of	  one	  percentage	  point	  increase	  in	  fiscal	  consolidation	  is	  much	  stronger	  than	  the	  positive	  impact	  of	  one	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percentage	  point	  increase	  in	  investment	  rate	  to	  GDP	  or	  an	  in	  the	  level	  of	  human	  capital	  (proxied	  as	  percentage	  of	  
labour	  force	  with	  tertiary	  education).	  
The	  most	  relevant	  finding	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  the	  positive	  sign	  and	  the	  statistically	  significance	  of	  the	  coefficient	  
estimate	  for	  the	  interaction	  term	  [ln (yi, t-T ) ⋅ (X1, it)]	  that	  confirms	  that	  fiscal	  consolidation	  and	  austerity	  	  do	  not	  
affect	   homogeneously	   economic	   growth	   in	   the	   economies	  of	   the	  EMU.	   	  Rather,	   the	  monotonic	  European	   fiscal	  
rules	  affect	  primarily	  the	  countries	  with	  lower	  income	  per	  capita	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  catch	  up	  with	  the	  richer	  
ones.	   	   From	   a	   technical	   point	   of	   view,	   the	   positive	   and	   statistically	   significant	   coefficient	   estimate	   on	   the	  
interaction	   term	   means	   that	   the	   European	   fiscal	   rules	   reduces	   the	   steady	   state	   growth	   in	   the	   peripheral	  
countries	  which	  could	  consequently	  never	  reduce	  the	  gap	  in	  income	  per	  capita	  with	  the	  richer	  economies	  of	  the	  
EMU-­‐12	  or	  the	  EU-­‐15.	  
In	  this	  framework	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  compliance	  of	  monotonic	  European	  budget	  rules,	  regardless	  
of	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  economy,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  relevant	  determinants	  of	  the	  divergence	  observed	  within	  the	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Appendix	  2.1:	  General	  Government	  Debt	  and	  Economic	  Growth	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  EMU	  
The	  relationship	  between	  government	  debt	  and	  economic	  growth	  is	  a	  topic	  that	  has	  been	  common	  concern	  in	  the	  
literature	  in	  particular	  since	  the	  breakout	  of	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  that	  was	  associated	  to	  sharp	  rises	  in	  the	  
stock	  of	  government	  debts	  (Igan	  et	  al,	  2019).	  This	  topic	  is	  particularly	  sensitive	  in	  the	  Euro	  Area	  because	  of	  the	  
absence	  of	  a	  federal	  budget	  and	  a	  common	  insurance	  scheme	  on	  bank	  deposits	  that	  makes	  the	  financial	  health	  of	  
banks	   and	   sovereigns	   intertwined	   	   (Dell’Ariccia	   er	   al,	   2018;	   Jarociński	   and	   Maćkowiak,	   2017;	   Stiglitz,	   2017;	  
Zingales,	   2014).	   Given	   this	   nexus	   between	   sovereigns	   and	   banking	   system	   the	   Maastricht	   Treaty	   initially	  
established	  strict	  public	  finances	  conditions	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  for	  the	  accession	  on	  the	  1st	  January	  1999.	  
However	  some	  countries	  were	  allowed	  to	  join	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	  in	  1999	  without	  fulfilling	  the	  
Treaty’s	  condition	  that	  imposed	  a	  debt	  to	  GDP	  ratio	  equal	  to	  60%.	  
Figure	  2a.1	  shows	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  Treaty-­‐implied	  ratio	  and	  the	  actual	  government	  debt	  to	  GDP	  ratio	  




May	   the	   magnitude	   of	   initial	   government	   debt	   in	   1999	   have	   negatively	   affected	   subsequent	   economic	  
performances	  of	  the	  countries	  that	  joined	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union?	  	  	  
In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  question,	  I	  provide	  the	  plot	  with	  the	  fitted	  line	  of	  the	  magnitude	  of	  government	  debt	  in	  
1999	  and	  average	  economic	  growth	  during	  the	  period	  1999-­‐2018	  (Figure	  2a.2)	  and	  as	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  note	  high	  
government	  debt	  in	  1999	  been	  negatively	  associate	  with	  average	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  following	  20	  years.	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The	  graphs	  show	  that	  the	  countries	  with	  the	  worst	  economic	  performances	  since	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Economic	  
and	  Monetary	  Union	  were	  actually	  Greece	  and	  Italy	  that	  were	  actually	  the	  countries	  that	  joined	  the	  club	  with	  the	  
highest	  government	  debt	  to	  GDP	  ratios.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  best	  performing	  economies	  since	  the	  introduction	  
of	   the	  European	   single	   currency	  were	  Luxembourg	  and	   Ireland	   that	   actually	   joined	   the	   club	  with	  government	  
debt	  to	  GDP	  ratios	  below	  40%.	  	  In	  Table	  2a.1	  I	  report	  the	  output	  of	  the	  regression	  of	  growth	  during	  the	  period	  
1999-­‐2018	  on	  initial	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  and	  the	  government	  debt	  ratio	  on	  the	  1st	  January	  1999.	  
	  
Tab.	  2a.1	   EMU	  before	  the	  Enlargement	   Enlarged	  EMU	  
Log	  of	  GDP	  in	  1999	   -­‐1.19	  	  	  	  
[1.0]	  
-­‐1.29***	  	  	  	  
[.37]	  




R2	   .53	   .76	  
Pairwise	  correlation	   -­‐.66	   -­‐.75	  
***Statistically	  significant	  at	  1%	  **Statistically	  significant	  at	  5%	  
	  
As	   it	   possible	   to	  note	   the	   regression	  output	   confirms	   that	   the	  variable	   “government	  debt	   ratio	   in	  1999”	  has	   a	  
negative	  impact	  on	  growth	  and	  that	  convergence	  in	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	  during	  the	  period	  1999-­‐
2018	  is	  detected	  only	  if	  NMS	  that	  joined	  the	  EMU	  are	  included	  in	  the	  sample.	  
After	   having	   empirically	   estimate	   the	   negative	   relationship	   between	   government	   debt	   and	   economic	   growth,	  
there	   is	   a	   second	   question	   to	   be	   answered	   to	   assess	   how	   the	   EMU	   membership	   has	   affected	   the	   peripheral	  
countries	   of	   the	  monetary	  union.	   	  Does	   government	  debt	  negatively	   affect	   economic	   growth	   regardless	   of	   the	  
monetary	  system	  or	  does	  government	  debt	  negatively	  affect	  economic	  growth	  in	  advanced	  economies	  only	  when	  
they	  join	  a	  monetary	  union	  as	  asserted	  by	  De	  Grauwe	  and	  Ji	  (2015),	  De	  Grauwe	  (2011)	  and	  Krugman	  (2011)?	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Figure	   2a.2	   shows	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   strict	   negative	   relationship	   between	   government	   debt	   in	   1999	   and	  
subsequent	   economic	   performances	   in	   the	   European	   Union	   non-­‐Euro	   countries	   (a)	   and	   within	   the	   group	   of	  




The	  negative	  and	  statistically	   significant	   relationship	  between	   the	   two	  variables	   is	   also	  absent	  also	  within	   the	  




Indeed	   government	   debt	   is	   positively	   related	   to	   higher	   interest	   rates	   and	   higher	   government	   interest	   rates	  
expenditures.	  Given	   the	  budget	   constrains	   imposed	  by	   the	  EMU	  membership,	   in	   this	   framework	  countries	  are	  
forced	  to	  increase	  their	  primary	  balance	  surpluses	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  rules	  established	  by	  the	  treaties	  and	  
reassure	   financial	  markets	  about	  public	  debt	   sustainability.	  As	   remarked	  by	  Krugman	   	   (2011)	  and	  De	  Grauwe	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(2011),	  the	  absence	  of	  lender	  of	  last	  resort	  in	  the	  member	  countries	  of	  the	  EMU	  forces	  the	  weaker	  countries	  to	  
offer	  higher	  interest	  rates	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  investors'	  reluctance	  to	  purchase	  riskier	  governemnt	  securities.	  
In	  the	  Appendix	  3.1	  of	  Chapter	  3	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  graphical	  example	  of	  the	  disadvantage	  of	  the	  constrain	  entailed	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3.1	  Introduction	  
In	  Chapter	  2	  I	  have	  analysed	  the	  negative	   impact	  of	  restrictive	  fiscal	  policy	  on	  growth	  and	  convergence	  within	  
the	  EMU-­‐12	  and	  EU-­‐15.	  By	  allowing	  the	  three-­‐year	  averaged	  variable	  “government	  primary	  balance”	  to	  interact	  
with	  the	  natural	  logarithm	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  time	  interval	  I	  showed	  that	  restrictive	  fiscal	  
policy	  affects	   in	  particular	  the	  “poorer”	  countries	  that,	  according	  to	  the	  theory,	  would	  be	  supposed	  to	  catch	  up	  
with	  the	  richer	  ones.	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  “bifurcation”	  in	  regional	  economic	  growth	  observed	  in	  Europe	  
since	   the	   early	   2000s	   is,	   among	   others,	   the	   consequence	   of	   contractionary	   fiscal	   policy	   implemented	   by	  
governments	  as	  policy	  response	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis.	  
The	  model	  will	  be	  estimated	  with	  Multilevel	  Mixed	  Effects	  regression	  technique	  on	  a	  panel	  dataset	  built	  on	  3-­‐
year	   non-­‐overlapping	   averages	   during	   the	   period	   2007-­‐2015,	   thus	   obtaining	   observations	   over	   three	   time	  
intervals	   (2007-­‐2009;	   2010-­‐2012;	   2013-­‐2015)	   for	   each	   of	   the	   156	   regions	   in	   the	   sample	   clustered	   into	   10	  
groups.	  
The	  relevance	  of	  the	  analysis	  I	  conduct	  in	  this	  chapter	  lies	  on	  its	  originality.	  Indeed,	  despite	  empirical	  analyses	  
on	  the	  effects	  of	  contractionary	  fiscal	  policy	  on	  economic	  growth	  have	  been	  flourishing	  since	  the	  Global	  Financial	  
Crisis,	   no	   authors	   have	   directly	   estimated	   the	   effects	   of	   government	   fiscal	   consolidation	   in	   time	   of	   crisis	   on	  
regional	   economic	   performances	   in	   Europe.	   Rather	   authors	   have	   extensively	   analysed	   the	   effects	   of	   fiscal	  
consolidation	  on	  economic	  growth	  in	  Europe	  at	  country	  level	  (Heimberger,	  2016;	  Cugnasca	  and	  Rother,	  2015)	  
However,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  analysis	  regional	  growth	  and	  convergence	  many	  studies	  limit	  themselves	  to	  test	  
absolute	  beta-­‐convergence	  during	  the	  period	  that	  comprises	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  and	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  
crisis	   to	   show	   that	   regional	   convergence	   in	   the	   EU-­‐28	   has	   bifurcated	   and	   shifted	   from	   Southern	   Europe	   to	  
Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  (Gross,	  2018;	  Alcidi,	  et	  al,	  2018).	  
Other	   studies	   incorporate	   spatial	   dependence	   in	   the	   form	   of	   inverse	   distance	   matrices	   in	   the	   well-­‐known	  
regression	  equation	  of	  conditional	  beta	  convergence	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  incorporate	  geographical	  spillovers	  in	  the	  
process	  of	  regional	  growth	  and	  convergence	  (Özyurt	  and	  Dees	  2015;	  Harris,	  2008).	  	  	  
The	   	   relevance	   of	   this	   analysis	   is	   also	   confirmed	   by	   the	   output	   of	   the	  model.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   I	   quantify	   the	  
effects	  of	  central	  government	  fiscal	  policy	  on	  within-­‐country	  regional	  performances	  and	  I	  empirically	  show	  that	  
contractionary	  fiscal	  policy	  measures	  are	  the	  principal	  determinant	  of	  weak	  or	  negative	  regional	  performances	  
observed	  in	  many	  countries	  during	  the	  period	  2008-­‐2015.	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On	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  show	  that	  almost	  60%	  of	  total	  cross	  regional	  variance	  in	  economic	  growth	  may	  be	  attributed	  
to	   between-­‐countries	   differences	   in	   macroeconomic	   fundamentals,	   among	   which	   government	   fiscal	   policy.	  	  
Furthermore	   the	   disaggregated	   slopes	   of	   the	   predictor	   general	   government	   primary	   balance	   as	   percentage	   of	  
trend	  GDP	   show	   that	   negative	   “Keynesian	   effects”	   of	   fiscal	   consolidation	   are	  much	   stronger	   in	   the	   peripheral	  
countries	   and	   France	   than	   in	   the	   “core”	   countries.	   Thus,	   the	   empirical	   evidence	   about	   the	   negative	   impact	   of	  
fiscal	  consolidation	  on	  convergence	  at	  country	  level	  showed	  in	  Chapter	  2	  is	  also	  confirmed	  at	  regional	  level.	  	  
	  
3.2	  Description	  of	  the	  Data	  
The	  main	  source	  of	  data	  used	  for	  the	  dataset	  is	  the	  European	  Regional	  Database	  made	  available	  upon	  license	  by	  
Cambridge	  Econometrics	  Ltd	  in	  2017.	  This	  is	  the	  unique	  database	  that	  provides	  disaggregate	  sectorial	  data	  for	  
regional	  economic	  activity	  for	  all	  the	  NUTS-­‐1,	  NUTS-­‐2	  and	  NUTS-­‐3	  European	  territories.	  	  Data	  are	  available	  until	  
the	  year	  2015	  therefore	  I	  cannot	  extend	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  on	  (regional)	  economic	  
growth	  to	  the	  year	  2018	  as	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  
Cambridge	   Econometrics	   database	   contains	   data	   for	   employment,	   population,	   aggregate	   GDP,	   aggregate	   GVA,	  
and	   aggregate	   investment	   rate.	   Data	   for	   GDP	   and	   GVA	   and	   Investment	   rates	   are	   expressed	   in	   Euro	   at	   2005	  
constant	  prices.	   	  The	  database	  also	  provides	  disaggregated	  data	   for	   regional	  economic	  activity	  of	   the	  different	  
sectors	  of	  the	  economy.	  
Therefore	  the	  data	  for	  GDP	  per	  Capita,	  GDP	  per	  capita	  growth,	  population	  growth	  and	  sectorial	  investment	  rates	  
utilized	  in	  the	  model	  are	  sourced	  from	  this	  database.	  
The	   regional	   data	   for	   labour	   force	   educational	   attainment	   rate	   are	   collected	   free	   in	   the	   free	   access	   regional	  
database	  made	  available	  by	  Eurostat.	  
Finally,	  data	  for	  general	  government	  balance	  as	  percentage	  of	  trend	  GDP	  are	  sourced	  from	  AMECO	  database.	  
The	  annual	  observations	  from	  2008	  to	  2015	  are	  averaged	  over	  3-­‐year	  non-­‐overlapping	  intervals	  and	  three	  time-­‐
observations	   for	   each	   of	   the	   sapling	   unit	   is	   obtained.	   The	  dataset	   is	   built	   on	   156	   regional	   sampling	   units	   and	  
includes	   13	   NUTS-­‐1	   territories	   (Belgium:	   Brussels;	   Germany:	   Brandenburg,	   Bremen,	   Hamburg,	   Mecklenburg-­‐
Vorpommern,	  Saarland,	  Sachsen-­‐Anhalt,	  Schleswig-­‐Holstein	  and	  Turingen;	  Spain:	  Community	  of	  Madrid;	  France:	  
Ile-­‐de-­‐France	  and	  Nord-­‐pas-­‐de-­‐Calais;	  	  Greece:	  Attika	  )	  and	  143	  NUTS-­‐2	  territories.	  The	  156	  NUTS	  territories	  are	  
clustered	  in	  11	  groups	  (countries)	  belonging	  to	  EMU-­‐1224.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Luxemburg	  is	  not	  included	  in	  the	  sample	  because	  it	  is	  classified	  as	  a	  NUTS0	  territory	  without	  any	  other	  subnational	  territorial	  levels.	  	  The	  
two	  Irish	  regions	  are	  not	  included	  in	  the	  sample	  because	  of	  their	  uncommon	  rates	  of	  growth	  recorded	  during	  the	  period	  2013-­‐2015.	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NUTS-­‐1	   territories	   are	   the	   territorial	   units	   where	   the	   administrative	   territory	   of	   a	   metropolitan	   area	  
corresponds	   to	   a	   region	  as	   a	  whole	   (as	   in	   the	   case	  of	   Ile-­‐de-­‐France	  and	   the	  metropolitan	  area	  of	  Paris).	   	  As	   a	  
consequence	  Sub-­‐Regional	  (NUTS-­‐2	  and	  NUTS-­‐3)	  data	  for	  territorial	  units	  (i.e.	  NUTS-­‐2)	  clustered	  within	  NUTS-­‐1	  
territories	  are	  not	  available	  in	  the	  database.	  	  	  
	  
3.4	  Methodology	  	  
Multilevel	  regression	  models	  are	  specifically	  designed	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  data	  that	  have	  
a	  clustered	  structure.	  	  Such	  data	  arise	  routinely	  in	  various	  fields,	  for	  instance	  in	  medical	  research	  with	  patients	  
nested	  within	  hospitals	  or	  in	  educational	  research	  with	  pupils	  nested	  within	  schools	  (Hox,	  1998).	  	  
Hierarchically	   clustered	   data	  may	   arise	   also	   in	   economic	   research	   for	   example	  when	   analysing	   cities	   that	   are	  
clustered	   into	   regions	   or	   regions	   that	   are	   clustered	   into	   countries,	   and	   this	   data	   structure	   requires	   a	   specific	  
estimation	  technique.	  The	  inverse	  and	  basic	  intuitive	  idea	  is	  that	  when	  drawing	  a	  random	  sample	  and	  there	  is	  no	  
clustering,	  than	  OLS	  and	  other	  linear	  techniques	  make	  more	  sense.	  
	  Indeed,	  when	   data	   are	   clustered	   in	   higher-­‐level	   units	   or	   groups	   (i.e.	   regions-­‐country,	  municipalities-­‐regions),	  
within-­‐group	  observations	   tend	   to	  be	  more	  similar	   to	  each	  other	   than	   they	  are	  across	  groups	  because	   they	  are	  
influenced	   by	   group	   membership.	   Furthermore	   in	   the	   case	   regional	   analysis,	   excluding	   the	   state	   level	   units	  
would	   mean	   not	   being	   able	   to	   take	   into	   account	   potentially	   relevant	   higher-­‐level	   determinants	   of	   regional	  
economic	  growth	  such	  as	  central	  government	  economic	  or	  regulatory	  policy	  (i.e.	  monetary	  policy,	   fiscal	  policy,	  
labour	  market	  regulation).	  	  
As	  in	  standard	  regression	  analyses,	  the	  purpose	  of	  multilevel	  modelling	  is	  to	  model	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  
response	  variable	  and	  a	  set	  of	  explanatory	  variables.	  The	  difference	  is	  that	  multilevel	  modelling	  involves	  units	  of	  
observations	  at	  different	  “levels”	  (Rabe-­‐Hesket	  and	  Skrondal,	  2012).	  	  
Given	   the	   fact	   that	   I	   want	   to	   study	   the	   response	   of	   regional	   growth	   (defined	   as	   Level-­‐2	   variable)	   to	   central	  
government	   fiscal	  policy	  (defined	  as	  Level-­‐1	  variable),	   I	  build	  a	  Multilevel	  Random	  Intercept	  and	  Slope	  Model.	  
Therefore	  the	  within-­‐group	  relationship	  between	  regional	  economic	  growth	  and	  government	  fiscal	  policy	  will	  be	  
modelled	   by	   allowing	   each	   group’s	   fitted	   line	   to	   have	   different	   slope,	  meaning	   that	   the	   relationship	   between	  
regional	  economic	  growth	  and	  government	  fiscal	  policy	  is	  different	  in	  each	  country.	  	  
Also	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   by	   including	   an	   interaction	   term	   within	   the	   conditional	   convergence	   regression	   model	  
estimated	  with	  fixed	  effects,	  I	  have	  showed	  that	  contractionary	  government	  fiscal	  policy	  has	  asymmetric	  effects	  
on	  economic	  growth	  because	  it	  affects	  more	  the	  “poorer”	  countries	  than	  the	  richer	  ones.	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Therefore	  with	  this	  econometric	  strategy	  I	  will	  be	  able	  to	  estimate	  the	  Fixed	  Effects	  slope	  for	  the	  whole	  group	  of	  
156	  regions	  and	  the	  random	  effects	  slope	  for	  each	  group	  regions	  nested	  within	  a	  country	  in	  order	  to	  show	  which	  
are	  the	  regions	  that	  were	  more	  penalized	  by	  austerity	  measures.	  
	  
3.5	  Stylized	  Facts	  and	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  
As	  mentioned	   in	   the	   second	   chapter	   of	   the	   thesis,	   since	   beginning	   of	   the	   process	   of	   monetary	   integration	   in	  
Europe,	  policy-­‐makers	  have	  chosen	  fiscal	  consolidation	  as	  the	  main	  criteria	  for	  the	  access	  and	  the	  permanence	  of	  
a	  country	  in	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union.	  
Fiscal	  consolidation	  has	  been	  chosen	  also	  as	  the	  strategy	  to	  bring	  the	  economy	  back	  on	  the	  track	  of	  growth	  since	  
the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  following	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  “expansionary	  austerity”.	  
However	   I	   showed	   that	   fiscal	   consolidation	   contributed	   to	   undermine	   the	   process	   of	   convergence	  within	   the	  
EMU	  because	  it	  affected	  more	  the	  peripheral	  economies	  than	  the	  core	  ones.	  
Besides	   the	   hypothesis	   of	   “expansionary	   austerity”,	   countries	   were	   “de	   facto”	   forced	   to	   consolidate	   their	  
government	  balances	  in	  times	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  member	  of	  a	  monetary	  union.	  	  
As	  De	  Grauwe	  and	  Ji	  (2014)	  remark,	  the	  nature	  of	  fiscal	  policies	  was	  dramatically	  changed	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  
Euro	  whose	  effects	  were	   largely	  overlooked	  by	   it	  designers.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   the	   structural	   change	  made	   the	  
countries	  vulnerable	   to	   self-­‐fulfilling	   liquidity	   crises	   that	   could	  push	   these	  governments	   into	   insolvency.	  Thus,	  
financial	  markets	  acquired	  great	  power	  over	  the	  governments	  in	  that	  they	  could	  force	  them	  into	  default.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  consequence	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  monetary	  sovereignty	  has	  been	  that	  these	  governments	  were	  
forced	  to	  switch	  off	  the	  automatic	  stabilizers	  in	  the	  budget	  when	  pressured	  by	  financial	  markets	  during	  financial	  
crisis	   and	   economic	   slowdowns.	   In	   this	   framework,	   after	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis,	   weaker	  
countries	   of	   the	   EMU	   experienced	   a	   remarkable	   increase	   in	   interest	   rates	   expenditures	   that	   forced	   them	   into	  
austerity	  programs25.	  As	  already	  mentioned	  in	  the	  second	  chapter	  fiscal	  consolidation	  after	  2010	  was	  the	  cause	  
of	  the	  “double	  dip”	  experience	  by	  many	  economies	  of	  the	  EMI	  during	  the	  period	  2010-­‐2012.	  General	  Government	  
fiscal	  austerity	  of	  course	  produced	  effects	  also	  on	  regional	  performances	  within	  the	  countries	  that	  implemented	  
austerity	   programs	   in	   order	   to	   consolidate	   their	   balances	   after	   the	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis	   that	   led	   to	   a	  
remarkable	  increase	  of	  government	  debts	  across	  the	  Western	  economies	  during	  the	  period	  2007-­‐2009.	  
However,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  countries,	  austerity	  produces	  different	  outcomes	  on	  economic	  growth	  also	  across	  the	  
regions.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  In	  Appendix	  3.1	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  brief	  comparison	  of	  the	  cases	  of	  government	  debt	  in	  Spain	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  In	  Appendix	  3.2	  I	  will	  
provide	  a	  brief	  comparison	  of	  the	  cases	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  in	  the	  EMU	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	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Figure	  3.2	  shows	  the	  bar	  chart	  of	  average	  primary	  balance	  and	  within	  country	  regional	  growth	  during	  the	  time	  




As	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   note,	   during	   the	   Global	   Financial	   crisis	   (a)	   and	   the	   period	   of	   the	   second	   recession	   that	  
encompasses	   the	   sovereign	  debt	   crisis	   (b)	   the	   relationship	   between	   government	   primary	   balance	   and	   “within	  
country”	   regional	   growth	   does	   not	   appear	   symmetric	   across	   countries,	   suggesting	   that	   fiscal	   policy	   exerted	  
different	  effects	  on	  regional	  performances	  within	  he	  countries.	  
However,	   if	   only	   period	   of	   economic	   recovery	   (2013-­‐2015)	   is	   taken	   into	   account,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   draw	   some	  
preliminary	  considerations	  before	  the	  estimation	  of	  the	  model.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Note	  that	  here	  “within	  country”	  regional	  growth	  is	  the	  unweighted	  average	  of	  regional	  rates	  economic	  growth	  observed	  in	  each	  time	  
interval.	  Given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  regions	  are	  not	  weighted	  for	  their	  share	  of	  total	  GDP,	  this	  indicator	  does	  not	  correspond	  to	  the	  rate	  of	  growth	  
observed	  in	  the	  country	  within	  which	  the	  regions	  are	  nested.	  Therefore	  in	  figure	  3.2a,	  Italian	  “within	  country”	  regional	  growth	  equal	  to	  -­‐2.41	  
does	  not	  match	  the	  growth	  performance	  of	  the	  country.	  For	  example	  Region	  Lombardia	  represents	  more	  that	  20%	  of	  the	  Italian	  GDP	  and	  a	  
drop	  in	  GDP	  in	  that	  regions	  would	  produce	  different	  effects	  on	  country	  economic	  performance	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  drop	  in	  GDP	  in	  smaller	  
region.	  However	  .I	  use	  this	  variable	  because	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  regional	  economic	  performances	  within	  the	  countries	  and	  not	  in	  country	  
performances	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As	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   note,	   during	   the	   period	   of	   “European”	   recovery	   Italy	   that	   recorded	   the	   large	   government	  
primary	   surplus	   (+3%)	   was	   also	   the	   country	   that	   recorded	   one	   worst	   “within	   country”	   regional	   economic	  
performances	   (-­‐0.63).	   	   The	   worst	   	   “within	   country”	   regional	   economic	   performance	   was	   observed	   in	   Finland	  
whose	  central	  government	  recorded	  a	  primary	  surplus	  equal	  to	  1.16%.	  
	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  best	  “within	  country”	  regional	  growth	  was	  observed	  in	  Spain	  that	  during	  the	  time	  interval	  
recorded	  a	  slightly	  negative	  primary	  government	  balance.	  	  
	  In	   Figure	   3.4	   I	   provide	   the	   graph	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   primary	   balance	   and	   “within	   country”	   regional	  
growth	   during	   the	   period	   2013-­‐2015.	   Ireland,	   Germany	   and	   Greece	   are	   not	   included	   in	   the	   sample	   for	   the	  
reasons	   I	   have	   already	   explained	   about	   outliers	   as	   exceptional	   rate	   of	   growth	   (Ireland27),	   economic	   growth	  
pursued	  with	  an	  export-­‐led	  strategy	  in	  time	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  (Germany)	  and	  the	  relevance	  and	  duration	  of	  
the	  economic	  (Greece).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  During	  the	  time	  interval	  2013-­‐2015	  the	  Irish	  region	  of	  Dublin	  “Southern	  and	  Eastern”	  grew	  at	  an	  average	  of	  11%	  per	  year	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As	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   note,	   in	   the	   sample	   of	   country	   there	   is	   an	   evident	   negative	   relationship	   between	   central	  
government	  primary	  surpluses	  and	  within	  country	  regional	  rate	  of	  growth.	  
This	  negative	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  variables	  is	  matched	  by	  an	  observable	  process	  of	  evident	  divergence	  
between	  regions	  in	  terms	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita.	  
As	  Figure	  3.5	  shows,	  during	   the	  period	  2001-­‐2007	  before	   the	  outbreak	  of	   the	  global	   financial	  crisis	  an	  overall	  




However,	   since	   the	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis	   outbreak	   and	   the	   implementation	   of	   austerity	   programs	   aimed	   at	  
fiscal	  consolidation,	  a	  process	  of	  regional	  divergence	  has	  been	  observable	   in	  all	   the	  phases	  of	  the	  crisis	  (2007-­‐
2009	  and	  2010-­‐2012)	  and	  during	  the	  phase	  of	  recovery	  (2012-­‐2015).	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As	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  note	  the	  regions	  of	  the	  EMU	  have	  been	  diverging	  over	  the	  three	  time	  intervals	  under	  analysis.	  
However,	   the	   peak	   of	   regional	   divergence	   was	   observed	   during	   the	   period	   2010-­‐2012	   when	   the	   harshest	  
austerity	  measures	  were	   implemented	   by	   governments	   in	   the	   peripheral	   countries.	   During	   that	   period	   it	   has	  
been	   possible	   to	   even	   observe	   a	   statistically	   significant	   tendency	   of	   richer	   regions	   to	   growth	   faster	   than	   the	  
poorer	  ones	  and	  diverged	  at	  a	  rate	  of	  5%	  per	  year.	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The	  divergence	  process	  seems	  to	  have	  faded	  during	  the	  time	  interval	  2013-­‐2015	  when	  expansionary	  monetary	  
policy	  of	  the	  ECB	  bought	  down	  interest	  rates	  on	  government	  bonds	  allowing	  the	  countries	  to	  loosening	  the	  grip	  
of	  fiscal	  austerity.	  
	  
3.6	  The	  specification	  of	  the	  model	  
Mixed-­‐effects	  models	  are	  characterized	  as	  containing	  both	  fixed	  effects	  and	  random	  effects.	  The	  fixed	  effects	  are	  
analogous	   to	   standard	   regression	   coefficients	   and	   are	   estimated	   directly.	   The	   random	   effects	   are	   not	   directly	  
estimated	   (although	   they	  may	   be	   obtained	   postestimation)	   but	   are	   summarized	   according	   to	   their	   estimated	  
variances	   and	   covariances.	   Random	   effects	   can	   take	   the	   form	   of	   either	   random	   intercepts	   or	   random	   slopes	  
(StataCorp.,	  2017).	  	  
Therefore	  with	  this	  particular	  econometric	  estimation	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  obtain	  the	  fixed	  effects	  slope	  for	  the	  whole	  
sample	  of	  regions	  and	  the	  random	  slope	  of	  each	  group	  of	  regions	  nested	  within	  the	  countries	  (Hamilton,	  2005).	  
The	  model	  is	  specified	  as	  follows	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Level	  1:	  Yij,t=	  β0j	  +	  β1j	  (X1j,t)	  +	  eij	  
(3.1)	  
	  
Where	   j	  denotes	   the	  subscript	   for	  groups	   (Level	  2)	  and	   i	   is	   the	  subscript	   for	   individual	   sampling	  units.	   In	   this	  
case	  regions	  (Level	  1)	  i	  nested	  into	  country	  j.	  
Regression	  coefficients	  βj	  ‘’s	  vary	  across	  groups	  and	  this	  variation	  is	  predicted	  by	  a	  Level	  2	  explanatory	  variable	  
Z.	  Therefore,	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Level	  2:	  β0j=	  γ0,0	  +γ0,1	  	  Zj	  +	  μ0j	  
(3.2)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Level	  2:	  β1j=	  γ1,0	  +γ1,1	  Zj,	  +	  μ1j	  
(3.3)	  
	  
Where	  γ00	  and	  γ01	  	  	  are	  the	  random	  intercept	  and	  the	  random	  slope	  to	  predict	  β0	  from	  Z,	  and	  μ0	  is	  the	  error	  term.	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At	   the	   same	   time	   γ1,0	   and	   γ1,1	  are	   the	   intercept	   and	   the	   slope	   to	   predict	   β1	   while	   μ1j	  is	   the	   error	   term	   of	   the	  
regression.	  
Replacing	  (2)	  and	  (3)	  in	  (1)	  and	  rearranging	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  obtain	  the	  multilevel	  mixed	  effects	  model	  as	  
	  
Yi	  =	  [γ0,0	  +	  γ0,1	  Zj,t	  +	  γ1,0	  X1ij,t	  +	  γ11	  Zj,t	  X1j,t]	  +	  [μ0j	  +	  	  μ1j	  X1j,t	  +	  eij]	  
i=region	  1,2,3,….i	  
j=	  country	  1,2,3	  ....j	  
t=2007-­‐2009,	  2010-­‐2012,	  	  2013-­‐2015	  
(4)	  
Where	   polynomial	   [γ00	   +	   γ01	  Zj	   +	   γ10	  X1ij	   +	   γ11	  Zj,	   X1j]	   is	   the	   group	   of	   coefficients	   in	   the	   regression	   that	   denote	  
regression	  intercept	  	  (γ00)	  and	  regression	  slopes	  	  (γ01	  ,	  γ10,	  	  γ11).	  As	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  note	  regression	  slope	  (γ01)	  is	  
predicted	  by	  the	  Level	  2	  explanatory	  variable	  (Z).	  
Polynomial	  [μ0j	  +	  μ1j	  X1j	  +	  eij]	  is	  the	  random	  component	  of	  the	  model	  and	  denotes	  the	  group	  of	  error	  terms	  of	  the	  
equation.	   	   Note	   that	   eij	   is	   the	   error	   variance	   at	   level	   1	   (regions),	   μ0j	   is	   the	   variance	   of	   the	   error	   at	   Level	   1	  
(countries)	  or	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  intercept	  β0j	  of	  equation	  (2)	  and	  μ1j	  is	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  other	  Level	  2	  error	  or	  
the	  variance	  of	  the	  slopes	  β1j.	  
In	  the	  polynomial	  X	  denotes	  a	  vector	  of	  predictors	  that	  include	  the	  natural	  logarithm	  of	  region	  i	  nested	  in	  country	  
j	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	  each	   time	   interval,	  percentage	  of	   labour	   force	  with	   tertiary	  education,	  population	  growth	  
and	   investment	   rates	   by	   sector	   of	   economic	   activity.	   Z	   denotes	   the	   central	   government	   primary	   balance	   as	  
percentage	  of	  trend	  GDP	  as	  the	  explanatory	  variable	  that	  predicts	  the	  “within	  group”	  random	  slope.	  	  The	  vector	  
of	   variables	   includes	   also	   a	  dummy	  variable	   that	   takes	  on	  value	  1	   is	   the	   regions	   is	   located	  or	   “clustered”	   into	  
Greece.	  Ireland	  is	  excluded	  from	  the	  sample.	  
Multilevel	   Mixed	   Effects	   Model	   are	   very	   useful	   to	   analyse	   grouped	   or	   hierarchical	   data	   because	   with	   this	  
econometric	   techniques	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  calculate	   the	   intraclass	  correlation	  (ICC)	  and	  the	  random	  slope	  on	  the	  
level	  two	  variable	  (Z	  or	  primary	  balance	  as	  percentage	  of	  trend	  GDP)	  for	  each	  group	  j	  of	  regions	  i.	  
Provided	  that	   fixed	  effects	  define	   the	  expected	  values	  of	   the	  observations	  and	  random	  effects	  define	  variances	  
and	  the	  covariance	  of	  the	  observations	  (Littlel	  et	  al,	  2000),	  the	  intraclass	  correlation	  is	  calculated	  as	  follows28:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  The	  results	  of	  the	  estimation	  of	  ICC	  are	  reported	  in	  Table	  3.1	  together	  with	  the	  regression	  output	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ICC=	  
!"#(!!")
!"# !!" !!"#(!!")  
	  
(2)	  
The	  intra-­‐class	  correlation	  is	  a	  coefficient	  that	  accounts	  for	  the	  relatedness	  of	  clustered	  data	  by	  comparing	  the	  
variance	   within	   clusters	   with	   the	   variance	   between	   clusters	   and	   is	   calculated	   as	   the	   ratio	   of	   the	   standard	  
deviation	  (S.d.)	  of	  the	  random	  intercept	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  random	  intercept	  itself	  plus	  the	  
standard	  deviation	  of	  level-­‐1	  (regions)	  residuals.	  	  	  
So	  for	  example,	  in	  this	  case	  it	  can	  denote	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  random	  deviation	  of	  Madrid	  Community’s	  rate	  of	  growth	  
from	  the	  mean	  rate	  of	  growth	  observed	  in	  the	  whole	  sample	  of	  156	  regions	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  random	  deviation	  of	  
Madrid	   Community’s	   rate	   of	   growth	   itself	   plus	   the	   deviation	   of	   average	   rate	   growth	   observed	   in	   the	  Madrid	  
Community	  from	  the	  average	  rate	  of	  growth	  of	  Spanish	  regions	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  
Therefore,	   an	   intraclass	   or	   intracluster	   correlation	   coefficient	   (ICC)	   is	   commonly	   used	   to	   quantify	   how	  much	  
more	  similar	  outcomes	  are	  for	  individuals	  within	  clusters	  than	  for	  those	  in	  different	  clusters	  (Pagel	  et	  al,	  2011).	  
An	   Intra-­‐class	   correlation	   close	   to	   0	   would	   mean	   that	   observations	   within	   groups	   or	   clusters	   are	   not	   more	  
similar	  to	  each	  other	  than	  observations	  across	  groups.	  Therefore,	  it	  would	  unnecessary	  to	  use	  a	  Multilevel	  Mixed	  
model	   estimation	   for	   the	   panel	   dataset.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   the	   higher	   is	   the	   ICC,	   the	   more	   suitable	   is	   the	  
multilevel	   estimation	   technique	   in	   order	   to	   infer	   the	   data	   of	   interest.	   Besides	   the	   relevance	   of	   intra-­‐class	  
correlation,	  application	  of	  multilevel	  estimation	  technique	  in	  this	  case	  is	  still	  needed	  because	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  
model	   is	   to	   estimate	   how	   a	   variable	   at	   higher	   hierarchical	   level	   (austerity	   expressed	   as	   government	   primary	  
balance	  to	  GDP)	  affects	  regional	  economic	  growth.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  Model	  3.1a,	  an	  intraclass	  or	  intracluster	  correlation	  equal	  to	  0.57%	  means	  that	  almost	  60%	  of	  the	  
cross-­‐regional	  variance	   in	  economic	  growth	   is	  determined	  by	   the	   fact	   that	  regions	  are	  nested	  within	   the	  same	  
cluster.	  That	  is,	  almost	  60%	  of	  cross-­‐regional	  variance	  in	  economic	  growth	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  regions	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Tab	  3.1	  Obs:	  459	   Sample	  Size=156	  	  -­‐	  	  T=3	   Sample	  Size=156	  -­‐	  T=3	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  Growth	  
	  
a	   b	  








Total	  Investment	  to	  GDP	   -­‐	   .008	  
[.02]	  
Investment	  in	  manufacturing	  to	  GDP	   .11***	  
[.03]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	  in	  non-­‐market	  services	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.039	  
[.04]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	  in	  Market	  services	  to	  GDP	   .092*	  
[.05]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	   in	   Financial	   and	   Business	  














Dummy	  for	  Greece	   -­‐4.11***	  
[.80]	  
-­‐4.04	  	  	  	  
[.81]	  
Time	  Effects	   	   	  




2013-­‐2015	   2.22***	  
[.26]	  
2.26	  	  	  	  
[.26]	  
Constant	   8.33***	  
[3.9]	  
	  	  	  5.50	  	  	  	  
[3.72]	  
	   	   	  
Random	  Effects	  Parameters:	  Country	   	   	  
S.d.	  Primary	  Balance	  to	  GDP	   .55	  
[.13]	  
.545	  	  	  	  
[.14]	  
S.d.	  Constant	  	   1.42	  
[.36]	  
1.39	  	  	  	  	  
[.36]	  
	  
Corr	  (primar~e,_cons)	  	   -­‐.91	  
[.12]	  
	  	  -­‐.90	  	  	  	  
[.12]	  





	   ICC=1.42/(1.42+1.06)=0.57	  
	  
LR	  test	  vs.	  linear	  model:	  chi2(3)	  =	  102.56	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Prob	  >	  chi2	  =	  0.0000	  
Or	  	  
Likelihood-­‐Ratio	  Test	  for	  best	  model	  fit:	  
LR	  chi2(2)	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  57.32	  




LR	  test	  vs.	  linear	  model:	  chi2(3)	  =	  102.51	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Prob	  >	  chi2	  =	  0.0000	  
	  
Likelihood-­‐Ratio	  Test	  for	  best	  model	  fit:	  
LR	  chi2(1)	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  47.81	  
Prob	  >	  chi2	  =	  	  	  	  0.0000	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3.7	  Model	  Post	  estimation	  and	  “within-­‐country”	  slope	  decomposition	  	  
Multilevel	  regression	  technique	  estimates	  the	  parameters	  with	  the	  Maximum	  Likelihood	  (ML)	  estimation.	  As	  in	  
all	   the	   linear	   regression	  models,	   one	   of	   the	   key	   assumptions	   of	   the	  Multilevel	  Mixed	   Effect	  model	   is	   that	   the	  
residuals	  are	  normally	  distributed	   in	  the	   form	  i.d.d.	  e≅N(0,	  σ).	   	   Indeed,	  when	  residual	  errors	  are	  not	  normally	  
distributed,	  the	  parameter	  estimates	  are	  still	  consistent	  and	  asymptotically	  unbiased	  but	  the	  standard	  errors	  are	  
incorrect.	  As	  a	  consequence	  significance	  tests	  and	  confidence	  intervals	  cannot	  be	  trusted	  (Maas	  and	  Hox,	  2004).	  
Therefore	   in	   order	   to	   check	   if	   the	   model	   complies	   with	   this	   assumption	   of	   linear	   regression	   I	   calculate	   the	  
average	  of	  the	  residuals	  (Table	  3.3)	  and	  I	  the	  statistical	  distribution	  (Fig.3.7)	  of	  the	  residuals	  of	  model	  A	  with	  the	  
investment	  rate	  disaggregated	  by	  sector	  of	  economic	  activity.	  
	  

















As	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  note,	  the	  mean	  is	  very	  close	  to	  0	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  residual	  errors	  approximates	  very	  
well	  a	  normal	  distribution.	  Therefore	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  Multilevel	  Mixed	  Effects	  Model	  is	  correctly	  
specified	  and	  correctly	  estimated.	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After	  having	  empirically	   tested	   that	   the	  model	   satisfies	   linear	   regression	  assumption	  about	   the	  distribution	  of	  
residuals,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  obtain	  the	  values	  for	  the	  Random	  Effects	  part	  of	  the	  model	  that	  basically	  consists	  of	  the	  
coefficients	  on	  level-­‐2	  variable	  Z	  (Government	  Primary	  Balance	  as	  percentage	  of	  GDP).	  	  
	  
	  
Yi	  =	  [γ0,0	  +	  γ0,1	  Zj,t	  +	  γ1,0	  X1ij,t	  +	  γ11	  Zj,t	  X1j,t]	  	  +	  	  [μ0j	  +	  	  μ1j	  X1j,t	  +	  eij]	  	  (5)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Fixed	  Effects	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Random	  Effects	  
	  
Therefore	  the	  current	  model	  is	  (according	  to	  model	  a):	  
	  
Growth	  ij	  	  =	  -­‐1.03	  (Log	  of	  GDP)	  -­‐0.60	  (Primary	  balance	  ij	  )	  +	  	  0.11	  (Manufacturing)	  +	  ………………………………………..+	  	  	  
μ0j	  	  +	  	  μ1j	  1j,t	  	  (Primary	  balance	  ij	  	  )	  +	  eij	  
	  
Here	   the	   fitted	   slope	   for	   the	  whole	   sample	   (-­‐0.60)	   can	  be	   discomposed	   and	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   predict	   the	   fitted	  
random	  slope	  (on	  general	  government	  primary	  balance	  as	  percentage	  of	   trend	  GDP)	  for	  each	  group	  of	  regions	  
clustered	  within	  countries.	  
	  	  
Tab	  3.3	  
Country	   Fixed	  Effects	  Slope	   Country	  Random	  Effects	  
Slopes	  
Total	  Country	  Slope	  on	  
each	  Primary	  Balance	  as	  
Percentage	  of	  GDP	  (Fixed	  
plus	  Random)	  
Austria	   -­‐.60	   1.07	   .47	  
Belgium	   -­‐.60	   .19	   -­‐.41	  
Germany	   -­‐.60	   3.7	   3.1	  
Greece	   -­‐.60	   -­‐.64	   -­‐1.24	  
Spain	   -­‐.60	   -­‐1.02	   -­‐1.62	  
Finland	   -­‐.60	   -­‐.20	   -­‐.80	  
France	   -­‐.60	   -­‐1.12	   -­‐1.72	  
Italy	   -­‐.60	   -­‐.62	   -­‐1.22	  
Netherlands	   -­‐.60	   -­‐.34	   -­‐0.94	  
Portugal	   -­‐.60	   -­‐1.10	   -­‐1.70	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3.8	  A	  Brief	  Discussion	  of	  the	  Results	  
The	  estimation	  of	  the	  fixed	  effect	  component	  of	  the	  regression	  equation	  suggests	  that	  fiscal	  consolidation	  after	  
the	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis	   outbreak	   exerted	   generally	   negative	   effects	   on	   within	   country	   regional	   economic	  
growth.	  Indeed,	  a	  coefficient	  estimate	  equal	  to	  -­‐60%	  for	  the	  fixed	  effects	  component	  of	  the	  model	  means	  that	  one	  
percentage	  point	  increase	  in	  general	  government	  primary	  balance	  produces	  a	  reduction	  of	  regional	  GDP	  equal	  to	  
-­‐0.60%.	  Indeed,	  here	  the	  coefficient	  estimate	  on	  general	  government	  primary	  balance	  represents	  the	  fitted	  slope	  
for	  the	  whole	  sample	  of	  156	  regions.	  This	  first	  result	  matches	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  at	  country	  level	  outlined	  in	  
Chapter	   2	   and	   according	   to	   which	   fiscal	   consolidation	   exerts	   negative	   effects	   on	   economic	   growth	   in	   the	  
countries	  of	  the	  EMU.	  
Then,	  the	  estimation	  of	  the	  countries’	  random	  slopes	  on	  primary	  government	  balance	  as	  percentage	  of	  trend	  GDP	  
reveals	   a	   very	   relevant	   empirical	   evidence	   that	   further	   confirms	   at	   regional	   level	   the	   empirical	   findings	   of	  
Chapter	  2.	  First	  austerity	  is	  actually	  “expansionary”	  only	  in	  Germany	  and	  Austria,	  where	  an	  increase	  in	  primary	  
balance	  is	  respectively	  associated	  to	  a	  3%	  and	  0.45%	  increase	  in	  “within	  country”	  regional	  output.	  Second,	  the	  
contractionary	  effect	  of	  austerity	  on	  “within-­‐country”	  regional	  growth	  is	   larger	  in	  the	  peripheral	  countries	  and	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France	  than	  in	  the	  other	  “core”	  countries	  like	  Finland	  (-­‐0.8%),	  Netherlands	  (-­‐0.9%)	  and	  Belgium	  (-­‐0.45%).	  In	  the	  
peripheral	  economies	  and	  France	  each	  percentage	  point	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  is	  associated	  to	  a	  drop	  in	  regional	  
GDP	  much	  larger	  than	  one	  percentage	  point.	  However,	  France	  did	  not	  apply	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  austerity	  as	  the	  
peripheral	  countries	  like	  Italy	  because	  the	  country	  recorded	  negative	  primary	  balance	  throughout	  the	  period	  of	  
the	  crisis	  (and	  could	  reduce	  its	  primary	  government	  deficit	  more	  gradually	  than	  Spain).	  Furthermore,	  during	  the	  
period	  of	  the	  continental	  “recovery”	  (2013-­‐2015)	  France	  recorded	  a	  government	  primary	  deficit	  well	  below	  	  -­‐1%	  
(Fig	  2.5,	  Chapter	  2).	  Therefore,	  the	  “within	  country”	  slope	  decomposition,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  interaction	  term	  in	  
model	  2.3	  (Table	  2.2)	  of	  Chapter	  2,	  confirms	  that	  fiscal	  austerity	  prejudices	  convergence	  within	  the	  EMU	  because	  
it	  affects	  harder	  the	  poorer	  regions	  located	  in	  the	  countries	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  catch-­‐up	  in	  terms	  of	  income	  per	  
capital	  with	  the	  riches	  ones.	  
	  
3.9	  Conclusions	  
Starting	  from	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  tested	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  government	  fiscal	  consolidation	  
during	  the	  crisis	  time	  intervals	  comprised	  between	  2007	  and	  2015	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  main	  determinants	  of	  the	  
process	  of	  regional	  divergence	  observed	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  since	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Single	  Currency.	  
Indeed	  one	  percentage	  point	  of	   fiscal	  consolidation	  has	  been	  associated	  on	  average	  to	  a	  0.60%	  drop	  in	  GDP	  in	  
regional	   growth	   in	   the	  whole	   sample	   of	   156	  NUTS	   regions.	   However,	   the	   disaggregate	   slopes	   on	   government	  
primary	   balances	   show	   that	   government	   fiscal	   consolidation	   has	   produced	   asymmetric	   outcomes	   within	   the	  
different	   countries	   after	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis.	   Indeed,	   fiscal	   consolidation	   in	   peripheral	  
countries	  and	  France	  is	  much	  more	  harmful	  to	  regional	  economic	  than	  in	  countries	  like	  Finland,	  Belgium	  and	  the	  
Netherlands.	  Contrariwise	  fiscal	  consolidation	  exerted	  positive	  effects	  on	  regional	  economic	  growth	  in	  Germany	  
and	  Austria.	  	  
Therefore	   the	  results	  of	   this	  analysis	  allow	  drawing	  at	   least	   two	  considerations.	   	  First,	   austerity	  was	   the	  main	  
cause	  of	  the	  double	  dip	  recession	  observed	  in	  many	  countries	  of	  the	  EMU	  (especially	  the	  peripheral	  ones).	  The	  
empirical	   evidence	   at	   regional	   level	   derived	   from	   the	  model	   confirms	   the	   analysis	   of	   De	   Long	   and	   Summers	  
(2012)	   according	   to	   which	   policies	   of	   deficit	   reduction	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   substantial	   output	   shortfalls	   have	  
adverse	   impacts	   on	   the	   economy	   both	   in	   the	   short	   and	   long	   run.	   	   In	   this	   framework	   the	   authors	   advocate	   in	  
favour	  of	  substantial	  caution	  regarding	  the	  pace	  of	   fiscal	  consolidation	   in	  depressed	  economies	  where	   interest	  
rates	  are	  constrained	  by	  a	  zero	  lower	  bound,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EMU	  countries	  after	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  Public	  
Sector	  Purchase	  Programme	  by	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  in	  2015.	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Second,	  austerity	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  main	  culprit	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  regional	  convergence	  over	  the	  period	  2008-­‐
2015.	  Indeed,	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2007-­‐2008	  was	  initially	  “global”,	  economic	  growth	  should	  
have	  been	  affected	  symmetrically	  in	  all	  the	  European	  countries.	  However	  empirical	  evidence	  shows	  that,	  because	  
of	   fiscal	   austerity,	   the	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis	   hit	   in	   particular	   those	   regions	   located	   within	   the	   peripheral	  
economies	  that	  were	  supposed	  to	  convergence.	  	  	  
Besides	   the	   main	   finding	   related	   to	   the	   asymmetrical	   affect	   of	   government	   fiscal	   consolidation	   on	   regional	  
economic	  growth,	  the	  results	  of	  this	  research	  also	  show	  that	  investment	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  was	  the	  main	  
driver	  of	  regional	  economic	  growth	  during	  the	  double	  dip	  recession	  and	  the	  period	  of	  recovery.	   	   Indeed	  I	   first	  
estimated	   the	  model	  with	   aggregate	   investment	   rate	   as	   a	  predictor	  of	   economic	   growth	   (3.1a),	   but	   coefficient	  
estimate	   is	   not	   statistically	   significant.	   Then	   I	   have	   disaggregated	   investment	   rate	   to	   GDP	   and	   estimated	   the	  
model	  including	  its	  three	  main	  components	  (manufacturing	  industry,	  market	  services	  and	  non-­‐market	  services)	  
and	   I	   have	   showed	   that	   investment	   rate	   composition	   matters.	   	   In	   fact	   the	   regression	   output	   in	   Table	   3.1a	  
implicitly	  confirms	  the	  findings	  of	  Fürst	  (2013)	  and	  Reiner	  (2012)	  that	  empirically	  find	  out	  that	  countries	  with	  
large	   manufacturing	   industrial	   sectors	   performed	   much	   better	   than	   others	   since	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   Global	  
Financial	  Crisis.	  
For	  this	  reason	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  will	  specifically	  analyse	  the	  role	  of	  played	  by	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	   in	  
shaping	  long-­‐run	  regional	  economic	  performances	  since	  the	  early	  2000s	  and	  through	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	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Appendix	  3.1:	  Disadvantage	  of	  being	  in	  a	  monetary	  union	  during	  a	  financial	  crisis	  
De	  Grauwe	   and	   Ji	   (2013c)	   assert	   that	   the	   European	  Monetary	  Union	   exacerbated	   the	   dysfunctions	   previously	  
embedded	  in	  the	  European	  Monetary	  System	  (ESM)	  that	  existed	  between	  1979	  and	  1999.	  	  
Before	   the	   European	  Monetary	   Union,	   the	   EMS	  was	   a	   pegged	   exchange	   rates	   arrangement	   in	   which	   national	  
central	  banks	  promised	  to	  convert	  domestic	  currency	  into	  a	  foreign	  currency	  at	  a	  fixed	  price.	  	  
The	   problem	   arose	   when	   central	   banks	   had	   not	   foreign	   currency	   (Deutsche	   marks)	   to	   purchase	   domestic	  
currency	  and	  sustain	  the	  fixed	  exchange	  rate.	  The	  necessity	  to	  attract	  foreign	  currency	  to	  restore	  their	  reserves	  
together	  with	  capital	  flight	  induced	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  investors’	  confidence	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  central	  banks	  to	  meet	  
their	  obligations	  resulted	  in	  high	  interest	  rates	  in	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  European	  Monetary	  Union.	  By	  joining	  the	  
Euro	  Area,	  national	  governments	  made	  a	  similar	  promise,	  that	  is,	  to	  convert	  their	  liabilities	  (government	  bonds)	  
into	  “foreign”	  currency	  over	  which	  they	  have	  not	  control	  and	  this	  has	  generated	  similar	  fragility	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  EMS.	  The	  fear	  that	  government	  could	  run	  out	  money	  to	  convert	  its	  treasury	  bonds	  into	  currency	  may	  trigger	  
massive	   sales	   of	   government	   bonds	   issued	   in	   the	   weaker	   countries,	   speculative	   attacks	   and	   self-­‐fulfilling	  
prophecies	  about	  government	  default	  on	  its	  debt	  obligations.	  
Therefore	  in	  absence	  of	  a	  lender	  of	  last	  resort,	  negative	  market	  sentiment	  can	  turn	  a	  liquidity	  crisis	  into	  solvency	  
crisis	  or	  even	  a	  default.	  De	  Grauwe	  and	  Ji	  (2018)	  remark,	  the	  countries	  of	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	  that	  got	  
into	  troubles	  during	  the	  exchange	  rate	  crisis	  in	  1992	  are	  broadly	  the	  same	  as	  the	  countries	  that	  got	  into	  troubles	  
during	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis.	  
In	  order	   to	  describe	   the	   fragility	  of	   the	  Euro	  Area,	  De	  Grauwe	  (2011)	  provides	   the	  paradoxical	  example	  of	   the	  
evolution	  of	  general	  government	  debt	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Spain	  through	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis.	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As	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  Figure	  3a.1,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  in	  2007-­‐08	  the	  government	  debt	  to	  GDP	  
ratio	   increased	   more	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   than	   in	   Spain.	   Furthermore,	   when	   Spain	   was	   gradually	   losing	  
market	   access	   under	   the	   speculative	   attacks	   on	   its	   sovereign	   bonds	   and	   was	   forced	   to	   request	   conditional	  
financial	  assistance	  to	  Euro	  Group	  on	  June	  2012	  in	  order	  to	  recapitalize	  the	  banking	  system,	  its	  debt	  to	  GPD	  ratio	  
stood	   16%	   lower	   than	   the	   one	   in	   the	   UK.	   Given	   this	   evidence,	   De	   Grauwe	   	   (2011)	   argues	   that	   this	   different	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Appendix	  3.2	  -­‐	  Fiscal	  consolidation	  after	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  outbreak	  in	  the	  EMU	  and	  in	  the	  UK	  
As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  comparison	  of	  the	  annual	  government	  primary	  balance	  in	  the	  EMU	  and	  in	  the	  US	  in	  Chapter	  
2,	   in	  Figure	  3.2.1	   I	   compare	   the	  evolution	  of	  government	  primary	  balance	   in	   the	  UK	  and	   in	   the	  EMU	  since	   the	  
outbreak	   of	   the	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis	   in	   2007-­‐08.	   Note	   that,	   here	   as	   in	   Figure	   2.2	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   primary	  
government	  balance	  in	  the	  EMU	  denotes	  the	  aggregate	  sum	  of	  total	  revenue	  minus	  total	  expenditures	  (excluding	  
interest	   expenditures)	   in	   the	   whole	   monetary	   area.	   Therefore	   an	   improvement	   of	   EMU	   primary	   balance	  
represents	   the	  sum	  of	   the	  primary	  balances	   improvements	   taking	  place	   in	   the	  member	  states	  of	   the	  Economic	  
and	  Monetary	  Union.	  
As	   it	  possible	   to	  note	   in	   the	   figure,	   since	  1995	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  recorded	  a	  negative	  primary	   that	  dropped	  
below	  -­‐6%	  during	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  crisis	  that	  hit	  its	  banking	  system	  and	  involved	  British	  government	  intervention	  
with	  a	  rescue	  package	  worth	  roughly	  £500	  billion	  (King,	  2015).	  
This	  massive	  rescue	  of	  the	  banking	  system	  together	  with	  the	  economic	  downturn	  consequently	  led	  to	  an	  abrupt	  
increase	  in	  the	  British	  government	  debt	  to	  GDP	  ratio	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3.1.1	  in	  Appendix	  3.1.	  
However,	   despite	   such	   a	   sharp	   increase	   in	   the	   stock	   of	   government	   debt,	   the	   British	   government	   was	   not	  
pressured	  by	  financial	  markets	  to	  consolidate	  its	  primary	  balance	  in	  order	  not	  to	  lose	  the	  access	  to	  the	  financial	  
market	   to	   finance	   its	  public	  debt.	  On	   the	   contrary	  given	   the	  peculiar	   structure	  of	   the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  
Union	  with	  the	  implicit	  absence	  of	  a	  lender	  of	  last	  resort,	  all	  the	  member	  states	  and	  the	  weaker	  ones	  in	  particular	  
were	  forced	  with	  different	  grades	  of	   intensity	  to	   implement	  recessionary	  measures	  of	   fiscal	  consolidation	   	  (De	  
Grawe	  and	  Ji,	  2018;	  Pasimeni,	  2015;	  De	  Grauwe	  and	  Ji,	  2015a	  and	  2015b;	  De	  Grauwe	  and	  Ji,	  2013c).	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4.1	  Introduction	  
In	  the	  first	  chapter,	  by	  testing	  “absolute	  beta	  convergence”	  I	  showed	  that	  the	  convergence	  process	  between	  the	  
EU-­‐15	   countries	   has	   gradually	   faded	   away	   as	   long	   as	   the	   process	   of	   economic	   and	  monetary	   integration	   has	  
intensified	  during	  the	  early	  1990s	  (Table	  1.2,	  Chapter	  1).	  As	  matter	  of	  facts	  when	  the	  sub-­‐periods	  period	  1999-­‐
2008	  and	  2009-­‐2018	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  allowing	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  single	  currency	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  
natural	  logarithm	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  time	  interval,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  observe	  a	  process	  of	  
statistically	   significant	   divergence	   between	   the	   countries	   under	   analysis.	   As	   a	   consequence	   the	   group	   of	   the	  
“Western”	  EU	  countries	  no	  longer	  configures	  as	  a	  convergence	  club	  in	  the	  Baumol’s	  (1986)	  and	  DeLong’s	  (1988)	  
significations.	   Rather	   income	   convergence	   has	   been	   observable	   only	   between	   the	   CEE	   economies	   and	   the	  
“Northern”	  countries	  of	  the	  EU-­‐15	  meaning	  that	  the	  European	  “convergence	  club”	  is	  actually	  driven	  by	  the	  New	  
Member	  States	  since	  the	  mid	  of	  the	  1990s.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  process	  of	  European	  monetary	  integration	  in	  the	  
EU-­‐15	  and	  the	  enlargement	  have	  been	  accompanied	  by	   the	  shift	  of	   income	  convergence	   from	  the	  periphery	  of	  
the	   EMU	   to	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   European	   countries.	   Starting	   form	   this	   empirical	   evidence	   I	   have	   tested	   the	  
hypothesis	  that	  the	  interruption	  of	  convergence	  within	  the	  EU-­‐15	  economies	  since	  the	  mid	  of	  the	  1990’s	  could	  be	  
attributed	  fiscal	  rules	  established	  by	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  for	  the	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  join	  the	  Euro	  and	  avoid	  
financial	   crises	   during	   their	   permanence	   in	   the	   Euro	   group.	   According	   to	   the	   regression	   output	   	   (Table	   2.2,	  
Chapter	   2)	   the	   market	   discipline	   for	   government	   and	   permanent	   fiscal	   consolidation	   have	   affected	   growth	  
particularly	  in	  the	  peripheral	  countries	  that	  were	  supposed	  to	  catch-­‐up	  with	  the	  richer	  ones.	  
The	  results	  of	  Chapter	  2	  are	  further	  confirmed	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  chapter	  3	  where	  I	  estimated	  a	  multilevel	  mixed	  
effects	  model	   in	   order	   to	   show	   how	   government	   fiscal	   “austerity”	   since	   the	   financial	   crisis	   outbreak	   in	   2007	  
produced	  the	  double	  dip	  recession	  in	  Europe.	  In	  particular	  I	  showed	  that	  fiscal	  austerity	  is	  the	  main	  culprit	  for	  
the	  pattern	  of	  regional	  divergence	  in	  the	  EMU-­‐12	  during	  the	  period	  2007-­‐2015.	  	  
However,	   besides	   strict	   government	   fiscal	   policy	   and	   austerity,	   there	   exist	   other	   factors	   such	   as	   economic	  
structures,	  mobility	  of	  the	  factors	  of	  produciton,	  the	  size	  of	  industry	  and	  geography	  may	  that	  impact	  convergence	  
in	  income	  per	  capita	  and	  labour	  productivity	  in	  particular	  (Buti	  and	  Turrini,	  2015;	  Martin,	  2001;	  Krugman	  and	  
Venables,	  1995;	  Krugman,	  1991a).	  
Indeed,	   in	   the	  Kaldorian	  economics	   theoretical	   framework,	  manufacturing	   industry	   is	   the	   engine	   of	   economic	  
development	  because	  there	  exists	  a	  strict	  positive	  relationship	  between	  the	  size	  of	  manufacturing	  sector,	  labour	  
productivity	  growth	  in	  manufacturing	  and	  economic	  growth	  (Pons-­‐Novell	  and	  Viladecans-­‐Marsal,	  1998;	  Kaldor,	  
1975	  and	  1998).	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Also	   the	  European	  Commission	   (2014),	   despite	   the	  progressive	   reduction	  of	  manufacturing	   share	   of	  GVA	  and	  
employment	   observed	   since	   the	   1970s	   in	   most	   of	   the	   advanced	   economies,	   has	   recognized	   the	   crucial	  
importance	   of	   the	   manufacturing	   industry	   for	   creating	   growth,	   jobs	   opportunities	   and	   innovation.	   For	   this	  
reason	   the	   European	   Commission	   called	   for	   an	   action	   aimed	   at	   industrial	   renaissance	   in	   Europe	   with	   the	  
objective	  to	  raise	  the	  share	  of	  manufacturing	  on	  total	  GVA	  to	  20%	  by	  2020.	  
As	  matter	  of	  facts,	  Veugelers	  (2017)	  remarks	  that	  manufactured	  goods	  are	  more	  tradable	  than	  services	  and	  as	  a	  
consequence	   manufacturing	   remains	   an	   important	   contributor	   to	   economies’	   trade	   balances	   and	   external	  
competitiveness.	  Manufacturing	  exports	  still	  represent	  more	  than	  two	  thirds	  of	  total	  EU	  exports.	  	  
Despite	   the	   reduction	   of	  manufacturing	   share	   of	   total	   GVA	   in	   the	   EU	  has	   been	   less	   pronounced	   than	   in	   other	  
advanced	  economies	   like	   the	  US,	  a	  process	  of	   recomposition	  and	  relocation	  of	   the	  geographical	  distribution	  of	  
manufacturing	  activity	  was	  observed	  across	  countries	  and	  regions	  within	  the	  European	  Union	  since	  the	  end	  of	  
the	   1990s.	   As	  matter	   of	   facts	   in	   the	   EMU	  during	   the	   period	   2001-­‐2015	   the	  manufacturing	   share	   of	   total	   GVA	  
shrank	  in	  most	  of	  the	  French,	  Italian	  and	  Greek	  regions	  and	  remained	  stable	  in	  most	  of	  Spanish	  and	  Portuguese	  
regions29.	  Symmetrically	  the	  manufacturing	  share	  of	  total	  GVA	  increased	  remarkably	  in	  the	  regions	  of	  Germany,	  
Austria	   and	   of	   the	   countries	   of	   the	   Visegrad	   Group.	   As	   a	   consequence	   a	   process	   delocation/relocation	   has	  
changed	   the	   location	   of	   the	   European	   manufacturing	   industry	   beneficiating	   the	   “core”	   regions	   and	   bringing	  
spatial	  concentration	  of	  industrial	  activity	  in	  Europe	  (Alvarez-­‐Lopez	  et	  al,	  2011).	  
Therefore,	   given	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   process	   of	   recomposition/relocation	   of	   the	   geographical	   distribution	   of	  
manufacturing	   activity	   was	   accompanied	   by	   the	   progressive	   geographical	   South-­‐East	   “bifurcation”	   of	  
convergence	  around	  the	  core,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  shift	  of	  the	  convergence	  process	  
from	  Southern	  Europe	  to	  CEE	  countries	  highlighted	   in	   the	  1st	  chapter	   is	  also	  the	  consequence	  of	  a	  progressive	  
polarization	  of	  manufacturing	  activity	  around	  the	  a	  European	  core	  of	  regions	  that	  has	  occurred	  since	  the	  early	  
2000s	  in	  coincidence	  with	  the	  EU	  enlargement.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  test	  this	  hypothesis	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  propose	  three	  spatial	  models	  to	  study	  the	  process	  of	  regional	  
development	  in	  Europe	  since	  the	  early	  2000s.	  	  
With	   the	   first	   spatial	   model	   I	   will	   analyse	   the	   process	   of	   regional	   concentration	   of	   manufacturing	   activity	   in	  
Europe	  and	  show	  the	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  between	  the	  regional	   investment	  rate	   in	  
manufacturing	  industry,	  the	  initial	  size	  of	  manufacturing	  industry	  and	  neighbourhood	  spillovers.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  In	  the	  statistical	  map	  of	  Appendix	  4.3	  I	  show	  the	  changes	  in	  manufacturing	  share	  of	  total	  GVA	  occurred	  in	  the	  European	  regions	  during	  the	  
period	  2001-­‐2015	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With	  the	  second	  spatial	  model	  I	  will	   infer	  the	  relationship	  between	  regional	  growth	  of	  manufacturing	  industry	  
size,	   its	   spatial	   location	   and	   growth	   in	   output	   per	   worker	   in	   manufacturing	   industry	   or	   overall	   labour	  
productivity.	  Finally,	  with	  the	  third	  model	  I	  will	  analyse	  the	  determinants	  of	  regional	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  EU	  
and	  I	  will	  show	  that	  investment	  rate	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  is	  a	  key	  driver	  of	  economic	  growth	  in	  EU.	  
	  
4.2	  Literature	  Review	  	  
Since	  the	  signature	  and	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  (1992)	  and	  the	  EU	  Enlargement,	  19	  of	  the	  28	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  
member	   states	   have	   progressively	   joined	   the	   Single	   Currency	   (EMU).	   However,	   after	   some	   decades	   of	  
convergence	  between	   and	  within	   countries	   as	   documented	   by	   Barro	   and	   Sala-­‐i-­‐Martin	   (1991),	   in	   the	   2000s	   a	  
process	  of	  divergence	  between	   countries	  has	  coincided	  with	   the	  beginning	  of	  a	  process	  of	   regional	  divergence	  
within	  and	  across	   countries	   (Wunsch,	  2013.	  Ascani,	  2012).	   Indeed,	  as	  Martin	   (2001:1)	  points	  out,	  much	  of	   the	  
discussion	   surrounding	   the	   formation	   of	   “Euroland”	   focused	   on	   the	   nominal	   convergence	   criteria	   but	   far	   less	  
attention	   was	   directed	   at	   the	   role	   and	   significance	   of	   real	   economic	   conditions,	   such	   as	   output	   growth,	  
productivity,	  economic	  structures,	  employment	  or	  unemployment.	  In	  this	  framework,	  Bianchi	  (1995)	  remarked	  
that	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  economic	  and	  monetary	  union	  entailed	  risks	  of	  a	  progressive	  polarization	  in	  the	  levels	  of	  
economic	  development	  across	  European	  regions.	  	  
Despite	  some	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  technological	  progress	  and	  capital	  mobility	  have	  de	  facto	  determined	  the	  “end	  
of	   geography”	   (O’Brein,	   1992),	   the	   opposite	   seems	   to	   be	   the	   case	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   regional	  
development	   in	   Europe.	   Indeed,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   EU,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   US,	   it	   is	   well	   documented	   that	  
productivity	   and	   innovation	   tend	   to	   be	   highly	   concentrated	   in	   a	   core	   of	   regions.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   poorer	  
regions	  tend	  to	  lag	  behind	  while	  most	  prosperous	  areas	  exhibit	  sustained	  growth	  (Ascani	  et	  al,	  2012).	  	  
This	   trend	   of	   regional	   divergence	   among	   integrated	   areas	   is	   an	   economic	   phenomenon	   that	   has	   been	  widely	  
explored	  within	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  New	  Economic	  Geography	  (Krugman,	  2011).	  
New	  Economic	  Geography	   theories	  differs	   from	   International	  Trade	   theories	  because	   the	   latter	   treat	   economic	  
areas	  as	  dimensionless	  points	  while	   the	   former	  allows	   to	   take	   into	  account	   the	   role	  played	  by	   “the	  location	  in	  
space”	   of	   the	   factors	   of	   production	   (Krugman,	   2009).	   	   Therefore	   in	   New	   Economic	   Geography	   theoretical	  
framework,	   	   “space”	   or	   geographic	   location	   becomes	   recognized	   as	   a	   crucial	   factor	   contributing	   to	   economic	  
development	  and	  growth	  (Krugman	  and	  Venables,	  1995).	  
As	  a	  consequence,	   in	  a	  context	  of	  mobility	  of	  production	   factors	   it	   is	   likely	   to	  observe	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  self-­‐
reinforcing	  core-­‐periphery	  pattern	  with	  an	   industrialized	  “core”	  and	   less	  productive	  periphery	  whose	  regional	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economic	  structures	  tend	  to	  specialize	  in	  non-­‐tradable	  sector	  or	  market	  services	  sector	  like	  retail,	  wholesale	  and	  
tourism.	  Indeed,	  in	  order	  to	  realize	  scale	  economies	  and	  minimize	  transport	  costs,	  manufacturing	  firms	  tend	  to	  
locate	   in	   regions	   with	   larger	   demand,	   but	   the	   size	   of	   the	   demand	   itself	   depend	   on	   the	   distribution	   of	  
manufacturing	  (Krugman,	  1991a:	  483)30.	  	  	  
Krugman	   and	   Venables	   (1995:861)	   in	   their	   model	   consider	   two	   regions	   where	   a	   region	   has	   a	   larger	  
manufacturing	  sector	  than	  the	  other.	  The	  former	  offers	  a	   larger	  market	  for	   intermediate	  goods	  and	  this	  makes	  
the	  region	  more	  attractive	  to	  locate	  the	  production	  of	  such	  goods.	   	  But	  if	  this	  region	  produces	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  
intermediate	  goods	   than	   the	  other,	  a	  better	  access	   to	   these	  goods	  will	  mean	   lower	  costs	  of	  production	  of	   final	  
goods,	  leading	  a	  further	  shift	  of	  manufacturing	  from	  the	  less	  industrialized	  region	  to	  the	  more	  industrialized	  one.	  
In	   this	   framework,	   trade	   liberalization	  creates	   further	   incentives	   for	   the	   industry	   to	  concentrate	   in	   the	  central	  
region,	  near	  the	  larger	  market	  (Krugman,	  1991b,	  Krugman	  and	  Venables,	  1990).	  
For	  example	  Álvarez	  López	  et	  al	  (2011)	  empirically	  find	  out	  that	  the	  process	  of	  industrial	  delocation	  observed	  in	  
many	  European	  countries	  and	  regions	  has	  contributed	  to	  concentrating	  European	  manufacturing	  industry	  in	  the	  
areas	   with	   higher	   market	   potential,	   in	   the	   centre	   of	   continental	   Europe.	   	   The	   authors	   also	   empirically	  
demonstrate	   the	  existence	  of	   a	  positive	   relationship	  between	   regional	   advances	  of	   industrial	  productivity	   and	  
the	  attractiveness	  for	  new	  manufacturing	  firms.	  As	  remarked	  also	  Hanson	  (2009:485)	  showed,	  after	  controlling	  
for	  differences	  in	  labour	  costs,	  tax	  rates	  and	  trade	  openness,	  investment	  activity	  of	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  firms	  is	  
higher	  in	  the	  geographical	  areas	  with	  larger	  markets,	  a	  larger	  concentration	  of	  foreign	  firms	  and	  higher	  quality	  of	  
infrastructures.	   Therefore	   firms	   are	   attracted	   to	   locations	   that	   have	   large	   concentrations	   in	   their	   industry	   or	  
related	   industries.	   Indeed,	   locating	  within	   an	   industrial	   cluster	   can	   provide	   firms	  with	   superior	   or	   lower-­‐cost	  
access	   to	  specialized	   inputs	  such	  as	  components,	  machinery,	  business	  services,	  and	  personnel,	  as	  compared	  to	  
the	  alternatives	  -­‐	  vertical	   integration,	   formal	  alliances	  with	  outside	  entities,	  or	  “importing”	   inputs	   from	  distant	  
locations.	  The	  industrial	  cluster	  represents	  a	  spatial	  organizational	  form	  that	  can	  be	  an	  inherently	  more	  efficient	  
or	  effective	  means	  of	  assembling	  inputs	  if	  competitive	  local	  suppliers	  are	  available	  	  (Porter,	  2009:259).	  
Therefore,	   high	   mobility	   of	   factors	   of	   production	   entailed	   by	   the	   progressive	   economic	   integration	   may	  
inherently	  produce	  divergent	  rates	  of	  economic	  growth	  over	  time	  (Krugman,	  1993).	  
Also	  Friesenbichler	  and	  Glocker	  (2018)	  	  and	  Stöllinger	  (2016)	  argue	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  	  “manufacturing	  divide”	  in	  
the	  European	  Union	  and	  that	  the	  relative	  decline	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	  represents	  an	  unfavourable	  shift.	  	  
The	  structural	  impact	  of	  European	  economic	  integration	  has	  strengthened	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	  in	  the	  “core”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Despite	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  speak	  of	  an	  “agricultural”	  periphery,	  as	  I	  will	  show	  in	  the	  statistical	  maps	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  notice	  how	  Europe	  has	  
become	  divided	  into	  a	  core	  area	  with	  prevalence	  of	  manufacturing	  and	  a	  periphery	  with	  a	  prevalence	  of	  services,	  retail	  and	  government	  as	  
percentage	  of	  Gross	  Value	  Added.	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and	  the	  surrounding	  regions	  of	  CEE	  countries	  and	  reduced	  its	  size	  in	  the	  periphery.	  This	  process	  of	  asymmetric	  
industrialization	  is	  a	  relevant	  factor	  of	  regional	  divergence	  in	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  and	  labour	  productivity.	  
	  
4.3	  The	  dataset	  
Data	   concerning	   economic	   growth	   (GDP	   per	   Capita	   and	   GVA	   per	   Worker)	   and	   sectorial	   investment	   rates	   or	  
sectorial	   GVA	   share	   on	   the	   total	   economy	   are	   sourced	   from	   the	   Cambridge	   Econometrics	   European	  Regional	  
Database	  2017.	  	  	  
Data	   concerning	   human	   capital	   (educational	   attainment	   of	   the	   population)	   and	   social	   development	   (young	  
people	  neither	  employed	  nor	  in	  education	  and	  training)	  are	  sourced	  from	  the	  open	  access	  database	  provided	  by	  
Eurostat.	  The	  annual	  data	  are	  averaged	  from	  2001	  to	  2015	  for	  the	  sampling	  units	  and	  the	  sample	  of	  272	  units	  
includes	   15	   NUTS-­‐1	   territories	   (Belgium:	   Brussels;	   Germany:	   Brandenburg,	   Bremen,	   Hamburg,	   Mecklenburg-­‐
Vorpommern,	  Saarland,	  Sachsen-­‐Anhalt,	  Schleswig-­‐Holstein	  and	  Turingen;	  Spain:	  Community	  of	  Madrid;	  France:	  
Ile-­‐de-­‐France	   and	   Nord-­‐pas-­‐de-­‐Calais;	   	   Greece:	   Attika;	   Hungary:	   Central	   Hungary-­‐Budapest;	   United	   Kingdom:	  
Northern	  Ireland),	  4	  NUTS-­‐0	  territories	  (Luxembourg,	  Estonia,	  Latvia	  and	  Lithuania31)	  and	  253	  NUTS-­‐2	  regions,	  
comprising	  7	  NUTS-­‐2	  Norwegian	  regions32,	  .	  
I	   use	   15	   NUT-­‐1	   because	   Cambridge	   Econometrics	   European	   Regional	   Database	   for	   those	   territories	   does	   not	  
provide	  neither	  NUTS-­‐2	  nor	  NUT-­‐3	  sub-­‐regional	  data.	  For	  three	  Baltic	  States	  and	  Luxemburg	  data	  are	  available	  
only	  at	  NUTS-­‐0	  level	  (country	  level).	  
Cambridge	  Econometrics	  ERD	  2017	  contains	  data	  until	  the	  year	  2015,	  therefore	  I	  have	  to	  limit	  my	  analysis	  to	  the	  
period	  2001-­‐2015	  without	  being	  able	  to	  extend	  the	  analysis	  to	  the	  year	  2018	  as	  in	  Chapters	  1	  and	  2.	  
I	  chose	  the	  period	  2001-­‐2015	  because	  data	  for	  educational	  attainment	  of	  the	  population	  and	  social	  development	  
are	   not	   available	   during	   the	   1990s	   for	   the	   most	   of	   CEE	   regions.	   Furthermore,	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   analysing	  
regional	   growth	   and	   convergence	   in	   the	   European	   Union	   since	   the	   advent	   of	   the	   single	   currency	   and	   the	   EU	  
enlargement	  that	  took	  place	  at	  the	  very	  end	  of	  the	  1990s.	  
	  
4.5	  Some	  Stylized	  Facts	  about	  Regional	  absolute	  Beta-­‐Convergence	  2001-­‐2015	  
Figure	   4.1	   that	   displays	   the	   process	   of	   regional	   convergence	   essentially	   matches	   Figure	   1.7	   (Chapter	   1)	   that	  
shows	  convergence	  (and	  divergence)	  between	  countries.	  Convergence	  has	  been	  taking	  place	   in	   the	  EU-­‐28	  as	  a	  
whole	  but	  EU15	  (and	  EMU-­‐12)	  countries	  and	  regions	  have	  diverged.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
32	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  list	  of	  the	  territorial	  units	  in	  the	  sample	  see	  Table	  1	  of	  appendix	  4.1	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Table	  4.1	  reports	  the	  estimations	  of	  the	  coefficients	  of	  regional	  absolute	  beta-­‐	  convergence	  within	  the	  EU-­‐28	  and	  
within	  a	  set	  of	  relevant	  sub-­‐groups	  of	  regions.	  
	  
Table	  4.1	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  Regional	  	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  growth	  2001-­‐2015	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R2	   .43	   .17	   0.65	   .34	   .01	   .03	   .07	  
Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  
Standard	  Errors	  in	  parentheses	  
	  
	  
As	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  note,	  regional	  absolute	  beta-­‐convergence	  has	  been	  strong	  in	  the	  EU-­‐28	  and	  between	  the	  group	  
that	  includes	  Germany,	  Austria,	  Netherlands	  and	  Visegrád	  countries.	  Convergence	  has	  been	  also	  observed	  
between	  the	  German	  regions.	  Conversely	  regions	  in	  the	  EMU-­‐12	  have	  diverged	  at	  a	  statistically	  significant	  rate.	  
Figure	  4.2	  shows	  the	  shift	  of	  regional	  convergence	  from	  Southern	  Europe	  to	  CEE	  regions.	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As	   it	   possible	   to	   note,	   convergence	   concentred	   in	   the	   regions	   Visegrad	   group	   while	   most	   of	   the	   Southern	  
European	  Regions	  actually	  diverged	  from	  the	  Northern	  European	  regions,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  Southern	  regions	  
of	  the	  EMU	  underperformed	  the	  Northern	  ones.	  In	  the	  above	  map	  it	   is	  apparent	  that,	  excluding	  Spanish	  region	  
Galicia	  and	  Basque	  Community	  that	  recorded	  average	  rates	  of	  growth	  between	  1	  and	  2%,	  economic	  growth	   in	  
the	  EMU-­‐12	  concentrated	   in	   the	  Benelux	  area	  and	  mostly	   in	   the	  German	  and	  Austrian	   regions	   that	  are	  placed	  
close	  to	  the	  fast	  growing	  regions	  of	  Eastern	  Europe.	  
Symmetrically,	   almost	   all	   Iberian	   peninsular	   regions	   and	   most	   of	   French	   regions	   recorded	   rates	   of	   growth	  
comprised	  between	  0	  and	  1%,	  while	  almost	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  Italian	  and	  Greek	  regions	  recorded	  negative	  rates	  
of	  growth	  comprised	  between	  0	  and	  -­‐1%.	  
These	   unbalanced	   and	   asymmetrical	   regional	   performances	   have	   changed	   the	   geography	   of	   regional	   income	  
distribution	   in	   the	   European	   Monetary	   Union	   that	   has	   become	   increasingly	   concentrated	   in	   the	   regions	   of	  
Benelux	  and	  Germany	  and	  Austria.	  
In	  Figure	  4.3,	  regions	  are	  sorted	  in	  9	  groups	  according	  to	  their	  income	  per	  capita	  levels	  (as	  percentage	  of	  to	  the	  
European	   Union	   income	   per	   capita)	   and	   it	   is	   shown	   how	   economic	   development	   in	   the	   European	   Monetary	  
Union	  has	  increasingly	  concentrated	  in	  the	  regions	  of	  Germany,	  Austria,	  Benelux	  and	  Finland.	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Symmetrically,	  regions	  located	  in	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  monetary	  union	  have	  experienced	  a	  decline	  in	  the	  level	  of	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As	  it	  possible	  to	  note	  in	  the	  figures	  4.3a	  a	  and	  4.3	  b,	  between	  2000	  and	  2015	  wealth	  has	  tended	  to	  move	  from	  the	  
peripheral	  countries	  towards	  the	  core	  countries	  of	  the	  EMU	  whose	  regions	  classify	  in	  the	  higher	  ranks	  of	  income	  
per	  capita	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  European	  Union	  income	  per	  capita.	  	  
In	  this	  regard,	  Italy	  represents	  an	  extreme	  and	  emblematic	  case	  of	  the	  tendency	  by	  which	  a	  progressive	  shift	  of	  
income	  per	  capita	  from	  south	  to	  north	  is	  observed	  between	  and	  within	  countries.	  While	  in	  2000	  the	  income	  per	  
capita	  in	  all	  the	  Northern	  Italian	  regions	  ranked	  in	  the	  third	  group	  of	  regions	  	  (see	  map	  1.6a	  -­‐	  income	  per	  capita	  
between	  120	  and	  140%	  of	  the	  EU	  income)	  with	  Lombardy	  and	  Lazio	  ranking	  in	  the	  2nd	  group	  (income	  per	  capita	  
between	  140	  and	  160%),	  in	  2015	  Lombardy	  ranked	  in	  the	  3rd	  group	  (see	  map	  1.6b)	  with	  the	  most	  of	  Northern	  
Regions	  and	  Lazio	  ranking	  in	  the	  4th	  group	  (see	  map	  1.6b)	  and	  Piedmont	  ranking	  in	  the	  5th	  group	  of	  regions	  by	  
relative	  income	  per	  capita	  (see	  map	  1.6b	  -­‐	  income	  per	  capita	  between	  80	  and	  100%	  of	  the	  EU	  income	  per	  capita).	  	  
Symmetrically	   also	   the	   Italian	  Mezzogiorno	   experienced	   a	   sharp	   squeeze	   in	   income	   per	   capita	   relative	   to	   the	  
European	  Union:	  in	  2000	  Puglia,	  Campania	  and	  Sicily	  classified	  in	  the	  6th	  group	  of	  regions	  	  (income	  between	  70	  
and	  80%	  of	  the	  EU	  income	  per	  capita)	  with	  Sardinia	  raking	  in	  the	  5th	  group	  of	  regions	  (income	  between	  80	  and	  
100%	  of	   the	  EU	   income	  per	   capita).	   In	   2015	   all	   the	   regions	   of	   Italian	  Mezzogiorno	   ranked	   in	   the	  7th	   group	  of	  
regions	  income	  per	  capita	  (income	  between	  50	  and	  70%	  of	  the	  EU	  income	  per	  capita).	  
Although	  with	   lower	   intensity	  than	  Italian	  regions,	  also	  Spanish	  regions	  partially	  experienced	  similar	  patterns.	  	  
In	  the	  North	  Eastern	  macro	  area,	  Catalonia	  switched	  from	  the	  4th	  group	  in	  2000	  (income	  between	  100	  and	  120%	  
of	   the	  EU	   income	  per	   capita)	   to	   the	  5th	   group	  of	   regions	   (income	  per	   capita	   between	  80	   and	  100%	  of	   the	  EU	  
income	  per	  capita)	  in	  2015.	  In	  the	  same	  period,	  Valencian	  Community	  switched	  from	  the	  5th	  group	  in	  2000	  to	  the	  
6th	  group	  of	  regions	  (income	  between	  70	  and	  80%	  of	  the	  EU	  income	  per	  capita)	  in	  2015.	  In	  the	  same	  year	  in	  the	  
North-­‐East	  area	  only	  Aragon,	  Navarra	  and	  Basque	  Community	  had	  maintained	  the	  same	  position	  held	  in	  2000.	  
Also	  the	  income	  per	  capita	  of	  the	  Community	  of	  Madrid,	  Castilla-­‐La	  Mancha	  and	  Murcia	  declined	  by	  one	  position	  
relatively	   to	   the	   European	   Union	   income	   per	   capita	   while	   during	   the	   same	   period	   all	   the	   Southern	   regions	  
maintained	  the	  same	  income	  per	  capita	  comprised	  between	  50	  and	  70%	  of	  the	  European	  GDP	  per	  capita.	  
The	  most	  alarming	  figure	  concerns	  Greece	  whose	  richest	  region	  in	  2000	  (Attica)	  ranked	  in	  the	  5th	  group	  in	  2015	  
while	  most	  of	  the	  regions,	  excluding	  Crete	  and	  Epirus,	  had	  switched	  from	  the	  7th	  group	  (income	  between	  50	  and	  
70%	  of	  the	  EU	  income	  per	  capita)	  to	  the	  8th	  regional	  group	  (income	  between	  30	  and	  50%	  of	  the	  EU	  income	  per	  
capita).	  	  
Overall,	  most	  of	  the	  poor	  regions	  (and	  countries)	  that	  during	  the	  period	  2000-­‐2015	  experienced	  an	  increase	  of	  
income	  per	  capita	  relative	  to	  the	  European	  Union’s	  GDP	  per	  capita	  are	  located	  in	  Eastern	  Europe:	  Slovakia	  and	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the	   Baltic	   states	   that	   joined	   the	   EMU	   in	   recent	   years	   and	   Czech	   Republic,	   Poland	   and	   Hungary	   that	   opted	   to	  
remain	  out	  of	  the	  EMU.	  
	  
4.6	  Labour	  Productivity,	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  and	  Manufacturing	  Industry	  
First	  Kaldor’s	  law	  asserts	  that	  manufacturing	  is	  the	  engine	  of	  economic	  growth	  (Kaldor,	  1975,	  1966	  and	  1968).	  
Thus	   economic	   areas	   or	   regions	  with	   high	   rates	   of	   productivity	   growth	   in	   the	  manufacturing	   sector	  will	   also	  
record	  higher	  rates	  of	  overall	  economic	  growth	  (in	  terms	  of	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  and	  Labour	  productivity)	  than	  will	  
the	  economies	  with	  slow	  growth	  of	  productivity	  in	  manufacturing	  sector	  (Bernat,	  1996:463).	  	  
As	   Pons-­‐Novel	   and	   Viladecans-­‐Marsal	   (1998)	   remark,	   there	   is	   always	   a	   positive	   relation	   between	   economic	  
growth	  and	  output	  growth	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  industry	  or	  its	  share	  in	  the	  whole	  economy.	  	  
Empirical	  evidence	  at	  regional	  level	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  seems	  to	  confirm	  Kaldor’s	  assumptions.	  
The	   tight	   positive	   relationship	   between	   GDP	   per	   Capita	   (and	   overall	   labour	   productivity)	   and	   productivity	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Labour	   Productivity	   is	   calculated	   as	   the	   overall	   GVA	   divided	   by	   the	   total	   number	   of	   employees.	   Labour	   Productivity	   in	  Manufacturing	  
Industry	  is	  calculated	  as	  the	  total	  GVA	  produced	  by	  the	  industrial	  sector	  divided	  by	  the	  number	  of	  the	  employees	  in	  the	  industrial	  sector.	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The	  graphical	  evidence	  is	  confirmed	  also	  by	  remarkably	  large	  correlation	  coefficients.	  	  A	  correlation	  coefficient	  
equal	   to	   0.89	  means	   that	   there	   exists	   almost	   a	   perfect	   liner	   relationship	   between	   growth	   in	   industrial	   labour	  
productivity	  and	  overall	  labour	  productivity	  in	  the	  economy.	  This	  empirical	  evidence	  confirms	  the	  suitability	  of	  
the	   First	   Kaldor’s	   law	   to	   explain	   the	   patterns	   of	   growth	   observed	   across	   the	   regions	   of	   the	   European	   Union	  
during	  the	  period	  2001-­‐2005.	  
Furthermore,	  if	  I	  plot	  the	  convergence	  line	  in	  labour	  productivity	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  as	  in	  Rodrik	  (2013),	  
it	  is	  possible	  to	  note	  that	  this	  process	  essentially	  matched	  the	  process	  of	  regional	  absolute	  beta-­‐convergence	  in	  
GDP	  per	  Capita	  and	  output	  per	  worker.	  EU-­‐28	  regions	   that	  have	  experienced	  sustained	  convergence	   in	   labour	  
productivity	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  are	  mostly	  the	  CEE	  regions	  that	  experienced	  convergence	  in	  income	  per	  
capita.	  Regions	  that	  did	  not	  experience	  convergence	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  are	  mostly	  the	  Southern	  Regions	  





	   87	  
	  
Table	   4.2	   reports	   the	   estimations	   of	   absolute	   beta-­‐convergence	   in	   industrial	   labour	   productivity	   across	   the	  
regions	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  different	  sub-­‐groups.	  
	  
Table	  4.2	  –	  Regional	  Absolute	  Beta-­‐Convergence	  in	  Labour	  Productivity	  in	  Industry,	  Overall	  Labour	  productivity	  and	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  
	  
	   EU-­‐28	   NMS	   EU-­‐15	  	   EMU-­‐12	  
Log	  of	  Output	  per	  





-­‐.025***	  	  	  	  
[.001]	  
-­‐.001	  	  	  	  
[.002]	  
-­‐.002	  	  	  	  
[.002]	  
Intercept	   	  	  .21***	  
[.01]	  
.29***	  	  	  
[.01]	  
.041	  	  	  	  
[.02]	  
.05	  	  	  	  
[.03]	  
R2	   0.49	   .72	   .004	   .005	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Log	  of	  Output	  per	  
Worker	  in	  2001	  
	  
-­‐.019***	  	  	  	  
[.000]	  
-­‐.024***	  	  	  	  
[.00]	  
-­‐.001	  	  	  
[.001]	  
-­‐.006**	  	  	  	  
[.002]	  
Intercept	   .21***	  	  	  	  
[.008]	  
.26***	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
.02	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
.08***	  	  	  	  
[.02]	  
R2	   .66	   .78	   .006	   0.08	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Log	  of	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  in	  
2001	  
	  




.0056***	  	  	  	  
[.001]	  
.006***	  	  	  
[.001]	  








R2	   .44	  
	  
.59	   .06	   .06	  
***	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  **	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  5%	  
Standard	  Errors	  in	  Parentheses	  
	  
Absolute	   beta-­‐convergence	   estimates	   reported	   in	   Table	   4.2	   show	   how	   regional	   convergence	   in	   labour	  
productivity	   in	  manufacturing	   industry	  matched	   the	   patterns	   of	   absolute	   beta-­‐convergence	   in	   GDP	  per	   capita	  
and	   overall	   labour	   productivity	   across	   the	   European	   regions.	   In	   the	   EU-­‐28	   sustained	   rates	   of	   convergence	   in	  
industrial	   labour	   productivity	   have	   been	   associated	   to	   sustained	   rates	   of	   convergence	   in	   GDP	   per	   Capita	   and	  
overall	   labour	   productivity.	   In	   the	   EU-­‐15	   and	   EMU-­‐12,	   the	   absence	   of	   convergence	   in	   industrial	   labour	  
productivity	  has	  been	  associated	  to	  patterns	  of	  divergence	  or	  negligible	  convergence	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  EMU-­‐12	  
regions)	   in	   overall	   labour	   productivity	   and	   GDP	   per	   Capita.	   In	   other	  words,	   statistical	   evidence	   suggests	   that	  
during	   the	  period	  under	  analysis	   the	   regions	   that	  have	   converged	   in	   terms	  GDP	  per	   capita	   and	  overall	   labour	  
productivity	  have	  been	  the	  regions	  that	  have	  converged	  in	  the	  labour	  productivity	  of	  manufacturing	  industry.	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4.7	  Detecting	  Spatial	  Autocorrelation	  of	  Regional	  Growth	  
Spatial	  dependence	  between	  statistical	  observations	  is	  commonly	  detected	  with	  the	  Moran’s	  test	  (Moran,	  1950).	  
The	  statistic	  reveals	  to	  what	  extent	  high	  (low)	  values	  of	  a	  random	  variable	  are	  surrounded	  by	  high	  (low)	  values	  
of	   it.	   Therefore	   it	   evaluates	   whether	   the	   distribution	   pattern	   of	   a	   variable	   is	   clustered,	   dispersed	   or	   random	  
(Özyurt	  and	  Dees	  2015:	  11).	  









Where	  n	  is	  the	  number	  of	  regions,	  xi	   is	  the	  value	  (economic	  growth)	  observed	  of	  region	  i	  and	  region	  j,	  which	  is	  
standardized	  or	  centered	  to	  the	  mean,	  and	  u	  is	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  variable	  x.	  Finally	  wij	  is	  the	  ijth	  element	  of	  the	  row-­‐
standardized	  spatial	  weight	  matrix	  W	  (Ciotoli	  et	  al,	  2016).	  
The	   estimations	   of	   the	   Moran’s	   I	   (Moran’s	   Index)	   for	   spatial	   autocorrelation	   of	   GDP	   per	   Capita	   and	   Labour	  
productivity	  growth	  are	  reported	  in	  Table	  4.3.	  
	  
Table	  4.3	  -­‐	  Moran’s	  Index	  estimations	  
	   I	   E(I)	   sd(I)	   Z	   p-­‐value*	  
Variables	   	   	   	   	   	  
GDP	  per	  capita	  
Growth	  
0.67	   -­‐0.004	   .016	   32.6	   .000	  
Labour	  Productivity	  
Growth	  
0.76	  	   -­‐0.004	   .015	   36.89	   .000	  
*	  One	  Tail	  Test	  
	  
The	   next	   to	   graph	   (Figure	   4.6a	   and	   4.6b)	   shows	   graphically	   the	   estimations	   reported	   in	   Table	   4.3	   of	   spatial	  
autocorrelation	   between	   rates	   of	   growth	   (GDP	   per	   Capita	   and	   GVA	   per	  Worker)	   of	   a	   region	   and	   the	   rate	   of	  
growth	  in	  the	  closer	  spatially	  lagged	  region.	  
The	  Moran’s	  I	  plot	  displays	  spatially	  lagged	  standardized	  observations	  for	  economic	  growth	  (GDP	  per	  capita	  and	  
labour	  productivity)	  plotted	  against	  the	  average	  rates	  of	  growth	  observed	  in	  each	  region	  during	  the	  period	  2001-­‐
2015.	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The	   first	  and	  the	  third	  quadrants	  (High-­‐High	  and	  Low-­‐Low)	  display	  the	  cases	  of	  positive	  dependence	  between	  
economic	   growth	   observed	   in	   a	   region	   and	   economic	   growth	   observed	   in	   its	   neighbouring	   regions 34 .	  
Symmetrically,	   the	   second	   and	   the	   forth	   quadrant	   display	   cases	   of	   negative	   dependence	   between	   economic	  
growth	  observed	  in	  a	  region	  and	  economic	  growth	  observed	  in	  its	  neighbouring	  regions.	  Given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
observations	  are	  standardized,	  the	  fitted	  line	  is	  the	  bisector	  of	  the	  quadrants	  “high-­‐high”	  and	  “low-­‐low	  and,	  as	  it	  
possible	   to	   note,	   the	   cases	   of	   negative	   spatial	   dependence	   between	   regions	   are	   very	   rare	   if	   compared	   to	   the	  
volume	  of	  the	  observations	  of	  positive	  spatial	  dependence.	  	  
Table	  4.4	   and	  4.5	   report	  directly	   the	  Moran’s	   I	   statistics	   for	   spatial	   autocorrelation	  of	   the	   residuals	  of	   an	  OLS	  
model	  of	  conditional	   regional	  convergence	   that	   then	  will	  be	   transformed	   in	  a	  Spatial	  Lag	  Model	  and	   in	  Spatial	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Given	  the	  fact	  that	  Cyprus	  has	  not	  neighbouring	  regions	  within	  the	  1st	  quartile	  distance	  cutoff,	  the	  Island	  is	  excluded	  from	  the	  sample	  in	  the	  
spatial	  regression	  models.	  Similarly,	  also	  Malta	  is	  excluded	  from	  the	  sample.	  
	   91	  
Table	  4.4	  –	  Moran’s	  I	  Test	  for	  conditional	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  Growth	  and	  Convergence	  
	   Q1	   P-­‐Value	   Median	   P-­‐Value	   Q-­‐3	  	   P-­‐Value	   Q4	   P-­‐Value	  
Moran’s	  I	  
Test	  
6.157	   0.000	   4.414	   .000	   3.551	  	  	   .000	   	  	  2.761	   .000	  
	  
	   Q1	   P-­‐Value	   Median	   P-­‐Value	   Q3	   P-­‐Value	   Q4	   P-­‐Value	  
Spatial	  Error	  
Lagrange	  multiplier	   16.417	   .000	   5.267	   .022	   2.518	   .113	   1.119	   .290	  
Robust	  Lagrange	  
multiplier	  	  	  |	  
7.242	   .000	   3.12	   .077	   2.361	   .124	   .120	  	   .729	  
Spatial	  Lag	  
Lagrange	  multiplier	  	   14.949	   .000	   3.163	   .075	   0.177	   0.177	   2.467	   .116	  
Robust	  Lagrange	  
multiplier	  
	  	  5.774	   .016	   1.016	   .314	   	  	  0.020	   .887	   1.469	   .226	  
	  
Table	  4.5	  –	  Moran’s	  Test	  I	  for	  Conditional	  Labour	  Productivity	  Growth	  and	  Convergence	  
	   Q1	   P-­‐Value	   Median	   P-­‐Value	   Q-­‐3	  	   P-­‐Value	   Q4	   P-­‐Value	  
Moran’s	  I	  
Test	  
10.540	  	  	   0.000	   10.742	   .000	   	  10.704	   .000	   10.295	   .000	  
	  
	   Q1	   P-­‐Value	   Median	   P-­‐Value	   Q3	   P-­‐Value	   Q4	   P-­‐Value	  
Spatial	  Error	  
Lagrange	  multiplier	   56.861	  	  	  	   .000	   	  	  47.132	   .000	   42.988	   .000	   39.572	   .000	  
Robust	  Lagrange	  
multiplier	  	  	  |	  
21.632	  	  	  	   .000	   	  	  21.133	   .000	   21.250	   .000	   12.717	  	  	   .000	  
Spatial	  Lag	  
Lagrange	  multiplier	  	   	  	  60.980	  	  	   .000	   52.339	   .000	   	  	  44.447	   .000	   51.242	   .000	  
Robust	  Lagrange	  
multiplier	  
25.751	   .000	   26.339	  	  	   .000	   	  	  22.708	  	  	   .000	   24.387	   .000	  
	  
As	  in	  Brasili	  et	  al	  (2012),	  the	  results	  of	  the	  Lagrange	  multiplier	  test,	  both	  for	  the	  spatial	  lag	  and	  the	  spatial	  error,	  
lead	  to	  choose	  a	  spatially	  weighted	  matrix	  based	  on	  the	  1st	   (Q1)	  quartile	  of	  cutoff	  distance	  that	  maximizes	   the	  
value	  of	  the	  significant	  Lagrange	  Multiplier	  statistics	  for	  both	  GDP	  per	  capita	  and	  labour	  productivity	  growth35.	  	  
	  
4.8	  Econometric	  Methodology	  
Given	  the	  detection	  of	  spatial	  autocorrelation	  within	  the	  sample	  of	  regions,	  I	  build	  a	  row	  standardized	  spatially	  
lagged	  (inverse	  distance)	  weight	  matrix	  in	  order	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  spatial	  spillover	  in	  regional	  growth.	  The	  
matrix	  has	  272	  rows	  and	  272	  columns	  and	  each	  off-­‐diagonal	  entry	  [i,	  j]	  in	  the	  matrix	  is	  equal	  to	  w=1/(distance	  
between	  point	  i	  and	  point	  j).	  Therefore	  the	  larger	  is	  the	  distance	  between	  points	  i	  and	  j	  (as	  in	  the	  matrix	  row	  we	  
shift	   towards	   right),	   the	   smaller	   is	   the	   weight.	   Said	   less	   technically,	   the	   larger	   is	   the	   distance	   between	   two	  
regions,	   the	   lower	   the	   reciprocal	   regional	   spillovers	  are.	  Therefore	   I	  define	   the	   spatial	   structure	  as	  an	   inverse	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Given	  the	  fact	  that	  Lagrange	  Multiplier	  specification	  tests	  indicate	  that	  both	  a	  SLM	  and	  a	  SEM	  model	  can	  be	  used	  to	  fit	  the	  data	  efficiently,	  I	  
will	  also	  estimate	  a	  Spatial	  Autoregressive	  Error	  Model	  (SEM)	  on	  the	  same	  sample	  of	  NUTS	  territories	  
	   92	  
distance	  decay	   function,	  considering	   that	   the	  strength	  of	  spatial	   interaction	  declines	  with	   the	  distance	  (Özyurt	  
and	  Dees	  2015:	  18).	  Given	  the	  presumption	  that	  the	  intensity	  of	  geographical	  spillovers	  decreases	  with	  distance	  
it	   would	   be	   possible	   to	   interpret	   the	   results	   for	   an	   inverse	   distance	  matrix	   as	   a	   good	   proxy	   for	   externalities	  
(either	  positive	  or	  negative)	  related	  to	  the	  variable	  of	  interest	  (Anselin	  et	  al,	  2004).	  
Following	   the	   results	  of	  Moran’s	  Test,	   the	  distance	  band	  set	   as	   cutoff	   applied	   to	   the	   Inverse	  Distance	  Weights	  
matrix	   is	   comprised	   between	   0	   and	   the	   1st	   quartile	   distance,	   meaning	   that	   regions	   will	   be	   considered	   as	  
neighbours	  when	  located	  within	  a	  maximum	  distance	  equal	  to	  the	  1st	  quartile	  distance.	  That	  is,	  growth	  in	  region	  j	  
produces	   spillover	   effects	   in	   the	   region	   of	   interest	   i	  only	  when	   j	   is	   geographically	   located	  within	   a	  maximum	  
distance	  equal	  to	  the	  1st	  quartile	  distance	  cutoff.	  
A	  simple	  model	  with	  spatial	  lag	  dependent	  variable	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  
	  
	  
y=	  λWy	  +	  ε	  
(1)	  
	  
Where	  y	  is	  the	  dependent	  variable	  and	  Wy	  is	  its	  spatial	  lag.	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Where	   the	   diagonal	   elements	   take	   value	   0	   and	   the	   sum	   of	   the	   row	   takes	   value	   of	   1	   as	   the	   matrix	   is	   row-­‐
standardized.	  	  
Therefore,	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In	  the	  regression	  model	  the	  coefficient	  estimate	  λ	  for	  the	  matrix	  W	  can	  take	  maximum	  value	  of	  1	  and	  denotes	  the	  
percentage	  increase	  in	  y	  for	  each	  percentage	  point	  increase	  in	  Wy.	  
Once	  that	  the	  matrix	  W	  has	  been	  generated,	  it	  also	  possible	  to	  build	  a	  model	  with	  spatially	  lagged	  predictors	  in	  
the	  form	  
y=	  x+λWx	  +	  ε	  
(2)	  
The	   inclusion	  of	  a	   spatial-­‐weighting	  matrix	  within	  an	  econometric	  model	  permits	   to	  account	   for	  Tobler’s	  First	  
Law	  of	  Geography	  according	  to	  which	  everything	  is	  related	  to	  everything	  else,	  but	  near	  things	  are	  more	  related	  
than	  distant	  things”	  (Tobler	  1970:	  236).	  
	  
	  4.9	  Model	  1:	  Increasing	  returns	  and	  Investment	  Rate	  in	  Manufacturing	  Industry	  
New	   Economic	   Geography	   (NEG)	   provides	   an	   integrated	   and	   micro-­‐founded	   approach	   to	   spatial	   economics	  
because	  it	  emphasises	  the	  role	  of	  clustering	  forces	  in	  generating	  an	  uneven	  distribution	  of	  economic	  activity	  and	  
income	  across	  space	  (Venables,	  2008)36.	  	  
When	  economies	  get	  more	  integrated,	  firms	  tend	  to	  concentrate	  their	  economic	  activity	  in	  the	  geographical	  areas	  
where	   the	  manufacturing	   sector	   is	   already	   large	   in	   order	   to	  minimize	   transport	   cost	   and	   benefiting	   from	   the	  
access	   to	   a	   large	  market	   for	   intermediate	   production	   goods.	   Furthermore,	   a	   larger	  manufacturing	   sector	   also	  
ensures	  a	  large	  market	  potential	  for	  the	  final	  goods	  produced	  by	  firms	  (Álvarez	  López	  et	  al,	  2011;	  Krugman	  and	  
Venables,	   1990).	   	   In	  other	  words,	   increasing	   returns	   represent	   a	  notable	   incentive	   for	   firms	   to	  geographically	  
concentrate	   their	  productive	   activities	   rather	   than	  dispersing	   them	   in	   several	   locations,	  due	   to	   the	  benefits	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  	  In	  Appendix	  4.2	  I	  will	  show	  the	  statistical	  maps	  with	  the	  economic	  structures	  of	  the	  272	  European	  (EU)	  regions	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terms	   of	   production	   costs	   deriving	   from	   creating	   larger	   plants.	   In	   this	   respect,	   increasing	   returns	   crucially	  
constitute	   a	   sort	   of	   leitmotiv	   of	   NEG,	   which	   is	   central	   to	   the	   explanation	   of	   the	   spatial	   differences	   in	   the	  
distribution	   of	   productive	   activities	   (Ascani	   et	   al.	   2013:3).	   Therefore,	   firms	   may	   tend	   to	   concentrate	   their	  
investment	   activity	   in	   specific	   locations	   with	   an	   already	   large	   industrial	   sector	   when	   barriers	   to	   trade	   and	  
international	  factor	  mobility	  are	  removed.	  	  
The	   process	   of	   geographical	   concentration	   of	   investment	   rate	   in	   manufacturing	   industry	   can	   be	   shown	   by	  
plotting	   the	  graph	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  size	  of	  manufacturing	   industry	   in	  2001	  and	  the	  subsequent	  
rates	  of	  investment	  in	  of	  manufacturing	  industry	  over	  the	  period	  2001-­‐2015.	  
	  
	  
As	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  note,	   the	  correlation	  coefficient	  between	  the	  manufacturing	   industry	  share	   in	  2001	  and	  the	  
subsequent	  investment	  rate	  in	  the	  sector	  is	  remarkably	  high	  both	  in	  the	  sample	  of	  the	  EMU-­‐12	  regions	  and	  of	  the	  
EU-­‐28	  regions.	  
From	  the	  econometric	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  process	  of	  industrial	  concentration	  that	  has	  followed	  the	  completion	  of	  
the	   Common	   Market,	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   Single	   Currency	   and	   the	   EU	   Enlargement	   can	   be	   modelled	   as	  
follows:	  
	  
yi=α	  +ρWyij	  	  +	  β1X1,	  i	  	  +	  μi	  
(3)	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Where	  y	  denotes	  the	  average	  annual	  investment	  rate	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  as	  percentage	  to	  GDP	  during	  the	  
period	  2001-­‐2015	  and	  Wy	  denotes	  an	  inverse	  distance	  weight	  matrix	  of	  y.	  X1	  denotes	  the	  size	  of	  manufacturing	  
industry	  in	  2001.	  
Whether	   the	   assumption	   of	   “increasing	   returns	   and	   economic	   geography”	   applies	   for	   the	   EU	   regions,	   the	   ρ	   is	  
expected	  be	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant,	  meaning	  that	  investment	  rate	  in	  a	  region	  i	  tends	  to	  be	  positively	  
related	  both	  to	  the	  investment	  rate	  in	  the	  neighbouring	  regions37.	  Symmetrically,	  also	  coefficient	  estimate	  β1	  on	  
the	   size	   of	   manufacturing	   industrial	   sector	   in	   2001	   is	   expected	   to	   be	   positive	   and	   statistically	   significant,	  
meaning	  that	  manufacturing	  firms	  had	  tended	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  regions	  with	  an	  already	  large	  industrial	  sector	  in	  
order	  to	  realize	  scale	  economies.	  
	  
	  
Table	   4.6:	   Investment	   Rate	   in	   Manufacturing,	   Initial	   size	   of	  
Manufacturing	  and	  Spatial	  Spillovers	  
	  




















	   Acceptance	  range	  for	  ρ:	  -­‐1.633	  <	  rho	  <	  1.000	  
	  
Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  




According	   to	   the	   regression	   output,	   a	   1%	   increase	   in	   the	   initial	   size	   of	   industry	   in	   2001	   is	   expected	   to	   be	  
associated	   with	   an	   average	   annual	   0.3%	   increase	   in	   investment	   rate	   in	   industry	   while	   a	   1%	   increase	   in	   the	  
investment	  rate	  in	  industry	  in	  a	  neighbouring	  region	  j	  located	  within	  the	  first	  quartile	  distance	  cutoff	  is	  expected	  
to	  produce	  a	  0.58%	  increase	  in	  investment	  rate	  region	  i.	  The	  model	  formalizes	  the	  centripetal	  force	  of	  economic	  
geography	   in	   shaping	   regional	  distribution	  of	   the	  manufacturing	   industry’s	   activity	   and	   the	  empirical	   findings	  
essentially	  confirm	  the	  assumptions	  of	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  NEG	  that	  focuses	  on	  increasing	  returns	  and	  
the	  progressive	  fostering	  of	  asymmetries	  in	  the	  economic	  structures	  within	  economic	  and	  political	  areas	  when	  
they	  get	  more	  and	  more	   integrated.	   	  As	  matter	  of	   facts,	  during	   the	  period	  2001-­‐2015	   there	  was	  a	   statistically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Symbol	  ρ	  in	  Equation	  3	  denotes	  the	  same	  as	  symbol	  λ	  in	  Equation	  2	  but	  with	  a	  different	  notation	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significant	  tendency	  of	   investment	  rate	   in	   industry	  to	  concentrate	  within	  and	  around	  the	  regions	  with	  a	   larger	  
manufacturing	  sector	  in	  200138.	  
	  
4.10	  Model	  2:	  Kaldor-­‐Verdoorn	  Law	  
Based	  on	  Verdoorn’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  Italian	  economy,	  Kaldor	  ‘s	  second	  law	  (1949)	  proves	  a	  positive	  relationship	  
between	  growth	  in	  productivity	  of	  manufacturing	  industry	  and	  growth	  of	  manufacturing	  output.	  In	  other	  words,	  
the	  larger	  is	  the	  size	  manufacturing	  industry	  out	  of	  the	  total	  economy,	  the	  faster	  the	  labour	  productivity	  growth	  
in	  the	  sector.	  
The	  essential	  point	  of	  this	  proposition	  is	  the	  formation	  of	  scale	  economies	  because	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  industrial	  
sector	  is	  characterized	  by	  increasing	  returns	  to	  scale	  and	  this	  produces	  growth	  of	  the	  output	  per	  worker	  in	  the	  
manufacturing	  industry	  (Pons-­‐Novell	  and	  Viladecans-­‐Marsal,	  1998).	  
In	   order	   to	   test	   the	  Kaldor’s	   Second	   law	   in	   a	   framework	  of	  manufacturing	   industry	   agglomeration	  because	   of	  
increasing	  returns,	  I	  specify	  the	  following	  model:	  
	  
yi=α	  +	  β1X1,	  i	  +ρWyij	  	  +	  β2X2,	  i	  	  +	  β3	  WX2,i	  	  +μi	  
(4)	  (5)	  
	  
Where	   y	  denotes	   the	  dependent	   variable,	   annual	   output	  pre	  worker	   (4)	   or	   output	  per	  worker	   in	   industry	   (5)	  
growth,	   during	   the	   period	   2001-­‐2015.	   	   X1	  denotes	   the	   natural	   logarithm	   of	   output	   per	  worker	   or	   output	   per	  
worker	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  in	  2001	  and	  Wyij	  denotes	  the	  inverse	  distance	  weight	  matrix	  of	  the	  dependent	  
variable.	  Variable	  X2	  denotes	   the	  average	   share	  of	  manufacturing	   industry	  of	   total	  GVA	   in	   region	   i.	   In	  order	   to	  
model	   an	   economy	   of	   scale	   I	   also	   include	   the	   variable	   WX1.i	   that	   denotes	   the	   spatially	   lagged	   size	   of	  
manufacturing	   industry,	   that	   is,	   the	   size	   of	  manufacturing	   industry	   in	   region	   j	   located	  within	   the	   1st	   quartile	  
distance	  cutoff	  from	  region	  i.	  	  
Despite	   Kaldor’s	   Second	   law	   establishes	   a	   relationship	   between	   growth	   in	   productivity	   of	   manufacturing	  
industry	   and	  growth	  of	  manufacturing	  output	  or	  manufacturing	   size,	   I	   also	   estimate	   the	   relationship	  between	  
overall	  labour	  productivity	  and	  the	  size	  of	  industrial	  sector	  because	  in	  paragraph	  4.6	  I	  showed	  the	  tight	  positive	  
relationship	  between	  labour	  productivity	  growth	  and	  manufacturing	  industry	  productivity	  growth.	  	  
The	  results	  of	  the	  models	  4	  and	  5	  are	  reported	  in	  Tables	  4.7	  and	  4.839.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  In	  Appendix	  4.3	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  short	  analysis	  about	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  manufacturing	  industry	  activity	  during	  the	  period	  2001-­‐
2015	  tended	  to	  agglomerate	  in	  regions	  that	  had	  an	  already	  large	  manufacturing	  sector	  in	  2001	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Table	  4.7:	  Convergence	  in	  Labour	  Productivity	  of	  Manufacturing	  Industry	  	  
	  





Log	  of	  Output	  per	  Worker	  in	  Manufacturing	  Industry	  in	  2001	   -­‐.013***	  
[.001]	  
	  
Average	  Size	  of	  Manufacturing	  Industry	  
	  
.0003***	  	  	  	  
[.0001]	  
	  
W*Average	  Size	  of	  Manufacturing	  Industry	  









	   Acceptance	  range	  for	  ρ:	  -­‐1.633	  <	  rho	  <	  1.000	  
	  
	  
Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  




Table	  4.8:	  Convergence	  in	  Labour	  productivity	  	  
	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  Growth	  of	  Productivity	  	  
	  
	  
Log	  of	  Output	  per	  Worker	  in	  2001	  
	  
	  
-­‐.015***	  	  	  	  
[.001]	  
Average	  Size	  of	  Manufacturing	  Industry	  
	  
	  
.0002***	  	  	  
[.000]	  
W*Average	  Size	  of	  Manufacturing	  Industry	  
	  
	  





.14***	  	  	  
[.01]	  
ρ	  (Wy)	   .77***	  
[.10]	  
	   Acceptance	  range	  for	  ρ:	  -­‐1.633	  <	  rho	  <	  1.000	  
	  
Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  




The	  regression	  output	  is	  very	  interesting	  fro	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  the	  results	  confirm	  the	  fact	  that	  Kaldor’s	  Second	  
Law	  applies	  to	  process	  of	  regional	  development	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  As	  matter	  of	  fact	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  size	  
of	  manufacturing	  industry	  as	  percentage	  of	  total	  GVA	  is	  positively	  associated	  to	  growth	  of	  labour	  productivity	  in	  
manufacturing	  industry	  and	  of	  overall	  labour	  productivity.	  	  
Second,	   coefficient	   estimates	   of	   the	   spatially	   lagged	   dependent	   variable	   (Wy)	   and	   spatially	   lagged	   size	   of	  
manufacturing	  industry	  are	  positively	  associated	  with	  growth	  of	  labour	  productivity	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  In	  Appendix	  4.4	  I	  will	  provide	  the	  output	  of	  the	  same	  model	  estimated	  by	  replacing	  the	  size	  of	  manufacturing	  industry	  with	  the	  size	  of	  
market	  services	  sector	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and	  of	  overall	  labour	  productivity,	  meaning	  that	  economic	  geography	  and	  scale	  economies	  paly	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  
regional	   development.	   It	   is	   also	   worth	   to	   note	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   exists	   almost	   a	   perfect	   linear	   relationship	  
between	   labour	   productivity	   in	  manufacturing	   industry	   in	   region	   j	   and	   labour	   productivity	   in	  manufacturing	  
industry	  in	  region	  i,	  that	  is,	  in	  the	  spatially	  lagged	  regions	  located	  within	  the	  distance	  band	  comprised	  between	  0	  
and	  the	  1st	  quartile	  cutoff.	  
	  
4.11	  Model	  3:	  Conditional	  beta-­‐convergence	  and	  spatial	  spillovers	  
After	   having	   analysed	   the	   dynamics	   of	   industrial	   activity	   in	   the	  EU	   regions,	   in	   this	   paragraph	   I	  will	   present	   a	  
model	  of	   conditional	   convergence	   that	   incorporates	   the	   inverse	  Distance	  Weights	  Matrix	   for	  economic	  growth	  
(Harris,	  2008)	  
In	   this	   model	   regional	   economic	   growth	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   initial	   conditions	   (based	   on	   the	   “Neoclassical”	  
negative	  relationship	  between	  economic	  growth	  and	  initial	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  or	  Labour	  Productivity	  per	  Worker),	  
by	   the	   geographical	   spillovers	   and	   by	   a	   vector	   of	   control	   variables	   that	   comprises	   investment	   rate	   in	  
manufacturing	   industry	   and	   human	   capital.	   Whether	   conditional	   β-­‐convergence	   is	   estimated,	   a	   possible	  
conclusion	  could	  be	  the	  significant	   influence	  of	  regional	  spillovers	  on	  the	  process	  of	  convergence	  (Feldkircher,	  
2006).	  	  
Given	   the	   empirical	   confirmations	   of	   Kaldor’s	   assumption	   in	   the	   previous	   paragraphs,	   investment	   rate	   in	  
manufacturing	   industry	   and	   economic	   growth	   in	   neighbouring	   regions	   are	   expected	   to	   prove	   to	   be	   the	  main	  
determinant	  of	  regional	  economic	  growth	  and	  conditional	  convergence.	  	  
The	  model	  is	  specified	  as	  follows40:	  
	  
yi=	  α	  +	  β1	  ln	  (x	  0,i)	  +	  ρWyij	  +	  β2	  x	  2,	  i	  +	  β3	  [	  ψ3,	  i]	  +	  	  β4	  [	  Γ4,	  i]	  +	  β5	  D(V)	  +	  β5	  D(P)	  	  +	  	  μ	  i	  	  
(6)	  (7)	  
	  
Where	  y	  denotes	  average	  annual	  rate	  of	  growth	  in	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  (or	  GVA	  per	  Worker)	  during	  the	  period	  2001-­‐
2015	  (Equation	  6	  and	  7	  respectively).	  	  W	  is	  a	  spatially	  lagged	  dependent	  variable	  y	  in	  the	  form	  of	  IDW,	  ρ	  denotes	  
a	  scalar	  spatial	  regressive	  parameter	  and	  x0	  denotes	  the	  GDP	  per	  capita	  (or	  output	  per	  worker)	  in	  2001.	  	  
x0	  denotes	  the	  log	  of	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  (6)	  or	  output	  per	  worker	  	  (7)	  in	  2001.	  
The	   inverse	   distance	  matrix	   ρWy	   allows	   capture	   the	   spatial	   spillovers,	   thus	   how	   growth	   in	   a	   given	   region	   is	  
influenced	  by	  growth	  in	  neighbouring	  regions	  or	  the	  spatially	  lagged	  regions41.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  In	  Appendix	  5.2	  of	  Chapter	  5	  I	  will	  provide	  the	  output	  of	  the	  test	  for	  multicollinearity	  between	  the	  variables	  utilized	  in	  this	  model	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X1	  denotes	   average	   investment	   rate	   in	  manufacturing	   industry	   while	   Ψ	   denotes	   a	   vector	   of	   control	   variables	  
related	   to	   the	   sectorial	   investment	   rates	   to	   GDP	   (investment	   in	   construction,	   investment	   in	   agriculture	  
investment	  in	  non-­‐market	  services	  and	  investment	  in	  market	  services	  to	  GDP42).	  	  
Γ	  denotes	  a	  vector	  of	  control	  variables	  related	  to	  labour	  force	  (education	  attainment	  of	  working	  age	  population	  
and	  youth	  occupational	  situation)	  in	  both	  the	  equations	  (6	  and	  7).	  D(V)	  denotes	  a	  dummy	  variable	  that	  takes	  on	  
value	   1	   if	   the	   region	   is	   located	  within	   a	   country	   of	   the	  Visegrad	  Group	   (Czech	  Republic,	   Poland,	   Slovakia	   and	  
Hungary)	  and	  0	  otherwise.	  D(P)	  	  	  denotes	  a	  dummy	  variable	  that	  takes	  on	  value	  1	  if	  the	  region	  is	  located	  within	  a	  
country	  of	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  EMU	  (Spain,	  Italy,	  Greece	  and	  Portugal)	  and	  0	  otherwise.	  The	  dummy	  variable	  is	  
expected	  to	  show	  whether	  there	  exists	  a	  statistically	  significant	  tendency	  for	  regions	  of	  peripheral	  countries	  of	  
the	  EMU	  to	  grow	  less	  than	  the	  other	  European	  regions.	  The	  dummy	  for	  peripheral	  regions	  can	  be	  also	  viewed	  as	  
a	   strategy	   to	   incorporate	   “geographical	   location	   effects”	   in	   the	   growth	   equation.	   Furthermore,	   provided	   that	  
geographical	   location	   affects	   regional	   economic	   growth,	   location	   effects	   are	   expected	   to	   have	   a	   strong	   impact	  
also	  on	  growth	  of	  labour	  productivity.	  
The	  spatial	  weight	  matrix	  allows	  to	  account	  for	  “spatial”	  endogeneity	  in	  GDP	  per	  capita	  and	  labour	  productivity	  
growth	  because	  its	  coefficient	  estimates	  will	  indicate	  how	  the	  economic	  growth	  (and	  thus	  an	  increase	  in	  demand	  
for	  intermediate	  or	  final	  goods)	  or	  economic	  shocks	  (in	  case	  of	  the	  SEM	  Model)	  from	  the	  neighbouring	  regions	  
(j’s)	  affect	  economic	  growth	  in	  a	  given	  region	  i.	  
The	  outputs	  of	  equations	  6	  and	  7	  are	  reported	  in	  tables	  4.8	  and	  4.9.	  Note	  that	  SLM	  and	  SEM	  models	  are	  estimated	  
with	  Maximum	  Likelihood	  estimator.	  Therefore	   in	   this	   case	   there	   is	  not	  a	   coefficient	  of	  determination	  R2	  as	   in	  
OLS	  regressions’	  output	  because	  the	  Maximum	  Likelihood	  estimator	  of	  the	  unknown	  parameters	  maximizes	  the	  
probability	   (or	   likelihood)	   that	   the	   statistical	   process	   described	   by	   the	   model	   draws	   the	   data	   being	   actually	  
observed.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   Maximum	   Likelihood	   coefficient	   estimate	   consists	   of	   the	   parameter	   value	   that	  
denotes	  as	  the	  “most	  likely”	  to	  have	  produced	  the	  observed	  data	  	  (Stock	  and	  Watson,	  2012).	  
Tables	  4.8	  and	  4.9	  report	  the	  outputs	  of	  Spatial	  Lag	  Model	  (SLM)	  and	  Spatial	  Lag	  Error	  (SLE)	  estimated	  with	  the	  
same	  variables.	  
The	  results	  of	  the	  models	  are	  expected	  to	  confirm	  the	  empirical	  findings	  of	  the	  previous	  paragraphs	  according	  to	  
which	   regional	   economic	   growth	   is	  mainly	   driven	   by	   the	  manufacturing	   industry	   activity	   and	   neighbourhood	  
spillovers.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  In	  the	  regression	  output	  I	  will	  also	  provide	  the	  estimations	  of	  a	  Spatial	  Error	  Model	  with	  the	  same	  variables.	   	   In	  the	  Appendix	  4.5	  I	  will	  
provide	  a	  brief	  explanation	  of	  the	  rationale	  and	  interpretation	  of	  Spatial	  Error	  Model	  
42	  Investment	  in	  market	  services	  comprises	  investment	  in	  wholesale,	  retail,	  transport,	  accommodation	  &	  food	  services,	  information	  and	  
communication	  plus	  investment	  in	  financial	  and	  business	  services	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Table	  4.9:	  “Spatial”	  Conditional	  beta-­‐convergence	  in	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  	  
	  
	   SLM	  (Spatial	  Lag	  Model)	  
Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  =	  272	  
SLE	  (Spatial	  Error	  Model)	  
Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  =	  272	  
	  










Investment	  in	  Manufacturing	   .0021***	  
[.0001]	  
.0019***	  	  	  	  
[.0001]	  
Investment	  in	  Construction	   	  	  .001***	  	  	  	  
[.0002]	  
.001***	  	  	  
[.0003]	  
Investment	  in	  market	  services	   .0001	  	  
[.00008]	  
.0001	  	  	  	  
[.0001]	  




Investment	  in	  Agriculture	  
	  
-­‐.0012**	  	  	  
	  [.0006]	  
-­‐.001	  	  	  	  
[.000]	  
Labour	  force	  with	  Tertiary	  Education	   .0003***	  	  	  	  
[.00007]	  
.0003***	  	  	  	  
[.00007]	  
Percentage	  of	  Labour	  force	  with	  
Primary	  Education	  or	  Less	  
-­‐.0002***	  	  	  	  	  
[.00004]	  
-­‐.0003***	  	  	  	  
[.000052]	  
Young	  people	  neither	  employed	  nor	  in	  
education	  or	  training	  Education	  
-­‐.00028***	  	  	  	  	  
[.0001]	  























λ	  (Wμ)	   	   .69***	  
[.15]	  
Acceptable	  range	  for	  lambda:	  
	  -­‐1.633	  <	  lambda	  <	  1.000	  
	  
***Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  	  
**Statistically	  Significant	  at	  5%	  	  
*Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  
Standard	  Errors	  in	  parentheses	  [	  ]	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Table	  4.10:“Spatial”	  Conditional	  beta-­‐convergence	  in	  Labour	  Productivity	  
	  
	   SLM	  (Spatial	  Lag	  Model)	  
Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  =	  272	  
SLE	  (Spatial	  Error	  Model)	  
Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  =	  272	  
	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  	  





Log	  of	  GVA	  per	  Worker	  in	  2001	   -­‐.0107***	  	  	  
[.001]	  
-­‐.015***	  	  	  	  
[.001]	  
Investment	  in	  Manufacturing	   .0024***	  	  	  	  
[.0002]	  
.0019***	  	  	  	  
[.0002]	  
Investment	  in	  Construction	   .0006*	  	  	  
[.0003]	  
.0007*	  	  	  	  
[.0004]	  
Investment	  in	  market	  services	   .0001	  	  	  
[.0001]	  
.0001	  	  	  	  
.0001	  
Investment	  in	  non-­‐Market	  Services	   .00003	  	  	  	  
[.0002]	  
-­‐.00004	  	  	  
	  [.0003]	  




-­‐.0015	  	  	  	  
[.0009]	  
Labour	  force	  with	  Tertiary	  Education	   .00017***	  	  	  
[.00007]	  
	  	  .0002**	  	  	  
[.00009]	  
Percentage	  of	  Labour	  force	  with	  
Primary	  Education	  or	  Less	  
-­‐.00014	  
	  	  [.00005]	  
-­‐.0000271	  	  	  	  
[.00007]	  
Young	  people	  neither	  employed	  nor	  in	  
education	  or	  training	  Education	  
-­‐.00025**	  	  
[.0001]	  













.56***	  	  	  	  
[.07]	  
Acceptable	  range	  for	  rho:	  -­‐1.633	  <	  rho	  
<	  1.000	  






λ	  (Wμ)	   	   .86***	  	  	  	  
[.07]	  
Acceptable	  range	  for	  lambda:	  
-­‐1.633	  <	  lambda	  <	  1.000	  
***Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  	  
**Statistically	  Significant	  at	  5%	  	  
*Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	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4.13	  Discussion	  of	  the	  Results	  of	  Models	  6	  and	  7	  
The	   regression	   outputs	   of	  model	   6	   and	   7	   seem	   to	   confirm	   the	  main	   hypothesis	   described	   in	   the	   body	   of	   the	  
chapter:	  manufacturing	  industry	  and	  spatial	  spillovers	  constitute	  the	  engines	  of	  regional	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  
European	  Union.	   	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   investment	  rate	   in	  manufacturing	   industry	   is	   the	  sectorial	   investment	  rate	  
with	  the	  largest	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  coefficient	  estimates	  both	  for	  income	  per	  capita	  and	  labour	  
productivity	   growth.	   	   Investment	   rate	   in	   other	   economic	   sectors	   exerts	   no	   statistically	   significant	   effects	  
(investment	   in	  market	   services)	   or	   negative	   effects	   (investment	   in	   agriculture	   and	   investment	   in	   non-­‐market	  
services)	  on	  economic	  growth.	  Therefore	  manufacturing	  industry	  activity	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  the	  main	  determinant	  
of	  regional	  conditional	  convergence	  in	  income	  per	  capita	  and	  labour	  productivity	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  
In	   this	   framework,	   the	   fact	   that	   investment	   in	  market	   services	   produces	  not	   statistically	   significant	   effects	   on	  
income	  and	   labour	  productivity	  growth	   is	  very	  relevant	  to	  explain	   lack	  of	  convergence	   in	  the	  EU-­‐15	  because	  a	  
very	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  GVA	  in	  the	  peripheral	  regions	  of	  the	  EMU	  is	  produced	  by	  the	  market	  services	  sector	  as	  
shown	  in	  the	  statistical	  maps	  in	  Appendix	  4.2.	  	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  statistically	  significant	  coefficients	  estimates	  for	  ρ	  and	  λ	  confirm	  the	  spatial	  autocorrelation	  of	  
the	  Moran’s	  Index	  as	  reported	  in	  table	  4.3.	  	  From	  technical	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  fact	  that	  coefficients	  estimates	  ρ	  and	  
λ	   are	   larger	   for	   Labour	   Productivity	   growth	   than	   for	   GDP	   per	   capita	   growth	   in	   perfect	   coherence	   with	   the	  
Moran’s	   Index	   estimated	  and	   reported	   in	   table	  4.3,	   confirms	   the	   robustness	  of	   the	   econometric	   approach	  and	  
analysis.	  
Furthermore,	   the	  empirical	  evidence	   that	   spatial	   autocorrelation	   for	   labour	  productivity	  growth	   is	   larger	   than	  
spatial	  autocorrelation	  for	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  growth	  confirms	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  increasing	  returns	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  
New	  Economic	  Geography	   theoretical	   framework.	   	   Indeed	   in	   the	  short	  run	  regions	  may	  experience	  demand-­‐led	  
economic	  growth	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  housing	  bubble	  or	  increase	  in	  government	  consumption	  
that	  may	  temporarily	  boost	  jobs	  creation,	  regardless	  of	  neighbourhood	  spillover	  and	  spatial	  location.	  	  	  
Instead,	   long	   run	   economic	   growth	   can	   be	   sustained	   only	   when	   it	   is	   underpinned	   by	   growth	   in	   labour	  
productivity	   that,	   according	   to	   the	  model,	   in	   turns	   strictly	  depends	  on	   investment	   rate	   in	   industry,	   increasing	  
returns	  and	  spatial	  spillovers.	  As	  Krugman	  (2004)	  remarks,	  a	  country’s	  ability	  to	  improve	  its	  standard	  of	  living	  
over	  time	  depends	  almost	  entirely	  on	  its	  ability	  to	  raise	  its	  output	  per	  worker.	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  coefficient	  estimate	  for	  λ	  (spatially	  lagged	  error)	  tell	  us	  
that	  the	  passthrough	  of	  regional	  spillover	  make	  growth	  in	  a	  given	  region	  also	  very	  sensitive	  to	  macroeconomic	  or	  
productivity	  shocks	  (either	  positive	  or	  negative)	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  neighbouring	  regions.	  	  
	   103	  
Another	   relevant	   empirical	   evidence	   is	   represented	   by	   the	   statistical	   significance	   of	   the	   dummy	   or	   binomial	  
variable	  utilized	  to	  denote	  regions	  belonging	  to	  the	  peripheral	  countries.	  Indeed	  the	  negative	  coefficient	  estimate	  
confirms	  that	  economic	  growth	  Southern	  European	  regions	  is	  also	  conditioned	  by	  	  “location	  effect”,	  that	  is	  by	  the	  
fact	   that	  regions	  are	   located	  within	  a	  peripheral	  country,	  be	   it	  Spain,	  Greece,	  Portugal	  or	   Italy.	  This	  essentially	  
means	  that	  on	  average	  growth	  in	  income	  per	  capita	  and	  labour	  productivity	  tend	  to	  be	  lower	  than	  in	  the	  other	  
European	  regions.	  
Symmetrically	   also	  positive	   and	   statistically	   significant	   coefficient	   estimate	   for	   the	  binomial	   variable	  denoting	  
regions	   located	  within	   the	  Visegrad	  Group	  confirm	  the	  relevance	  of	   the	  “location	  effect”	   for	  regional	  economic	  
performances.	  This	  essentially	  means	  that	  growth	  in	  income	  per	  capita	  and	  labour	  productivity	  in	  the	  regions	  of	  
the	  Visegrad	  Group	  	  tend	  to	  be	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  other	  European	  regions.	  
Location	   and	   spatial	   effects	   excluded,	   the	   coefficients	   estimates	   for	   the	   other	   control	   variables	   confirm	   the	  
common	  findings	  in	  the	  growth	  literature.	  A	  skilled	  labour	  force	  has	  a	  positive	  impact	  of	  economic	  growth	  while	  
unskilled	   labour	   force	   has	   a	   negative	   impact.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   human	   capital	   deterioration	   (proxied	   as	   the	  




The	   empirical	   evidence	   arising	   from	   the	   combination	   of	   the	  New	   Economic	   Geography	   theory	   and	   Kaldorian	  
assumptions	  leads	  to	  some	  important	  conclusions	  with	  relevant	  policy	  implications.	  
In	   paragraph	   4.9	   and	   4.10	   I	   have	   showed	   that	   since	   the	   early	   2000s	   the	   process	   of	   European	   economic	  
integration	   has	   been	   characterised	   by	   a	   progressive	   tendency	   of	   manufacturing	   firms	   to	   concentrate	   their	  
investments	  within	  or	  around	  the	  regions	  with	  already	  large	  industrial	  sector.	  	  
Therefore	  reciprocal	  regional	  spillovers	  have	  fostered	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  group	  of	  regions	  located	  in	  mainly	  in	  
those	  regions	  of	  Germany,	  Austria	  (and	  partially	  Finland	  and	  the	  Netherlands)	  and	  in	  the	  Visegrad	  group	  with	  a	  
strong	  manufacturing	  vocation.	  	  
Such	  concentration	  of	  investment	  rate	  of	  manufacturing	  firms	  in	  the	  core	  regions	  and	  the	  neighbouring	  ones	  led	  
to	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  manufacturing	  industry	  the	  has	  favoured	  the	  emergence	  of	  scale	  economies	  that	  in	  turn	  
drove	  high	  rates	  of	  growth	  in	  labour	  productivity	  and	  GDP	  per	  capita.	  As	  matter	  of	  facts	  in	  Table	  4.2,	  I	  showed	  
that	  regional	  convergence	  (in	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  and	  labour	  productivity)	  in	  the	  EU-­‐28	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  regions	  of	  
Eastern	   Europe,	   which	   actually	   experienced	   convergence	   in	   manufacturing	   industry	   labour	   productivity.	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Conversely	  in	  the	  EMU-­‐12	  and	  EU15,	  where	  no	  convergence	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  productivity	  took	  place,	  
regional	  divergence	  in	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  and	  overall	  labour	  productivity	  was	  observed.	  
High	   rates	   of	   growth	   and	   convergence	   in	   labour	   productivity	   in	   manufacturing	   industry,	   overall	   labour	  
productivity	   and	   GDP	   per	   Capita	   have	   been	   triggered	   by	   a	   virtuous	   circle	   of	   investment	   rate	   in	   industry,	   the	  
growth	   of	   manufacturing	   sector	   as	   share	   of	   total	   GVA	   and	   regional	   spillovers.	   Symmetrically,	   negligible	  
convergence	  or	  divergence	  in	  regions	  of	  Southern	  Europe	  have	  been	  triggered	  by	  a	  vicious	  circle	  represented	  by	  
the	  progressive	  shift	  of	  manufacturing	  industry	  activity	  towards	  the	  regions	  of	  Northern	  and	  Central	  Europe.	  
This	  bifurcation	  in	  regional	  convergence	  perfectly	  matches	  the	  process	  of	  the	  bifurcation	  in	  	  “between	  countries”	  
convergence	  highlight	  in	  Paragraph	  1.6	  of	  Chapter	  1.	  
Finally	  in	  Paragraph	  4.11	  I	  estimated	  a	  conditional	  convergence	  model	  of	  labour	  productivity	  and	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  
of	  the	  272	  regions	  located	  in	  the	  EU-­‐28.	  The	  model	  that	   incorporates	  an	  inverse	  distance	  weight	  matrix	  shows	  
both	  that	   investment	  rate	   in	  manufacturing	  industry	   is	  the	  main	  “discretional”	  determinant	  of	  regional	  growth	  
while	   geographical	   spillovers	   produce	   self-­‐reinforcing	   virtuous	   cycles	   of	   economic	   growth.	   I	   use	   the	   term	  
discretional	  to	  indicate	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  geographical	  location	  that	  is	  an	  “immutable”	  characteristics	  out	  of	  policy	  
discretion).	  
Therefore	  in	  a	  framework	  a	  progressive	  reduction	  of	  the	  government	  intervention	  in	  the	  economy,	  the	  observed	  
tendency	   of	   productive	   specialization	   and	   asymmetric	   regional	   development	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   foster	   regional	  
disparities	   in	   the	   levels	   of	   economic	   development	   across	   European	   regions.	   As	   the	   output	   of	  models	   6	   and	   7	  
shows	   (tables	   4.9	   and	   4.10),	   regional	   convergence	   in	   GDP	   per	   capita	   and	   overall	   labour	   productivity	   is	  
conditional	   on	   a	   set	   of	   exogenous	   variables	   including	   investment	   rate	   in	   industry	   that	   tends	   to	   be	   higher	   in	  
regions	  where	  the	  size	  of	  manufacturing	  sector	  is	  larger.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  economic	  growth	  and	  convergence	  in	  
a	   given	   region	   is	   strictly	   associated	   with	   economic	   growth	   in	   the	   neighbouring	   regions,	   which	   in	   turn	   is	  
positively	  affected	  by	  investment	  rate	  in	  industry	  and	  the	  size	  of	  industrial	  sector	  in	  the	  neighbouring	  regions	  as	  
well.	  	  
In	   this	   framework,	   the	   progressive	   structural	   shift	   from	  manufacturing	   to	   service	   sector	   has	   several	   log-­‐run	  
implication	   for	   regional	  economic	  growth.	  First,	   if	  a	   large	  part	  of	   the	  workforce	  moves	   into	   the	  service	  sector,	  
productivity	  growth	  within	  services	  will	  probably	  determine	  the	  outlook	  for	  living	  standards	  overall.	  However	  a	  
large	  part	  of	  service	  sectors	  such	  as	  wholesale,	  retail,	  accommodation	  and	  food	  services	  is	  less	  or	  no	  amenable	  to	  
technological	  progress,	  therefore	  less	  capable	  to	  generate	  wealth	  if	  compared	  to	  the	  manufacturing	  sector.	  As	  a	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consequence	   in	  many	   countries	   and	   regions	   the	   long-­‐term	   average	   rate	   of	   growth	  will	   be	   determined	   by	   the	  
activity	  in	  which	  productivity	  growth	  is	  slowest	  (Rowthorn	  and	  Ramaswamy,	  1997).	  
For	  example	  Accetturo	  et	  al	  (2015)	  argue	  that	  the	  stagnation	  of	   income	  per	  capita	  in	  North-­‐West	  of	  Italy	  since	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s	  	  is	  mainly	  due	  to	  a	  process	  of	  deindustrialization	  and	  tertiarization	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  to	  a	  
too	  slow	  structural	  transition	  towards	  high-­‐intensity	  technology	  and	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  services	  sectors.	  
In	  such	  a	  framework	  it	   is	  very	  likely	  that	  regional	  disparities	  within	  the	  European	  Union	  are	  bound	  to	  become	  
increasingly	   relevant	   with	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   European	   “core”	   growing	   fast,	   a	   group	   of	   integrated	   regions	  
(Visegrad	  regions)	  converging,	  and	  a	  group	  of	  peripheral	  regions	  (Italian	  Mezzogiorno,	  South	  of	  Spain,	  Portugal	  
and	   Greece)	   lagging	   persistently	   behind	   the	   core	   regions.	   As	  matter	   of	   facts	   the	   geographical	   location	   effects	  
captured	  with	  the	  dummy	  variable	  for	  regions	  located	  in	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  EMU,	  besides	  producing	  negative	  
and	   statistically	   significant	   effects	   on	   GDP	   per	   capita	   growth,	   produce	   also	   stronger	   negative	   and	   statistically	  
significant	   effects	   on	   labour	   productivity	   growth.	   The	   evidence	   of	   negative	   location	   effects	   in	   the	   peripheral	  
regions	  of	  the	  EMU	  for	  labour	  productivity	  growth	  in	  particular	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  the	  difficulty	  common	  to	  
the	   peripheral	   regions	   to	   get	  more	   integrated	   in	   the	   core	   regions	   industrial	   value	   chain	   and	   to	   develop	   scale	  
economies	  and	  competitiveness.	  	  
As	  matter	  of	  facts	  also	  Farole	  et	  al	  (2018:9)	  argue	  in	  a	  Report	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  that	  if	  the	  trends	  of	  the	  past	  
decade	  were	  to	  continue,	  by	  2025	  the	  poorest	  regions	  of	  Romania,	  Poland,	  Hungary,	  and	  Bulgaria	  will	  be	  richer,	  
on	  average,	  than	  the	  lagging	  regions	  of	  Italy,	  Spain,	  Portugal,	  and	  Greece.	  	  
	  
4.14	  Policy	  Implications	  
Manufacturing	   industry	   is	   also	   commonly	   recognized	   as	   the	   main	   driver	   of	   innovation	   and	   technological	  
advancements	   (Coad	   and	   Vezzani,	   2017),	   therefore	   the	   uneven	   regional	   distribution	   of	   the	   industrial	   activity	  
may	   further	   exacerbate	   divergence	   by	   determining	   also	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   group	   of	   regions	   lagging	  
chronically	   behind	   the	   core	   regions	   in	   technology	   and	   innovation.	   As	   Porter	   (2009:263)	   remarks,	   industrial	  
cluster	  participation	  offers	  to	  the	  firms	  the	  advantages	  in	  perceiving	  new	  technological,	  operational	  and	  delivery	  
possibilities.	   Participants	   learn	   early	   and	   consistently	   about	   evolving	   technology,	   component	   and	   machinery	  
availability	   and	   service	   availability	   facilitated	   by	   on-­‐going	   business	   interactions	   and	   relationships	   with	   other	  
firms	   within	   the	   same	   industrial	   clusters.	   As	   Ciccone	   (2001)	   remarks,	   despite	   education	   and	   public	  
infrastructure	   matters,	   large	   differences	   in	   regional	   productivity	   in	   Europe	   and	   the	   United	   State	   are	   mainly	  
driven	   by	   agglomeration	   effects	   in	   the	   manufacturing	   sector	   that	   allows	   larger	   economies	   of	   scale	   and	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technological	   transfer	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   larger	   variety	   of	   service	   firms	   that	   further	   enhance	   labour	  
productivity	  in	  the	  regions.	  	  
Therefore	   this	   perspective	   has	   lead	  many	   economists	   to	   formulate	   proposals	   for	   a	   new	   “European”	   industrial	  
policy	  based	  on	   innovation	   and	   investment	   in	  knowledge-­‐intensive	   industrial	   sectors.	   For	   example	  Mazuccato	  
(2018)	  points	  out	  that	  weak	  economic	  performances	  in	  Southern	  Europe	  in	  the	  last	  20	  years	  are	  attributable	  to	  
low	  level	  of	  government	  investment	  in	  the	  strategic	  sectors	  of	  innovation	  and	  productivity.	  Fiscal	  austerity	  in	  the	  
periphery	   has	   further	   contributed	   to	   the	   European	   duality	   between	   Northern	   and	   Southern	   Europe	   in	   R&D	  
expenditures.	  
In	   order	   to	   address	   this	   “European”	   challenge	   Myro	   (2019:11)	   proposes	   the	   set	   up	   of	   specialised	   European	  
agencies	  with	  the	  function	  to	  coordinate	  a	  new	  industrial	  policy	  aimed	  at	  the	  development	  of	  new	  technologies	  
and	  help	  define	  new	  activities	  and	  products,	  by	  creating	  an	  extensive	  network	  of	  cooperation	  between	  all	  agents	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Appendix	  4.1:	  Table	  of	  Regions	  with	  NUTS	  code	  and	  Name	  
Table	  4.1.1	  -­‐	  	  Appendix	  A	  -­‐	  Nomenclature	  of	  NUTS-­‐1	  and	  NUTS-­‐2	  territorial	  units	  in	  the	  Sample	  
Code	   Region	   Code	   Region	   Code	   Region	  
AT11	   Niederösterreich	   FR26	   Bourgogne	   SE32	   Västernorrlands	  
AT12	   Wien	   FR30	   Nord-­‐Pas-­‐de-­‐Calais	   SE33	   Övre	  Norrland	  
AT13	   Kärnten	   FR41	   Lorraine	   NO01	   Oslo	  og	  Akershus	  
AT21	   Steiermark	   FR42	   Alsace	   NO02	   Hedmark	  og	  Oppl.	  
AT22	   Steiermark	   FR43	   Franche-­‐Comté	   NO03	   Sør-­‐Østlandet	  
AT31	   Oberösterreich	   FR51	   Pays	  de	  Loire	   NO04	   Agder	  og	  Rogaland	  
AT32	   Salzburg	   FR52	   Bretagne	   NO05	   Vestlandet	  
AT33	   Tirol	   FR53	   Poitou-­‐Charentes	   NO06	   Trøndelag	  
AT34	   Vorarlberg	   FR61	   Aquitaine	   NO07	   Nord-­‐Norge	  
BE10	   Région de Bruxelles	   FR62	   Midi-­‐Pyrénées	   HR03	   Jadranska	  Hrvat.	  
BE21 	   Antwerpen	   FR63	   Limousine	   HR04	   Kontinentalna	  Hrv.	  
BE22 	   Limburg (B)	   FR71	   Rhône-­‐Alpes	   UKC1	   Tees	  Valley	  e	  Dur.	  
BE23 	   Oost-Vlaanderen	   FR72	   Auvergne	   UKC2	   North.	  &	  Ty.	  &	  W.	  
BE24 	   Vlaams Brabant	   FR81	   Languedoc-­‐Rouss.	   UKD1	   Cumbria	  
BE25 	   West-Vlaanderen	   FR82	   Prov.-­‐A.-­‐Côt.	  d'Az.	   UKD3	   Grea.	  Manchester	  
BE31 	   Brabant Wallon	   FR83	   Corse	   UKD4	   Lancashire	  
BE33 	   Liège	   IE01	   Southern	  and	  East.	   UKD6	   Cheshire	  
BE34	   Luxembourg (B)	   IE02	   Boar,	  Midla.	  &	  W.	   UKD7	   Merseyside	  
BE35	   Namur	   ITC1	   Piemonte	   UKE1	   East	  Rid.	  &	  No.	  Lin.	  
BG31 Severozapaden ITC2 Valle	  d’Aosta UKE2 North Yorkshire 
BG32 Severen tsentralen ITC3 Liguaria UKE3 South Yorkshire 
BG33 Severoiztochen ITC4 Lombardia UKE4 West Yorkshire 
BG34 Yugoiztochen ITF1 Abruzzo UKF1 Derbyshire & Nott. 
BG41 Yugozapaden ITF2 Molise UKF2 Leic.,Rut. & North. 
BG41 Yuzhen tsentralen ITF3 Campania UKF3 Lincolnshire 
CZ01 Praha ITF4 Puglia UKG1 Her.,Wor. & Warw. 
CZ02 Strední Cechy ITF5 Basilicata UKG2 Shrops. e Staffords. 
CZ03 Jihozápad ITF6 Calabria UKG3 West Midlands 
CZ04 Severozápad ITG1 Sicilia UKH1 East Anglia 
CZ05 Severovýchod ITG2 Sardegna UKH2 Bedford.&Hertford 
CZ06 Jihovýchod ITH1 Trentino UKH3 Essex 
CZ07 Strední Morava ITH2 Alto	  Adige UKI4 Inner London 
CZ08 Moravskoslezsko ITH3 Friuli	  Venezia-­‐Giu. UKI5 Outer London 
DK01 Hovedstaden ITH4 Veneto UKI6 Inner London 
DK02 Sjælland ITH5 Emilia-­‐Romagna UKI7 Outer London 
DK03 Syddanmark IT11 Toscana UKJ1 Berk, Buck.,& Oxfo. 
DK04 Midtjylland ITI2 Umbria UKJ2 Surr.,Ea. & We. Su. 
DK05 Nordjylland ITI3 Marche UKJ3 Hamp. & Is. of Wig. 
DE11 Stuttgart ITI4 Lazio UKJ4 Kent 
DE12	   Karlsruhe	   HU1	   Közép-­‐Mag.	  (Bud.)	   UKK1	   Glo.,	  Wil.	  &	  Br/Bat.	  
DE13	   Freiburg	   HU21	   Közép-­‐Dunántúl	   UKK2	   Dorset	  &	  Somerset	  
DE14	   Tübingen	   HU22	   Nyugat-­‐Dunántúl	   UKK3	   Corn.	  &	  Scilly	  Isl.	  
DE21	   Oberbayern	   HU23	   Dél-­‐	  Dunántúl	   UKK4	   Devon	  
De22	   Niederbayern	   HU31	   Észak-­‐Magyar.	   UKL1	   West	  Wales	  &	  Vall.	  
DE23	   Oberpfalz	   HU32	   Észak-­‐Alföld	   UKL2	   East	  Wales	  
DE24	   Oberfranken	   HU33	   Dél-­‐Alföld	   UKm2	   Eastern	  Scotland	  
DE25	  	   Mittelfranken	   NL11	   Groningen	   UKm3	   South	  Wes.	  Scot.	  
DE26	   Unterfranken	   NL12	   Friesland	   UKm5	   North	  East.	  Scot.	  
DE27	   Schwaben	   NL13	   Drenthe	   UKm6	   Highl.	  &	  Islands	  
DE30	   Berlin	   NL21	   Overijssel	   UKN1	   Northern	  Ireland	  
DE40	   Brandenburg	   NL22	   Gelderland	   	   	  
DE50	   Bremen	   NL23	   Flevoland	   	   	  
D£60	   Hamburg	   NL31	   Utrecht	   	   	  
DE71	   Darmstadt	   NL32	   North	  Holland	   	   	  
DE72	   Gießen	   NL33	   South	  Holland	   	   	  
DE73	   Kassel	   NL34	   Zeeland	   	   	   	  
DE80	   Meck.-­‐Vorp.	   NL41	   North	  Brabant	   	   	  
DE91	   Braunschweig	   NL42	   Limburg	   	   	  
DE92	   Hannover	   PL11	   Łódzkie	   	   	  
DE93	   Lüneburg	   PL12	   Mazowieckie	  (W.)	   	   	  
DE94	   Weser-­‐Ems	   PL21	   Małopolskie	   	   	  
DEA1	   Düsseldorf	   PL22	   Śląskie	   	   	  
DEA2	   Koln	   PL31	   Lubelskie	   	   	  
DEA3	   Münster	   PL32	   Podkarpackie	   	   	  
DEA4	   Detmold	   PL33	   Świętokrzyskie	   	   	  
DEA5	   Arnsberg	   PL34	   Podlaskie	   	   	  
DEB1	   Koblenz	   PL41	   Wielkopolskie	   	   	  
DEB2	   Trier	   PL42	   Zachodniopomorskie	   	   	  
DEB3	   Rheinhessen-­‐Pfalz	   PL43	   Lubuskie	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DEC	   Saarland	   PL51	   Dolnośląskie	   	   	  
DED1	   Chemnitz	   PL52	   Opolskie	   	   	  
DED2	   Dresden	   PL61	   Kujawsko-­‐Pomor.	   	   	  
DED3	   Leipzig	   PL62	   Warmińsko-­‐Mazur.	   	   	  
DEE	   Sachsen-­‐Anhalt	   PL63	   Pomorskie	   	   	   	  
DEF	   Schleswig-­‐Holstein	   PT11	   Norte	   	   	  
DEG	   Thuringia	   PT15	   Algarve	   	   	  
EL3	   Attica	   PT16	   Centro	   	   	  
EL41	   North	  Aegean	   PT17	   Area	  Met.	  Lisboa	   	   	  
EL42	   South	  Aegean	   PT18	   Alentejo	   	   	  
EL43	   Crete	   RO11	   Nord-­‐Vest	   	   	  
EL51	   East.	  Mac.	  &	  Thr.	   RO12	   Centru	   	   	  
EL52	   Central	  Macedonia	   RO21	   Nord-­‐Est	   	   	  
EL53	   West.	  Macedonia	   RO22	   Sud-­‐Est	   	   	  
EL54	   Epirus	   RO31	   Sud-­‐Muntenia	   	   	  
ES11	   Galicia	   RO31	   Bucarest	   	   	  
ES12	   Principado	  de	  As.	   RO41	   Sud-­‐Vest	  Oltenia	   	   	  
ES13	   Cantabria	   RO41	   Vest	   	   	  
ES21	   País	  Vasco	   SI03	   Vzhodna	  Slovenija	   	   	  
ES22	   Navarra	  	   SI03	   Zahodna	  Slovenija	   	   	  
ES23	   La	  Rioja	   SK01	   Bratislava	  Region	   	   	  
ES24	   Aragon	  	   SK02	   Západné	  Slovensko	   	   	  
ES30	   Com.	  De	  Madrid	   SK03	   Stredné	  Slovensko	   	   	  
ES41	   Castilla	  –	  León	   SK04	   Východné	  Slovensko	   	   	  
ES42	   Castilla-­‐La	  Mancha	   FI19	   West	  Finland	   	   	  
ES43	   Estremadura	   FI1B	   Helsinki-­‐Uusimaa	   	   	  
ES51	   Catalunya	   FI1C	   South	  Finland	   	   	  
ES52	   Co,.	  Valenciana	   FI1D	   North	  &	  East	  Finland	   	   	  
ES53	   Islas	  Balearias	   ET0	  	   Estonia	   	   	  
ES61	   Andalucia	  	   LV0	  	   Latvia	   	   	  
ES62	   Región	  de	  Murcia	   LT0	  	   Lithuania	   	   	  
ES63	   Ceuta	   LUX0	  	   Luxembourg	   	   	  
ES64	   Malilla	   SE11	   Stockholmd	   	   	  
FR21	   Champagna-­‐Ard.	   SE12	   Östra	  Mellansverige	   	   	  
FR22	   Picardie	  	   SE21	   Småland	  medöarna	   	   	  
FR23	   Haure-­‐Norman.	   SE22	   Sydsverige	   	   	  
FR24	   Centre	   SE23	   Västsverige	   	   	  
FR25	   Basse	  Norman.	   SE31	   Norra	  Mellansverige	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Appendix	  4.3:	  Regional	  De-­‐location	  and	  Relocation	  of	  Manufacturing	  Activity	  across	  the	  EU	  
	  
In	  paragraph	  4.9	  I	  show	  the	  tight	  positive	  relationship	  between	  the	  size	  of	  manufacturing	  industry	  in	  2001	  and	  
the	   subsequent	   investment	   rate	   in	   manufacturing	   industry	   during	   the	   period	   2001-­‐2015	   observed	   in	   the	  
European	  regions.	  This	  empirical	  evidence	  essentially	  confirms	  the	  intuitions	  of	  New	  Economic	  Geography	  about	  
the	  role	  of	  scale	  economies,	  increasing	  return	  and	  larger	  demand	  in	  shaping	  asymmetries	  in	  regional	  economic	  
structure.	   As	   Krugman	   (1993:242)	   remarks,	   although	   most	   economists	   believe	   that	   international	   trade	   and	  
factor	   mobility	   promote	   convergence	   in	   factor	   prices	   and	   economic	   structure,	   the	   evidence	   and	   the	   theory	  
suggest	   that	   the	   contrary	   is	   the	   case:	   a	   more	   integrated	   market	   leads	   to	   divergence	   in	   both	   the	   economic	  
structures	   and	   the	   rate	   of	   growth	   of	   regions.	   Therefore	   the	   tendency	   of	   investment	   rate	   in	   manufacturing	  
industry	   to	   concentrate	   in	   the	   regions	  with	   larger	   industrial	   sectors	   since	   the	  early	  2000’s,	   it	   is	   likely	   to	  have	  
exacerbated	  the	  divergence	  in	  regional	  economic	  structures.	  	  
Figure	   4.3.1	   shows	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   size	   of	   manufacturing	   industry	   in	   2001	   and	   the	   size	   of	  
manufacturing	  industry	  in	  2015	  both	  in	  the	  EMU-­‐12	  and	  EU-­‐15	  regions.	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In	   Figure	   4.3.1	   the	   vertical	   dashed	   line	   indicates	   the	   average	   regional	   manufacturing	   size	   in	   2001	   and	   the	  
horizontal	  dashed	   line	   indicates	  the	  average	  regional	  manufacturing	  size	   in	  2015	  (as	  percentage	  of	   total	  GVA).	  
Most	  of	  the	  regions	  with	  a	  manufacturing	  industry	  GVA	  in	  2001	  above	  the	  EMU-­‐12	  and	  EU-­‐15	  regional	  average	  
are	  actually	  the	  regions	  with	  a	  manufacturing	  industry	  GVA	  above	  the	  EMU-­‐12	  and	  the	  EU-­‐15	  regional	  average	  in	  
2015.	  With	  few	  exceptions,	  these	  regions	  (red	  labelled)	  are	  located	  in	  the	  Northern	  European	  countries,	  mainly	  
in	   Germany,	   Netherlands,	   Finland	   and	   Austria	   	   (in	   the	   EMU-­‐12)	   plus	   Denmark	   and	   Sweden	   if	   the	   regions	   of	  
remaining	  “Western”	  member	  states	  are	  included	  in	  the	  graph.	  
As	  it	  is	  possible	  there	  is	  a	  perfect	  positive	  linear	  relationship	  between	  the	  size	  of	  manufacturing	  industry	  in	  2001	  
and	  the	  size	  of	  manufacturing	  industry	  in	  2015.	  
Figure	  4.3.2	  makes	  the	  things	  clearer	  by	  showing	  the	  statistical	  map	  of	  the	  cumulative	  change	  in	  manufacturing	  
industry	  size	  occurred	  in	  the	  European	  regions	  during	  the	  period	  2001-­‐2015.	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As	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   note,	   growth	   of	  manufacturing	   sector	   tended	   to	   concentrate	   in	   Germany,	   Austria	   and	   the	  
surrounding	  regions.	  	  	  
Most	  of	   regions	  where	   the	  manufacturing	   industrial	   sector	   shrank	  compared	   to	   the	  2001	   levels	  are	   located	   in	  
France,	  Greece	  and	  South	  of	  Italy	  (and	  the	  UK).	  “Successful”	  Spanish	  and	  Italian	  regions	  recorded	  an	  expansion	  of	  
the	  manufacturing	   industrial	   sector	   generally	   below	   the	   levels	   observed	   in	  most	   of	  German	   regions	  Germany,	  
Austria	  and	  in	  the	  Visegrad	  group.	  
In	  order	  to	  quantify	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  size	  of	  manufacturing	  industry	  in	  2001	  and	  its	  size	  in	  2015,	  I	  
estimate	  the	  following	  univariate	  OLS	  simple	  regression	  model:	  
	  





Dependent	  Variable:	  Industry	  Size	  in	  2015	   EMU-­‐12	   EU-­‐15	  
Industry	  Size	  in	  2001	   1.14***	  	  	  	  
[.03]	  
1.12***	  	  	  	  
[.03]	  
Constant	   -­‐1.93***	  	  	  	  
[.68]	  
-­‐1.67**	  	  	  	  
[.71]	  
R2	   .89	   .88	  
***Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  
Standard	  Errors	  in	  Parentheses	  [	  ]	  
	  
	  
Besides	  the	  perfect	  positive	  linear	  relationship	  between	  the	  regional	  size	  of	  manufacturing	  observed	  in	  2001	  and	  
in	   2015,	   the	   regression	   output	   also	   shows	   that	   the	   regional	   size	   of	  manufacturing	   industry	   observed	   in	   2001	  
explains	  89%	  of	  the	  cross	  regional	  variation	  in	  the	  size	  of	  manufacturing	  industry	  observed	  in	  2015.	  
This	   empirical	   evidence	   in	   Europe	   further	   confirms	   both	   the	   analysis	   the	   fact	   that	   economic	   integration	   and	  
mobility	   of	   factors	   of	   production	   may	   lead	   to	   divergence	   in	   economic	   structures	   and	   rates	   of	   growth	   of	   the	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Appendix	  4.4:	  Neighbourhood	  Spillovers	  in	  Labour	  Productivity	  and	  Size	  of	  Market	  Services	  Sector	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  test	  the	  relevance	  of	  economic	  structure	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  New	  Economic	  Geography,	  I	  specify	  the	  
following	  model:	  
yi=α	  +	  β1X1,	  i	  	  	  +ρWyij	  	  +	  β2X2,	  i	  	  +	  β3	  WX2,i	  	  μi	  
(1)	  (2)	  
Where	   y	  denotes	   the	  dependent	   variable,	   annual	   output	  pre	  worker	   (1)	   or	   output	  per	  worker	   in	   industry	   (2)	  
growth,	   during	   the	   period	   2001-­‐2015.	   	   X1	  denotes	   the	   natural	   logarithm	   of	   output	   per	  worker	   or	   output	   per	  
worker	   in	   manufacturing	   industry	   and	   Wyij	   denotes	   the	   inverse	   distance	   weight	   matrix	   of	   the	   dependent	  
variable.	  	  Variable	  X2	  denotes	  the	  average	  share	  of	  market	  services	  sector	  of	  total	  GVA	  in	  region	  i.	  and	  in	  region	  j	  
located	  within	  the	  1st	  quartile	  distance	  cutoff	  from	  region	  i	  and	  WX	  denotes	  the	  size	  of	  market	  services	  sector	  in	  





Dependent	   Variable:	   Growth	   of	   Labour	   Productivity	   in	  
Manufacturing	  	  Industry	  
	  
Log	  of	  Output	  per	  Worker	  in	  Manufacturing	  Industry	  in	  2001	   -­‐.011***	  	  	  	  
[.001]	  
Average	  Size	  of	  Market	  Services	  sector	   .	  .0001	  	  	  	  
[.0001]	  
W*	  Average	  Size	  of	  Market	  Services	  sector	   -­‐.002***	  	  	  	  
[.0006]	  
Constant	   	  
.19***	  	  	  	  
[.02]	  
ρ	  (Wy)	   .70***	  
[.08]	  
	   Acceptance	  range	  for	  ρ:	  -­‐1.633	  <	  rho	  <	  1.000	  
	  
	  
Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  






Dependent	  Variable:	  Growth	  of	  overall	  Labour	  Productivity	  	   	  
Log	  of	  Output	  per	  Worker	  in	  2001	   -­‐.013***	  
[.001]	  
Average	  Size	  of	  Market	  Services	  sector	   .0001	  
[.0001]	  
W*	  Average	  Size	  of	  Market	  Services	  sector	   -­‐.0019***	  	  	  	  
[.0004]	  
Constant	   .18***	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
ρ	  (Wy)	   .57***	  	  	  	  
[.07]	  
	   Acceptance	  range	  for	  ρ:	  -­‐1.633	  <	  rho	  <	  1.000	  
	  
	  
Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  
Standard	  Errors	  in	  Parentheses	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The	  output	  of	   the	  models	   is	   remarkably	   interesting	  because	   indirectly	   confirms	   the	   assumptions	  of	   both	  New	  
Economic	  Geography	  theoretical	  framework	  and	  of	  the	  Kaldor’s	  laws.	  
As	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   note,	   the	   size	   of	  market	   services	   sector	   produces	   no	   effect	   on	   labour	   productivity	   growth	  
while	   the	  size	  of	  market	  services	  sector	   in	   the	  neighbouring	  regions	   j’s	  has	  an	  adverse	   impact	  on	  productivity	  
growth	   in	   region	   i.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   there	   exists	   a	   strong	   spatial	   autocorrelation	   between	   growth	   in	   labour	  
productivity	   in	   region	   i	   and	   growth	   in	   labour	   productivity	   in	   region	   j	   located	  within	   the	   1st	   Quartile	   distance	  
cutoff.	   This	   evidence	   essentially	   means	   that	   labour	   productivity	   growth	   both	   in	   the	   whole	   economy	   and	   in	  
manufacturing	   industry	   tends	   to	   be	   lower	   in	   those	   regions	   that	   specialize	   in	   the	   market	   services	   sector.	   As	  
matter	  of	  facts,	  small	  size	  of	  manufacturing	  industry	  and	  large	  size	  of	  market	  service	  sector	  as	  share	  of	  GVA	  in	  a	  
specific	  region	  and	  in	  neighbouring	  regions	  as	  well,	   is	  likely	  to	  reduce	  firms’	  ability	  to	  achieve	  scale	  economies	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Appendix	  4.5:	  Spatially	  Lagged	  Error	  Model	  
The	  Spatial	  Error	  Model	  has	  an	  error	  term	  that	  takes	  on	  the	  form	  μ=	  λWu+e	  and	  it	  consists	  of	   including	  in	  the	  
regression	  an	  additional	  term	  of	  lagged	  error	  or	  fluctuation	  u.	  	  
Here	   the	   spatial	   correlation	   structure	   of	   the	   error	   term	  determines	   parameter	   λ	   that	   denotes	   the	   intensity	   of	  
correlation	  of	   fluctuation	   in	   economic	   growth	   (Acevedo,	   2013).	  Therefore	  parameter	   λ	   identifies	   the	   intensity	  
with	   which	   economic	   shocks	   are	   transmitted	   from	   a	   region	   to	   another,	   in	   this	   case	   within	   the	   first	   quartile	  
distance	  cutoff.	   In	   the	  case	  of	   spatial	  error	  model,	   rather	   than	  being	  directly	  affected	  by	   the	  growth	  rate	  of	   its	  
neighbours,	  a	  region’s	  growth	  rate	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  influenced	  by	  a	  complex	  set	  of	  random,	  unexpected	  shocks	  
transmitted	  across	  space	  	  (Curran,	  2009).	  The	  model	  assumes	  the	  incidence	  of	  global	  spillovers	  in	  unobservable	  
variables	  or	  disturbances,	  meaning	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  residuals	  is	  determined	  by	  a	  spatial	  autoregressive	  
process.	   	  As	  Millo	  and	  Piras	  (2012)	  remark,	  fluctuations	  in	  economic	  activity	  across	  regions	  result	  from	  a	  wide	  
variety	   of	   aggregate	   and	   disaggregate	   phenomena	   that	   reflect	   underlying	   changes	   in	   innovations	   (positive	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5.1	  Introduction	  
The	   period	   2001-­‐2015	   was	   characterized	   by	   very	   poor	   regional	   economic	   performances	   in	   the	   old	   Member	  
states	  European	  Union	  (EU-­‐15).	  However,	  despite	   the	   financial	  crisis	  and	  the	  consequent	  double	  dip	  recession	  
analysed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  some	  regions	  performed	  much	  better	  than	  others	  while	  a	  group	  of	  44	  regions	  recorded	  
negative	  rates	  of	  average	  economic	  growth.	  The	  worst	  economic	  performances	  were	  generally	  observed	  in	  the	  
Italian	  and	  Greek	  regions	  that	  are	  also	  the	  region	  with	  the	  weakest	  quality	  of	  government	  institutions.	  The	  role	  of	  
government	  institutions	  in	  the	  process	  of	  regional	  development	  and	  convergence	  in	  Europe	  is	  stressed	  also	  in	  a	  
Report	   of	   the	  World	  Bank	   (Farole	   et	   al,	   2018)	   in	  which	   the	   authors	   argue	   that	   these	   regions	   are	   lagging	   also	  
because	  the	  weak	  quality	  of	  regional	  government	  institutions.	  
Therefore,	  in	  this	  chapter	  that	  concludes	  the	  dissertation	  I	  propose	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  regional	  performances	  in	  
Europe	  from	  a	  different	  theoretical	  and	  methodological	  perspective43.	  	  Based	  on	  an	  extensive	  body	  of	  literature	  I	  
will	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  besides	  economic	  geography,	  economic	  structures	  and	  government	  fiscal	  policy	  also	  
the	   quality	   of	   government	   institutions	   matters	   for	   regional	   economic	   development.	   As	   a	   consequence	   this	  
chapter	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  “complementary”	  section	  of	  this	  dissertation	  that	  analyses	  the	  determinant	  of	  growth	  
and	  convergence	  across	  countries	  and	  regions	  in	  the	  EU	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Single	  Currency.	  
This	   chapter	   aims	   at	   contributing	   to	   the	   existing	   literature	   by	   modelling	   the	   relationship	   between	   regional	  
economic	  performances	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  institutions	  with	  an	  econometric	  approach	  based	  on	  binary	  response	  
models	   for	   estimating	  marginal	   probability	   that	   a	   certain	   economic	   performance	   will	   take	   shape	   or	   not	   in	   a	  
region	   conditional	   on	   the	  quality	  of	   institutions	   and	  other	   control	   variables	   commonly	  used	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	  
economic	   growth.	   	   Therefore,	   with	   this	   approach	   I	   quantify	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   quality	   of	   government	  
institutions	   has	   shaped	   regional	   economic	   performances	   in	   the	   “old”	   European	   Union	   throughout	   the	   period	  
comprising	  the	  Great	  Recession	  and	  empirical	  results	  show	  that:	  1)	  The	  higher	  is	  the	  quality	  of	  institutions,	  the	  
higher	  is	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  region	  with	  high	  income	  per	  capita	  will	  grow	  above	  the	  levels	  of	  European	  Union	  
as	  a	  whole;	  2)	  The	  higher	  is	  the	  quality	  of	  institutions,	  the	  lower	  is	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  low	  income	  region	  will	  
grow	  below	  the	  levels	  of	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  whole;	  3)	  The	  higher	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  institutions,	  the	  higher	  is	  the	  
probability	  that	  any	  region,	  regardless	  of	  its	  income	  per	  capita,	  	  will	  outperform	  the	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  whole/	  
the	  lower	  is	  the	  probability	  that	  any	  region,	  regardless	  of	  its	  income	  per	  capita,	  	  will	  underperform	  the	  European	  
Union	  as	  a	  whole;	  4)	  The	  higher	  is	  the	  quality	  of	  Institutions,	  the	  lower	  is	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  region	  will	  “fail”	  
to	  grow.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  	  From	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  extracted	  a	  paper	  that	  has	  been	  published	  by	  the	  European	  Journal	  of	  Government	  and	  Economics	  	  (2019,	  
Volume	  8,	  N.	  2)	  and	  it	  is	  available	  for	  download	  at	  the	  link	  http://revistas.udc.es/index.php/ejge/issue/view/ejge.2019.8.2	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5.2	  Literature	  Review	  
Neoclassical	   Growth	   Model	   and	   its	   empirical	   extensions	   for	   growth	   analysis	   have	   traditionally	   focused	   on	  
exogenous	  factors	  such	  as	  saving	  rate,	  population	  growth	  and	  technological	  progress	  (Solow,	  1956).	  Within	  the	  
stream	  of	  the	  neoclassical	  approach,	  Mankiw	  et	  al	  (1992)	  have	  also	  remarked	  the	  relevant	  role	  played	  by	  human	  
capital	   in	   the	   transitional	   dynamics	   to	   the	   steady	   state	   output	   per	  worker.	   	   Other	   streams	   of	   theoretical	   and	  
empirical	   literature	   about	   economic	   growth	   have	   focused	   on	   human	   capital	   and	   endogenous	   technological	  
change	   arguing	   that	   innovation	   is	   the	   engine	   of	   economic	   growth	   and	   it	   is	   endogenously	   generated	   (Romer,	  
1986;	  Lucas,	  1988).	  	  	  
The	  consequence	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  human	  capital	  accumulation	  is	  not	  subjected	  to	  decreasing	  returns	  as	  physical	  
capital	  does	   can	  explain	   the	  discontinuity	  or	   the	   slow	  speeds	  of	   convergence	  often	  observed	  within	  groups	  of	  
regions	  or	  countries	  (Martin	  and	  Sunley,	  1998).	  
By	  including	  variables	  that	  can	  broadly	  be	  considered	  as	  proxies	  for	  institutional	  quality	  in	  a	  cross	  section	  of	  98	  
countries,	  Barro	  (1991)	  finds	  out	  that	  economic	  growth	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  measures	  of	  political	  stability	  and	  
negative	  related	  to	  the	  market	  distortions	  induced	  in	  the	  economy	  by	  the	  political	  sphere.	  	  
Also	  in	  a	  panel	  of	  around	  100	  countries	  with	  data	  collected	  from	  1960	  to	  1990,	  Barro	  (1996)	  finds	  out	  that	  for	  a	  
given	  level	  of	  initial	  GDP	  per	  Capita,	  the	  growth	  rate	  is	  enhanced	  among	  others	  also	  by	  a	  better	  maintenance	  of	  
the	  rule	  of	   law.	  However,	   the	   lack	  of	   institutional	  content	   in	  the	  core	  Neoclassical	  Theory	  has	  become	  an	  issue	  
both	  on	  a	  theoretical	   level,	  particularly	  as	  new	  concepts	  and	  analytical	   tools	  were	  developed,	  and	  on	  the	  more	  
applied	  level	  of	  comparison	  of	  market	  outcomes	  with	  institutional	  alternatives	  (Rutherford,	  2001:186).	  
As	   Acemoglu	   et	   al	   (2005:397)	   remark,	   although	   cultural	   and	   geographical	   forces	   also	   matter	   for	   economic	  
performances,	   differences	   in	   the	   quality	   of	   institutions	   are	   the	   major	   source	   of	   cross-­‐country	   differences	   in	  
economic	  growth	  and	  prosperity.	  	  	  
North	  (1990:3)	  defines	  institutions	  as	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  in	  a	  society	  or,	  more	  formally,	  the	  humanly	  devised	  
constrains	  that	  shape	  human	  interaction.	  	  	  
According	   to	   Alonso	   	   (2009:9),	   institutional	   structure	   defines	   the	   incentives	   and	   penalties	   that	   influence	   the	  
behaviour	  of	  agents	  and	  shape	  collective	  action.	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  uncertain	  world	  in	  which	  independent	  agents	  
operate	  with	   imperfect	   information,	   sound	   institutions	   reduce	  uncertainty	   and	   transaction	   costs	   and	   facilitate	  
social	  coordination.	  	  
Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  (2012)	  argue	  that	  rich	  countries	  are	  rich	  because	  they	  have	  inclusive	  institutions,	  while	  
poor	  countries	  are	  poor	  because	  they	  have	  extractive	   institutions.	  By	  “institutions”	  also	  the	  authors	  mentioned	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above	  mean	  the	  rules	  that	  govern	  and	  organize	  the	  economic	  and	  political	   life.	  Inclusive	  institutions	  create	  the	  
fundamental	   incentives	   and	   opportunities	   that	   stimulate	   investment	   and	   entrepreneurship,	   while	   extractive	  
economic	   institutions	  consist	  of	  a	  system	  where	  a	  small	  group	  of	  people	   is	  permitted	  to	  exploit	   the	  rest	  of	   the	  
population	   that	   is	   kept	   out	   the	   political	   and	   economic	   process.	   However,	   throughout	   the	   history	  most	   of	   the	  
societies	  have	  been	  ruled	  by	  extractive	  economic	  institutions	  with	  different	  levels	  of	  intensity	  44.	  	  
Acemoglu	  et	  al	  (2001)	  individuate	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  economic	  backwardness	  of	  former	  Western	  colonies	  in	  Asia,	  
Africa	  and	  Latin	  America	   in	   the	   fact	   that	  colonial	  powers	  set	  up	  extractive	   state	  structures	   in	   those	   territories.	  	  
Those	   institutions	   did	   not	   introduce	   much	   protection	   for	   private	   property,	   nor	   did	   they	   provide	   checks	   and	  
balances	  against	  the	  government	  because	  the	  explicit	  aim	  of	  the	  Europeans	  settled	  in	  those	  overseas	  territories	  
was	  the	  sole	  extraction	  of	  resources.	  This	  colonization	  strategy	  and	  the	  associated	  institutions	  contrast	  with	  the	  
institutions	   Europeans	   set	   up	   in	   other	   colonies	  where	   they	   settled	   in	   large	   numbers,	   for	   example,	   the	  United	  
States,	  Canada,	  Australia,	  and	  New	  Zealand	  (Acemoglou	  and	  Robinson,	  2008:4).	  	  
At	   the	   same	   time	   the	   quality	   of	   institutions	   affected	   also	   economic	   development	   of	   the	   colonial	   powers	  
themselves.	   	   Achemoglu	   at	   al	   (2002)	   argue	   that	   the	   discovery	   of	   America	   in	   1492	   with	   the	   consequent	  
intensification	   of	   intercontinental	   trade	   via	   the	   Atlantic	   Ocean	   benefited	   in	   terms	   of	   economic	   development	  
much	  more	  the	  countries	  that	  had	  already	  established	  a	  systems	  of	  checks	  and	  balance	  to	  the	  Monarchy,	  as	  Great	  
Britain	  and	  the	  Netherlands,	  rather	  than	  countries	  where	  the	  monarchy	  was	  highly	  absolutist	  as	   in	  the	  case	  of	  
Spain	  or	  Portugal.	  
The	   institutionalist	   explanation	   of	   disparities	   in	   economic	   development	   has	   been	   well	   received	   in	   academic	  
circles	  and	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  international	  organisations	  (Alonso,	  2009:12).	  
As	  matter	   of	   facts,	   it	   has	   progressively	   arisen	   an	   increasing	   recognition	   among	   practitioners	   in	   international	  
organizations	   that	   corruption	   and	   other	   aspects	   of	   poor	   governance	   have	   substantial	   and	   adverse	   effects	   on	  
economic	   development	   (Mauro,	   2002).	   	   Mauro	   (1995)	   also	   finds	   out	   a	   negative	   relationship	   between	   the	  
malfunctioning	  of	  institutions	  and	  investment	  rate,	  therefore	  between	  institutional	  inefficiency	  (and	  corruption)	  
and	  economic	  growth.	  
Somewhat	   contrary	   to	   the	   capital	   accumulation	   model	   of	   regional	   growth,	   institutional	   theorists	   argue	   that	  
differences	   in	   growth	   and	   prosperity	   across	   countries,	   regions	   and	   cities	   are	   strictly	   related	   to	   the	   quality	   of	  
political	  and	  economic	  institutions	  that	  shape	  the	  economic	  activity	  (Huggins	  and	  Thompson,	  2017).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  In	   relation	   to	   “extractive”	   economic	   institutions	   in	   the	   ancient	  history,	   prominent	  historian	  MacMullen	   (1988)	  has	   argued	   that	   also	   the	  
decline	   and	   consequent	   fall	   of	   the	   Roman	   Empire	   was	  mainly	   due	   to	   the	   progressive	   erosion	   of	   the	   solidity	   of	   government	   institutions	  	  
pursued	  by	  a	  small	  group	  of	  high-­‐ranking	  bureaucrats	  and	  military	  leaders.	  The	  spread	  of	  corruption	  and	  informal	  practices	  had	  long	  term	  
devastating	  effects	  on	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  integrity	  of	  the	  institutional	  foundations	  Roman	  Empire.	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By	  estimating	  the	  contribution	  to	  income	  levels	  of	  different	  forces	  as	  geography	  and	  trade	  in	  a	   large	  sample	  of	  
countries,	   also	  Rodrik	   et	   al	   (2002)	   find	   out	   that	   the	  quality	   of	   institutions	   is	   the	  main	  determinant	   of	   income	  
levels.	  Roughly	  said,	  after	  controlling	  for	  institutional	  quality,	  in	  the	  output	  of	  the	  regression	  model	  measures	  of	  
geography	  and	  trade	  result	  at	  best	  to	  exert	  weak	  effects	  on	  income	  levels	  while	  the	  institutional	  quality	  remains	  
the	  main	  determinant	  of	  economic	  development.	  	  
Turning	   to	   the	   more	   focused	   topic	   of	   regional	   performances	   in	   Europe,	   a	   wide	   body	   of	   literature	   has	   been	  
produced	  to	  study	  the	  relationship	  between	  economic	  growth	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  institutions.	  However,	  most	  of	  
these	   studies	   use	   “quality	   of	   institutions”	   as	   a	   predictor	   of	   economic	   growth	   with	   a	   “neoclassical	   approach”	  
where	  economic	  growth	  is	  regressed	  on	  the	  natural	  logarithm	  of	  initial	  levels	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  and	  other	  control	  
variables,	   including	   quality	   of	   institutions	   or	   regional	   geographic	   spillover	   (Ascani	   et	   al,	   2012;	   Harris,	   2008;	  
Feldkircher,	   2006;	   Rodríguez-­‐Pose,	   1998;	   Pons-­‐Novell	   and	   Viladecans-­‐Marsal,	   1998).	   Other	   empirical	   studies	  
assess	   the	   impact	   of	   the	  quality	   of	   institutions	   on	   innovative	   capacity	   and	   investment	   in	  European	   regions	  or	  
countries	  (Rodriguez	  -­‐Pose	  and	  Di	  Cataldo,	  2018;	  Canton	  and	  Solera,	  2016).	  
As	  matter	  of	   facts,	  once	  a	  marginal	  topic,	   the	  role	  of	   institutions	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  most	  popular	  research	  
areas	  in	  development	  economics	  over	  the	  last	  10–15	  years	  (Chang,	  2011).	  
However,	  the	  progressive	  recognition	  of	  the	  role	  of	  institutional	  quality	  as	  catalyst	  of	  economic	  development	  or	  
economic	   growth	   in	   advanced	   economies	   that	   has	   taken	   place	   in	   the	   academia	   has	   not	   been	   completely	  
internalized	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   policy-­‐making.	   As	   matter	   of	   facts	   EU	   policy	   prescription	   for	   regional	   cohesion	  
during	   the	   last	   three	   decades	   has	   followed	   a	   “neoclassical	   approach”	   based	   on	   physical	   capital	   accumulation,	  
human	  capital	  and	  innovation.	  As	  Rodriguez-­‐Pose	  and	  Ketterer	  (2019)	  remark,	  the	  bulk	  of	  cohesion	  investments	  
have	  been	  channelled	  towards	  improving	  the	  infrastructure	  endowment	  and	  accessibility	  of	  the	  least	  developed	  
regions	  of	  the	  EU,	  as	  well	  as	  towards	  increasing	  the	  availability	  and	  quality	  of	  human	  resources,	  and	  developing	  
the	   innovative	   capacity	  of	   individuals	   and	   firms	  across	  areas	  of	  Europe	   that	  have	  been	   lagging	  behind.	   In	   this	  
framework	  EU	  institutions	  have	  paid	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  improvement	  of	  government	  institutions	  as	  a	  means	  
to	  spur	  regional	  cohesion	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  
	  
5.3	  Empirical	  Strategy	  and	  Data	  
The	  annual	  data	  are	  averaged	  from	  2001	  to	  2015	  for	  each	  of	  the	  195	  sampling	  units	  and	  the	  dataset	  includes	  14	  
NUTS-­‐1	   territories	   (Belgium:	   Brussels;	   Germany:	   Berlin,	   Brandenburg,	   Bremen,	   Hamburg,	   Mecklenburg-­‐
Vorpommern,	  Saarland,	  Sachsen-­‐Anhalt,	  Schleswig-­‐Holstein	  and	  Turingen;	  France:	  Ile-­‐de-­‐France	  and	  Nord-­‐Pas-­‐
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de-­‐Calais;	  Greece:	  Attica;	  Spain:	  Community	  of	  Madrid;	  United	  Kingdom:	  Northern	  Ireland),	  1	  NUTS-­‐0	  territory	  
(Luxembourg)	  and	  180	  NUTS-­‐2	  regions45	  located	  in	  EU-­‐15	  countries4647.	  	  In	  the	  sample	  I	  include	  only	  the	  regions	  
of	  Western	   Europe	  where	   the	   heterogeneity	   in	   terms	   of	   initial	   conditions	   is	   smaller	   (despite	   the	   remarkable	  
cross	   country	   differences)	   than	   the	   cross	   regional	   heterogeneity	   observed	   in	   the	   post-­‐enlargement	   European	  
Union.	  Therefore	  regions	  of	  transition	  economies	  from	  Eastern	  Europe	  are	  not	   included	  in	  the	  sample	  because	  
they	  outperformed	  the	  average	  rate	  of	  growth	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  despite	  their	  very	  low	  institutional	  quality	  
and	   this	   is	  mainly	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   started	  with	   very	   low	   levels	   of	   income	  per	   capita	   their	  process	  of	  
transition	  and	  economic	  integration	  with	  the	  Western	  countries	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  
Data	   related	   to	   GDP	   per	   Capita	   and	   investment	   rates	   are	   sourced	   from	   Cambridge	   Econometrics	   European	  
Regional	  Database.	  	  	  
The	  data	  concerning	  the	  educational	  attainment	  of	  the	  population	  are	  sourced	  from	  the	  regional	  database	  made	  
available	  online	  from	  the	  European	  Commission.	  	  
Data	  related	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  regional	  governments	  consist	  of	  the	  EQI	  Score	  developed	  by	  Charron	  at	  al	  (2015)	  
from	  The	  Quality	  of	  Government	  Institute	  of	   the	  University	   of	  Gothenburg	   and	  made	   available	   in	   the	  European	  
Quality	   of	   Government	   Index	   (EQoG)	   database	   downloadable	   from	   the	   website	   of	   the	   Swedish	   academic	  
institution.	   	  EQoG	  database	   is	   relatively	  new	  and	   the	   indicators	  have	  been	  developed	  only	   for	   the	  years	  2010,	  
2013	  and	  2017.	  	  	  
Given	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   “success”	   or	   the	   “failure”	   of	   institutions	   reflects	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   historical,	   local,	  
sociological	  and	  anthropological	  factors	  (Alesina,	  2014;	  Greif,	  1994),	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  suppose	  that	  changes	  and	  
adjustments	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  institutions	  occur	  very	  slowly.	  Also	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  (2012:435)	  argue	  that	  
replacing	  extractive	  institutions	  with	  inclusive	  institutions	  is	  neither	  an	  automatic	  nor	  a	  simple	  process.	  Indeed,	  
it	   is	  often	  needed	  a	   convergence	  of	  historical	  or	  political	   factors,	   in	  particular	  a	   critical	   conjuncture	  combined	  
with	  a	  broad	  coalition	  of	  people	  that	  support	  and	  push	  for	  the	  reforms.	  
As	   a	   consequence,	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   analysis	   the	   choice	   of	   “EQI	   Score”	   of	   the	   year	   2013	   as	   predictor	   of	  
economic	   performances	   over	   the	   period	   2001-­‐2015	   represents	   a	   very	   reasonable	   strategy	   to	   remedy	   the	   fact	  
that	  the	  selected	  time	  series	  data	  for	  institutional	  quality	  are	  not	  available	  on	  annual	  basis	  from	  2001	  to	  2015.	  
The	  estimation	  methodology	  applied	  in	  this	  essay	  partially	  follows	  the	  methodology	  developed	  by	  Ainginger	  et	  al	  
(2013).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Nuts	  0	  territories	  of	  Cyprus	  and	  Malta	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  sample	  together	  with	  the	  7	  Nuts-­‐2	  Territories	  of	  Norway	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  
of	  the	  availability	  of	  data	  concerning	  Quality	  of	  Institutions	  and	  because	  Norway	  is	  not	  a	  member	  state	  of	  the	  Union.	  	  
46	  Here,	  by	  EU-­‐15	  group	  it	  is	  meant	  all	  the	  Western	  member	  States	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  excluding	  Malta	  and	  Cyprus	  that	  joined	  the	  EU	  in	  
2004	  
47	  Sub-­‐national	  data	  at	  NUTS-­‐1,	  NUTS-­‐2	  and	  NUTS-­‐3	  level	  are	  not	  available	  for	  Luxembourg	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Regions	   are	   assigned	   to	   4	   groups	   according	   to	   their	   economic	   performances	   over	   the	   period	   2001-­‐2015	   and	  
their	  initial	  income	  per	  capita	  levels:	  
	  
1) Group	  A	  (Taking	  off	  from	  Above):	  Regions	  with	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  above	  EU	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  level	  in	  2001	  
growing	   faster	   than	   the	   EU	   average	   over	   the	   period	   2001	   –	   2015	  	  
	  
2) Group	  B	  (Declining	   from	  above):	  Regions	  with	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  above	  EU	  GDP	  per	  Capita	   level	   in	  2001	  
growing	   below	   the	   EU	   average	   over	   the	   period	   2001	   –	   2015	  
	  
3) Group	  C	  (Converging	  from	  below):	  Regions	  with	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  below	  EU	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  level	  in	  2001	  
growing	   above	   the	   EU	   average	   over	   the	   period	   2001	   –	   2015	  
	  
4) Group	  D	  (Diverging	  from	  below):	  Regions	  with	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  below	  EU	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  level	  in	  2001	  
growing	  below	  the	  EU	  average	  over	  the	  period	  2001	  –	  2015	  
	  
Regions	   assigned	   to	   group	   A	   and	   C	   will	   be	   further	   grouped	   together	   (A&C)	   in	   another	   group	   of	   “Successful	  
regions”.	   Regions	   assigned	   to	   group	   B	   and	   D	   will	   be	   further	   grouped	   together	   (B	   &	   D)	   in	   another	   group	   of	  
“Unsuccessful	  regions”	  (or,	  symmetrically	  “Successful	  Regions”	  –	  A	  &	  C).	  Regions	  that	  recorded	  negative	  rates	  of	  
income	   per	   capita	   growth	   will	   be	   grouped	   in	   the	   group	   of	   “failed”	   regions	   	   (Group	   E).	   	   The	   methodology	  
developed	  in	  order	  to	  construct	  the	  binary	  dependent	  variables	  is	  explained	  in	  Table	  1.	  After	  having	  constructed	  
the	  four	  binary	  variables,	  with	  the	  Probit	  estimation	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  estimate	  at	  first	  instance	  what	  are	  the	  
structural	   features	   that	   increase	   (decrease)	   the	  probability	   that	   a	   region	  will	   be	   “Taking-­‐off”	   (Diverging)	  with	  
respect	  to	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  whole	  given	  its	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  in	  2001.	  Then	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  estimate	  both	  
the	  conditional	  probabilities	   that	  a	   region	  will	  be	   “Successful”	   (or	  Unsuccessful)	  at	  performing	  better	   than	   the	  
European	  Union	  as	  a	  whole	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  the	  conditional	  probabilities	  that	  a	  region	  will	  “fail”	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Table	  	  5.1	  
Economic	  
performance	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5.4	  Some	  further	  clarification	  about	  the	  sample	  selection	  criteria	  
In	   this	   analysis	   about	   institutions	   and	   economic	   growth	   I	   select	   only	   EU-­‐15	   regions	   because,	   as	   already	  
mentioned,	   the	  heterogeneity	   in	   terms	  of	   initial	  conditions	   in	  2001	  was	  smaller	   (despite	   the	  remarkable	  cross	  
country	   differences)	   than	   the	   cross	   regional	   heterogeneity	   observed	   in	   the	   EU-­‐28	   when	   also	   the	   post-­‐
enlargement	  countries	  are	  accounted	  for.	  Indeed,	  despite	  the	  very	  weak	  quality	  of	  government	  institutions,	  CEE	  
countries	  and	  regions	  have	  outperformed	  the	  EU	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  well-­‐documented	  and	  explored	  reasons.	  	  
First	  of	  all,	  all	  the	  CEE	  regions	  in	  2001	  had	  very	  low	  initial	  income	  per	  capita	  also	  relative	  to	  the	  poorer	  member	  
states	  of	   the	  EMU	   like	  Greece	  and	  Portugal.	  Therefore	   the	   fact	   that	   those	  regions	  outperformed	   the	  EU	  can	  be	  
considered	  as	  a	  mechanical	  outcome	  of	  the	  transition	  from	  centrally	  planned	  economy	  to	  market	  economy.	  
Second,	   CEE	   countries	   unleashed	   the	   inherent	   strengths	   of	   their	   economies	   by	   privatizing	   the	   state-­‐owned	  
enterprises	   and	   introducing	   comprehensive	   reforms	   concerning	   trade,	   competition,	   financial	   system	   and	   the	  
labour	  market	  (Labaye	  et	  all,	  2013).	  Furthermore,	  the	  progressive	  implementation	  of	  the	  “acquis	  communitaire”	  
strengthened	  the	  confidence	  of	  international	  investors	  and	  foreign	  capital	  started	  to	  flow	  into	  these	  economies.	  
In	  a	  context	  of	   financial	   liberalization,	  Neoclassical	  Theory	  asserts	   that	  capital	  should	   flow	  from	  rich	  countries	  
with	  high	  capital-­‐labour	  ratios	   (or	  higher	  GDP	  per	  capita)	   to	  poor	  countries	  with	   low	  capital-­‐labour	  ratios	   (or	  
lower	  GDP	  per	  Capita),	  increasing	  capital	  per	  worker	  in	  the	  latter	  and	  thus	  contributing	  to	  economic	  growth	  and	  
convergence	  (Abiad	  et	  al,	  2007).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  CEE	  countries,	  foreign	  capital	  was	  also	  attracted	  by	  lower	  wages	  
relatively	  to	  the	  “Western”	  European	  countries,	  educated	  labour	  force	  and	  geographical	  proximity	  to	  the	  “core”	  
and	  wealthy	  regions	  of	  Europe.	  Therefore	  the	  great	  profitability	  of	   the	   investment	  opportunity	  represented	  by	  
economic	   geography	   and	   cheap	   labour	   force	   offset	   the	   disadvantage	   represented	   by	   the	   weak	   quality	   of	  
government	   institutions.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   since	   the	  mid	   of	   1990s,	   CEE	   countries	   experienced	   an	   externally	  
financed	  growth	  which	  does	  not	  have	  precedents	   in	  the	  economic	  history,	  establishing	  a	  record	  of	  growth	  and	  
economic	  progress	  that	  few	  regions	  have	  matched	  (Friedrich	  et	  al,	  2010).	  
Third,	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  process	  of	  integration	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  CEE	  regions	  have	  been	  the	  major	  
recipients	  of	   Structural	   and	  Cohesion	  Funds	   established	  within	   the	  EU	  budget	   to	   foster	   territorial	   cohesion	   in	  
Europe	  (Mark	  et	  al,	  2015).	  
This	  mix	  of	   factors	   led	  to	  an	  unprecedented	  rate	  of	  growth	  and	  convergence	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  all	   the	  CEE	  
regions	  fall	  into	  the	  classification	  (C)	  of	  regions	  “Converging	  from	  below”	  as	  individuated	  with	  the	  methodology	  
explained	  in	  Table	  5.1.	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The	   statistical	  map	  5.1	   shows	   that	  during	   the	  period	  2001-­‐2015	   in	   the	  European	  Union,	   56	   regions	  of	   out	  72	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5.5	  Some	  Stylized	  facts	  about	  regional	  economic	  performances	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  
As	   already	  mentioned	   in	   the	   introduction,	   the	   period	   2001-­‐2015	  was	   characterized	   on	   average	   by	   very	   poor	  
regional	  economic	  performances	  because	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  of	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  EU	  (and	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  
EMU)	  were	  hit	  by	  severe	  financial	  and	  economic	  crises.	  
Figure	  1	  reports	  the	  average	  rates	  of	  regional	  economic	  growth	  observed	  within	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  within	  
the	  different	  subgroups	  of	  the	  EU.	  	  
As	  it	  possible	  to	  notice	  from	  Figure1	  regional	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  was	  essentially	  driven	  by	  
the	  	  “converging”	  economies	  of	  Eastern	  Europe.	  	  
Indeed,	  EU-­‐15	  regional	  average	  economic	  growth	  was	  nearly	   the	  half	  of	   the	  economic	  growth	  observed	   in	   the	  
EU-­‐28	  over	  the	  period	  2001-­‐2015.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5.2	   shows	   the	   statistical	  maps	  of	   regional	   performances	  A,	  B,	  A&C	  and	  B&D	  as	   formalized	   through	   the	  
methodology	  developed	  in	  the	  Table	  1.	  
As	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  note	  in	  Figure	  5.2,	  most	  of	  regions	  with	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  lower	  than	  the	  European	  Union	  GDP	  
per	  Capita	  in	  2001	  that	  underperformed	  the	  European	  Union	  (diverging	  regions)	  are	  located	  in	  Southern	  Europe	  
while	   the	   regions	   that	   outperformed	   the	   European	   Union	   “from	   above”	   are	   mainly	   located	   in	   Central	   and	  
Northern	  Europe	  (South-­‐East	  and	  North	  Germany,	  most	  of	  Austrian	  regions,	  Scotland,	  North	  of	  England	  and	  Ile-­‐
de-­‐France).	  Basque	  Country	  is	  the	  only	  Southern	  European	  region	  that	  has	  been	  “taking-­‐off	  from	  above”.	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	  most	   of	   the	   regions	   that	   have	   been	   “diverging	   from	   below”	   are	   located	   in	   Spain,	   Portugal,	  
Italian	  “Mezzogiorno”	  while	  most	  of	  the	  regions	  that	  have	  been	  “unsuccessful”	  (either	  by	  “diverging	  from	  below”	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or	   	   “declining	   from	  above”)	   are	   located	   in	  Northern	   and	  Central	   Italy,	   France	   and	   in	   the	   Southern	   area	   of	   the	  




However	  the	  situation	  of	  Spain,	  Great	  Britain	  and	  France	  should	  not	  be	  absolutely	  confused	  with	  the	  situation	  of	  
Italy	   and	   Greece.	   Indeed,	   as	   shown	   in	   Figure	   3,	   most	   of	   the	   French	   (14	   out	   21),	   British	   (Wells	   and	   South	   of	  
England)	  and	  Spanish	  (Community	  of	  Madrid,	  Catalonia	  and	  Navarra)	  	  “declining	  from	  above”	  regions	  or	  Spanish	  
and	   Portuguese	   (all	   the	   regions	   excepted	   Metropolitan	   Area	   of	   Lisbon)	   “diverging	   from	   below”	   regions	  
underperformed	  the	  European	  Union	  by	  recording	  positive	  (but	   lower	  than	  the	  EU)	  rates	  of	  economic	  growth.	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All	  the	  Italian	  “declining	  from	  above”	  and	  Italian	  and	  Greek	  “diverging	  from	  below”	  regions	  underperformed	  the	  





5.6	  	  	  Quality	  of	  Government	  Institutions	  across	  European	  regions,	  A	  Graphical	  Overview	  
European	  Quality	  of	  Government	  Index	  (EQI)	  for	  the	  year	  2013	  has	  been	  developed	  by	  the	  Quality	  of	  Government	  
Institute	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Gothenburg	  and	   it	   is	   the	  result	  of	  a	  regional	  survey	  answered	  by	  a	   large	  sample	  of	  
85.000	  citizen	  respondents48.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  In	  Appendix	  5.1	  I	  provide	  a	  more	  detailed	  definition	  of	  the	  EQI	  score	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The	  data	   focus	   “on	  both	  perception	  and	  experiences	  with	  public	  sector	  corruption	  along	  with	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
citizens	  believe	  various	  public	  sector	  services	  are	  impartially	  allocated	  and	  of	  good	  quality”.	  	  	  
Figure	   5.4	   shows	   the	   statistical	  maps	   of	   the	   regional	   EQI	   score	   as	   calculated	   for	   each	   region	   of	   the	   European	  
Union	  (when	  the	  index	  it	  is	  not	  available	  at	  NUTS-­‐2	  level,	  the	  NUTS-­‐2	  region	  will	  take	  on	  the	  score	  of	  its	  upper	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As	  it	  possible	  to	  notice	  in	  Figure	  5.4,	  EQI	  score	  tends	  to	  be	  generally	  very	  high	  or	  high	  in	  Northern	  and	  Central	  
Europe	  (Scandinavian,	  German,	  Austrian	  and	  British	  regions),	  and	  roughly	  in	  the	  half	  of	  French	  regions.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  the	  quality	  of	  government	  tends	  to	  be	  poorer	  in	  Southern	  Europe.	  Situation	  appears	  quite	  alarming	  
in	  the	  Italian	  “mezzogiorno”	  and	  Greece	  where	  the	  quality	  of	  regional	  government	  is	  comparable	  to	  the	  one	  of	  the	  
regions	  located	  in	  the	  poorest	  countries	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  namely	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania.	  
Quality	   of	   government	   within	   the	   group	   of	   peripheral	   countries	   appears	   to	   be	   higher	   in	   Spain	   and	   Portugal	  
whose	  regions	  performed	  much	  better	  than	  the	  Italian	  and	  the	  Greek	  regions.	  
As	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   note	   the	   quality	   of	   government	   institutions	   in	   CEE	   regions	   is	   generally	   poorer	  with	   some	  
exceptions	  than	  in	  the	  EU-­‐15.	  
	  
5.7	  The	  choice	  of	  Binary	  versus	  Linear	  Model	  to	  analyse	  regional	  convergence	  and	  divergence	  
Given	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  analysis	  how	  the	  quality	  of	  government	  institution	  has	  conditioned	  regional	  
convergence	   on	   a	   cross	   section	   of	   regions,	   it	   is	   also	   possible	   to	   study	   this	   relationship	  with	   a	   “standard”	  OLS	  
regression	  model	  where	  economic	  growth	  during	  the	  period	  2001-­‐2015	  is	  regressed	  on	  the	  GDP	  per	  Capita	   in	  
2001,	   the	   Quality	   of	   Government	   Institutions	   and	   other	   control	   variables.	   However,	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	  
analysis,	  conditional	  convergence	  regression	  estimated	  on	  cross	  sectional	  data	  may	  lead	  to	  some	  shortcomings.	  	  
Indeed	   the	   objective	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   not	   to	   study	   the	   emergence	   of	   core	   periphery	   patterns	   and	   increasing	  
returns	   as	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   where	   a	   linear	   spatial	   lagged	   model	   on	   a	   cross	   section	   of	   regions	  
demonstrated	   itself	   remarkably	   suitable	   to	   analysis	   geographical	   spillovers.	   Indeed,	   spatial	   spillovers	   and	  
increasing	  returns	  may	  take	  place	  through	  “location	  effects”	  also	  between	  regions	  with	  relevantly	  different	  levels	  
of	  economic	  or	  institutional	  development	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  regions	  of	  Germany,	  Austria	  and	  of	  the	  countries	  of	  
the	  Visegrad	  group	  or	  other	  Eastern	  European	  countries.	  
Rather,	   here	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   analysis	   how	  a	   given	   variable,	  Quality	   of	  Government	   Institutions,	   has	   shaped	  
economic	  performances	  in	  regions	  with	  different	  initial	  levels	  of	  economic	  development.	  Therefore	  estimating	  a	  
conventional	  model	  of	   conditional	  beta	   convergence	  would	  yield	   to	   the	  obvious	   result	   that	  on	  average	  poorer	  
regions	   tend	   to	   outperform	   the	   richer	   ones	   conditional	   to	   the	   Quality	   of	   Government	   Institutions,	   taken	   as	   a	  
determinant	  of	  the	  steady	  state.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  reason	  behind	  the	  choice	  of	  binary	  model	  I	  initially	  specify	  the	  following	  linear	  model	  to	  
be	  estimated	  with	  OLS	  estimator:	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yi=	  α	  +	  β1	  ln	  (x	  0,i)	  +	  β2	  x	  2,	  i	  +	  β3	  [	  ψ3,	  i]	  +	  	  μ	  i	  	  
(5.1)	  (5.2)	  
	  
Where	  y	  is	  the	  average	  rate	  of	  growth	  during	  the	  period	  2001-­‐2015	  and	  x0	  denotes	  the	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  in	  2001.	  
X2	  denotes	  the	  EQI	  score	  and	  ψ	  denotes	  a	  vector	  of	  control	  variables	  that	  includes,	  among	  others,	  investment	  rate	  
in	  manufacturing	   industry	  and	   the	  composition	  of	  human	  capital	  proxied	  as	   the	  educational	  attainment	  of	   the	  
working	  age	  population.	  In	  the	  alternative	  specification	  of	  the	  model	  (2)	  I	  replace	  sectorial	  investment	  rates	  with	  
the	  economic	  structures.	  
The	  output	  of	  the	  model	  is	  reported	  in	  Table	  5.149.	  
	  
Table	  5.1	  
Dependent	  Variable:	  Average	  GDP	  per	  
Capita	  growth	  2001-­‐2015	  
	  
	  	  	  Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  
	  	  	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  0.0000	  
	  	  	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .60	  
	  	  Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  	  	  
	  	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  0.0000	  
	  	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .60	  




Log	  	  of	  GDP	  pc	  in	  2001	  
	  
-­‐.005***	  	  	  	  
[.001]	  




	  	  .004***	  	  	  	  
[.0008]	  
.004***	  	  	  	  
[.0007]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  with	  Tertiary	  
Education	  
.0001**	  	  	  	  
[.00005]	  
.0002***	  	  	  	  
[.00005]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  with	  Primary	  
Education	  or	  Less	  
-­‐.0002***	  	  	  	  	  
[.00004]	  
-­‐.0001***	  	  	  	  
[.00004]	  
Investment	  in	  Industry	  to	  GDP	   .0008***	  	  	  	  
[.0001]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Construction	  to	  GDP	   	  	  .0010375	  	  	  	  	  
[0006]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  non-­‐Market	  Services	  GDP	   .00005	  	  	  	  
[.0002]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Market	  Services	  GDP	   -­‐.00007	  	  	  	  
[.0001]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Agriculture	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.001*	  	  	  	  
[.0007]	  
	  
Average	  GVA	  Industry	   	   	  	  .00003	  	  	  	  
[.00009]	  
Average	  GVA	  Construction	  	   	   	  	  -­‐.00006	  	  	  	  
[.0002]	  
Average	  GVA	  non-­‐Market	  Services	   	   -­‐.0003***	  	  	  	  
	  [.0001]	  
Average	  GVA	  Market	  Services	  	   	   -­‐.0002**	  	  
[.0001]	  
Average	  GVA	  Agriculture	   	   -­‐.0004***	  	  	  	  
[.0001]	  
***Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  	  **Statistically	  Significant	  at	  5%	  	  *	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  10%	  	  
Standard	  Error	  in	  Brackets	  [	  ]	  
	  
As	  it	  possible	  to	  note,	  while	  investment	  rate	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  is	  confirmed	  to	  play	  a	  relevant	  role	  in	  the	  
convergence	  process,	   the	  EQI	  score	   turns	  out	   to	  be	   the	  main	  determinant	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  conditional	  
convergence.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  In	  appendix	  5.2	  I	  will	  utilize	  the	  regression	  output	  of	  Table	  5.1	  in	  order	  to	  conduct	  an	  analysis	  for	  the	  eventual	  presence	  of	  multicollinearity	  
among	  the	  variables	  in	  the	  model,	  especially	  those	  one	  related	  to	  sectorial	  investment	  rates.	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However	  with	  this	  model	  it	  is	  only	  possible	  to	  conclude	  that	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  of	  poorer	  regions	  to	  outperform	  
the	   richer	   ones	   conditional,	   among	   others,	   on	   the	   quality	   of	   government	   institutions.	   Indeed	   with	   an	   OLS	  
estimation	  for	  the	  whole	  sample	  of	  195	  regions	  it	   is	  not	  possible	  to	  differentiate	   initial	  conditions	  in	  2001	  (i.e.	  
GDP	   per	   Capita)	   and	   the	   relationship	   with	   economic	   growth	   in	   the	   subsequent	   period.	   	   For	   example	   all	   the	  
regions	   of	   Italian	  Mezzogiorno	   have	   been	   “diverging	   from	  below”	   the	   level	   of	   EU	  GDP	  per	   Capita	   in	   2001	   like	  
most	   of	   the	   Spanish	   regions,	   but	   these	   two	   groups	   of	   regions	   are	   very	   different.	   In	   fact	   regions	   of	   Italian	  
Mezzogionro	   have	   been	   “diverging	   from	   below”	   because	   they	   recorded	   negative	   rates	   of	   growth	   while	   the	  
Spanish	  regions	  have	  been	  diverging	  from	  below	  because	  they	  recorded	  positive	  rates	  of	  growth	  below	  the	  EU	  
economic	  growth.	  
	  The	   same	   can	   be	   said	   if	   economic	   performances	   of	   Italian	   regions	   are	   compared	   with	   the	   economic	  
performances	  of	  the	  French	  regions.	  In	  fact,	  while	  all	  the	  French	  regions,	  excluding	  Ile-­‐de-­‐France	  (that	  has	  been	  a	  
region	   “taking	   off	   from	   above”),	   have	   been	   “unsuccessful”	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   recorded	  
positive	   rates	   of	   economic	   growth	  but	   underperformed	   the	  European	  Union,	   all	   the	   Italian	   regions	  have	  been	  
“unsuccessful”	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  recorded	  negative	  rates	  of	  economic	  growth	  (the	  same	  can	  
be	  told	  for	  Greek	  regions).	  
Given	  the	  statistical	  significance	  of	  the	  negative	  beta	  coefficient	  on	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  in	  2001,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
the	  OLS	  regression	  output	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  misleading	  conclusion:	  both	  the	  “poor”	  regions	  of	  Italian	  Mezzogiorno	  
(that	  recorded	  negative	  rates	  of	  growth)	  and	  the	  “poor”	  Spanish	  regions	  (that	  recorded	  positive	  rates	  of	  growth)	  
are	   expected	   to	   convergence	   towards	   the	   income	   per	   capita	   levels	   of	   the	   richer	   Northern	   European	   regions	  
conditional	  on	  a	  set	  of	  exogenous	  variable	  that	  includes	  the	  quality	  of	  government	  institutions.	  In	  other	  words,	  
when	   interpreting	   the	   regression	   output	   it	  would	   not	   be	   possible	   to	   differentiate	   from	  Aquitaine	   (FR61)	   and	  
Andalusia	   (ES61)	   that	   diverged	   with	   positive	   rates	   of	   growth	   and	   Campania	   (ITF2)	   and	   Calabria	   (ITF6)	   that	  
diverged	  by	  recording	  negative	  rates	  of	  economic	  growth	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  
As	   a	   consequence,	   a	   Probit	   model	   estimated	   on	   different	   subsamples	   of	   regions	   grouped	   according	   to	   their	  
economic	  performances	  and	  initial	  levels	  of	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  relatively	  to	  the	  European	  Union	  appears	  much	  more	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5.8	  The	  Specification	  of	  the	  Model:	  a	  Probit	  analysis	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  Quality	  of	  Government	  Institutions	  
on	  economic	  growth	  
Probit	   regression	   is	   nonlinear	   regression	  model	   specifically	   utilized	   for	   binary	   dependent	   variables.	   A	  model	  
with	  binary	  dependent	  variable	  models	  the	  probability	  that	  Y=1	  when	  a	  change	  in	  the	  predictor	  X	  occurs.	  
Cumulative	   probability	   distribution	   function	   (c.d.f.)	   is	   used	   in	   Probit	   regressions	   because	   it	   produces	  
probabilities	  between	  0	  and	  1	  in	  the	  form	  (Y=1|X).	  Therefore,	  when	  Y	  is	  binary,	  its	  conditional	  expectation	  is	  the	  
marginal	  probability	  that	  the	  variable	  Y	  equals	  1,	  therefore	  the	  expected	  change	  arising	  from	  a	  change	  in	  X	  is	  the	  
change	  in	  probability	  that	  Y=1	  (Stock	  and	  Watson,	  2012:431).	  
For	  the	  Probit	  model	  F(x´β)	  is	  the	  cumulative	  density	  function	  (C.d.f)	  of	  a	  standard	  	  normal	  distribution50	  	  
	  
Y=	  F(x´β)=	   𝛷!´!!! (z)	  dz	  	  with	  Φ	  (Z)	  ∈ 	  [0	  ,	  1]	  
(2)	  
Therefore,	  coefficient	  estimate	  β	  represents	  the	  increase/decrease	  in	  the	  z-­‐score	  of	  the	  probability	  Y=1|X	  when	  X	  
changes	  by	  1	  unit.	  
The	  model	  is	  specified	  as	  follows:	  
	  
Pr(Y=1|X’s)=	  Φ(α	  +	  β1	  X	  1	  ,i+	  β2	  X	  2,i	  +	  β3	  X	  3,i)	  	  
(3)	  
Where	  Y	  denotes	  binary	  dependent	  variable	  that	  can	  take	  on	  value	  1	  if	  a	  region	  has	  recorded	  a	  certain	  economic	  
performance	  (“diverging”,	  “converging”,	  “unsuccessful”/“successful”	  or	  “failed”)	  and	  0	  otherwise.	  X1	  denotes	  the	  
EQI	  score	  calculated	  in	  2013,	  X2	  denotes	  a	  vector	  of	  control	  variables	  related	  to	  sectorial	  investment	  rates	  to	  GDP	  
or	   the	   regional	   economic	   structure	   while	   X	   3	   denotes	   vector	   of	   control	   variables	   related	   to	   the	   educational	  
attainment	   of	   the	   working	   age	   population.	   All	   the	   variables	   other	   than	   EQI	   score	   are	   expressed	   as	   annual	  
averages	  during	  the	  period	  2001-­‐2015.	  
The	  model	  will	  be	  estimated	  for	  four	  cases:	  
	  
1) Regions	  “Taking-­‐off”	  from	  Above	  
2) Regions	  “Diverging”	  from	  Below	  
3) Unsuccessful	  Regions	  (GDP	  per	  Capita	  Growth<EU	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  Growth)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  The	  application	  of	  a	  Logistic	  or	  Logit	  model	  yields	  very	  similar	  results,	  therefore	  I	  only	  focus	  in	  the	  estimation	  with	  Probit	  model	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Or	  symmetrically,	  Successful	  Regions	  (GDP	  per	  Capita	  Growth	  >	  EU	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  Growth)51	  
4) Failed	  Regions	  (GDP	  per	  Capita	  Growth	  <	  0)	  
	  
Higher	   EQI	   score	   is	   expected	   to	   increase	   the	   probability	   that	   a	   region	   will	   be	   “taking	   off	   from	   above”	   or	   be	  
“Successful”	  while	   it	   is	   expected	   to	   reduce	   the	   probability	   that	   a	   region	  will	   be	   “Diverging	   from	  below”	   or	   be	  
“Unsuccessful”.	   Investment	   rates	   to	   GDP	   are	   expected	   to	   affect	   the	   binary	   variable	   according	   to	   sector	   of	   the	  
economy	   (Industry,	   Market	   services,	   Non-­‐Market	   services,	   Agriculture	   and	   Constructions)	   while	   labour	   force	  
higher	  education	  is	  expected	  to	  confirm	  the	  results	  common	  to	  the	  empirical	  literature	  about	  economic	  growth.	  	  	  
In	  the	  tables	  of	  the	  regression	  outputs	  I	  report	  directly	  the	  marginal	  effects	  or	  the	  predicted	  probability	  that	  Y=1	  
given	  the	  values	  of	  X1	  ,	  X2	  …,	  Xk	  	  calculated	  by	  computing	  the	  z-­‐value.	  Indeed,	  the	  coefficient	  β1	  is	  the	  change	  in	  z-­‐
value	   arising	   from	   a	   unit	   change	   in	   X1,	   holding	   constant	   X2	  …,	   X.	   The	   Probit	   model	   is	   fitted	   with	   Maximum	  
Likelihood	  estimator	  and	  provides	  also	  a	  Pseudo	  R	  Square52,	  53.	  
In	   order	   to	   provide	   a	  more	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   I	   also	   run	   the	   same	  models	  with	   variables	   averaged	   during	   the	  
period	  2001-­‐2008.	  With	  this	  strategy	  it	   is	  possible	  both	  to	  exclude	  the	  crisis	  period	  characterized	  by	  a	  general	  














	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  The	  coefficient	  estimates	  and	  their	  statistical	  significance	  of	  the	  models	  with	  “Successful”	  or	  “Unsuccessful”	  regions	  are	  exactly	  the	  same	  
with	   opposite	   signs.	   Therefore	   in	   the	   paper	   only	   the	   regression	   output	   for	   “Unsuccessful”	   regions	   (regions	   “declining	   from	   above”	   and	  
“diverging	  from	  below”)	  is	  reported	  
52	  In	  the	  Appendix	  5.2	  I	  will	  report	  the	  regression	  diagnostics	  for	  the	  detection	  of	  the	  eventual	  presence	  of	  multicollinearity	  in	  the	  model.	  As	  it	  
will	  be	  showed,	  no	  multicollinearity	  is	  detected	  between	  the	  variables	  in	  the	  model.	  
53	  In	  Figures	  5.3.1	  and	  5.3.2	  in	  Appendix	  5.3	  I	  report	  the	  plots	  of	  the	  marginal	  probabilities	  estimated	  with	  the	  Probit	  technique	  and	  reported	  
in	  Tables	  2,	  3	  4	  and	  5	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Table	  5.2:	  	  marginal	  effects	  on	  probability	  
Y=1|X	  
(A	  group	  in	  Table	  1-­‐	  	  “Taking	  off	  from	  
above”)	  
	  
	  	  Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  	  LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  79.86	  
	  	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  0.0000	  
	  	  Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  0.3376	  
	  	  Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  	  LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  85.09	  
	  	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  0.0000	  
	  	  Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  0.3639	  
Model	   1°	   1b	  





.22***	  	  	  	  
[.08]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  with	  Tertiary	  
Education	  
.003	  	  	  
[.003]	  
.007**	  	  	  	  
[.003]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  Primary	  Education	  
or	  Less	  
-­‐.002	  	  	  	  
[.003]	  
-­‐.0006	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[.003]	  
Investment	  in	  Industry	  to	  GDP	   .061***	  
[.01]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	  in	  Construction	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.07	  	  	  	  
[.07]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	  in	  non-­‐Market	  Services	  GDP	   -­‐.046**	  
[.02]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	  in	  Market	  Services	  GDP	   .01	  	  	  	  
[.009]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	  in	  Agriculture	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.20***	  
[.06]	  
-­‐	  
Average	  GVA	  Industry	   	   .016***	  
[.005]	  
Average	  GVA	  Construction	  	   	   	  	  -­‐.022	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
Average	  GVA	  non-­‐Market	  Services	   	   	  	  -­‐.014*	  	  
	  [.008]	  
Average	  GVA	  Market	  Services	  	   	   -­‐.002	  
	  	  [.01]	  
Average	  GVA	  Agriculture	   -­‐	   -­‐.028*	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
***	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  	  **	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  5%	  	  *Statistically	  Significant	  at	  10%	  
Standard	  Error	  in	  Brackets	  [	  ]	  
	  
Table	  5.3:	  	  marginal	  effects	  on	  probability	  
Y=1|X	  
(D	  group	  in	  table	  1-­‐	  “Diverging	  from	  below”)	  
	  
	  Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  124.04	  
	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  0.0000	  
	  Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .58	  
	  Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  139.35	  
	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .0000	  
	  Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  .65	  
Model	   2a	   2b	  
	   dy/dx	   dy/dx	  
EQI	  Score	  
	  




Working	  Age	  Population	  with	  Tertiary	  
Education	  
.003	  	  	  	  
	  [.003]	  
.001	  	  	  	  
[.003]	  




.003*	  	  	  
[.002]	  
Investment	  in	  Industry	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.009	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	  in	  Construction	  to	  GDP	   	  	  -­‐.027	  	  	  	  
[.03]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	  in	  non-­‐Market	  Services	  GDP	   .026**	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	  in	  Market	  Services	  GDP	   .010	  	  	  	  
[.007]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	  in	  Agriculture	  to	  GDP	   .021	  	  	  	  
[.03]	  
-­‐	  
Average	  GVA	  Industry	   	   .008	  	  	  	  
[.005]	  
Average	  GVA	  Construction	  	   	   .012	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
Average	  GVA	  non-­‐Market	  Services	   	   .026***	  	  	  	  
[.007]	  
Average	  GVA	  Market	  Services	  	   	   .013	  	  	  
[.008]	  
Average	  GVA	  Agriculture	  	   	   .021	  	  	  	  
[.03]	  
***	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  	  **	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  5%	  	  *Statistically	  Significant	  at	  10%	  
Standard	  Error	  in	  Brackets	  [	  ]	  
	  
	   136	  
	  
Table	  5.4:	  	  marginal	  effects	  on	  probability	  
Y=1|X	  –	  Unsuccessful	  	  
(B	  group	  +D	  group	  in	  table	  1	  -­‐	  Regions	  
“Declining	  from	  above”	  and	  regions	  
“diverging	  from	  below”)	  
	  	  Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  	  LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  94.99	  
	  	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .0000	  
	  	  Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .34	  
Number	  of	  obs	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  100.91	  
Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .0000	  
Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .36	  
	  
Model	   3a	   3b	  
	   dy/dx	   dy/dx	  
EQI	  Score	   -­‐	  .27***	  	  	  	  	  
[.08]	  
-­‐.24***	  	  	  
[.08]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  with	  Tertiary	  
Education	  
.002	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[.004]	  
-­‐.0047	  	  	  	  
[.004]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  Primary	  Education	  
or	  Less	  
.013***	  	  	  	  
[.004]	  
.007*	  	  	  
[.004]	  
Investment	  in	  Industry	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.037**	  	  	  
[.01]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	  in	  Construction	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.07	  	  	  
[.05]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	  in	  non-­‐Market	  Services	  GDP	   .005	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	  in	  Market	  Services	  GDP	   .002	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
-­‐	  
Investment	  in	  Agriculture	  to	  GDP	   .07	  	  	  	  
[.067]	  
-­‐	  
Average	  GVA	  Industry	   	   -­‐.014**	  	  	  	  
[.006]	  
Average	  GVA	  Construction	  	   	   -­‐.015	  	  	  
[.01]	  
Average	  GVA	  non-­‐Market	  Services	   	   .001	  	  	  	  
[.009]	  
Average	  GVA	  Market	  Services	  	   	   .005	  	  	  
[.01]	  
Average	  GVA	  Agriculture	  	   	   .01	  	  	  
[.01]	  
***	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  	  **	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  5%	  	  *Statistically	  Significant	  at	  10%	  
Standard	  Error	  in	  Brackets	  [	  ]	  
	  
	  
Table	  5.5:	  	  marginal	  effects	  on	  probability	  
Y=1|X	  –	  Failed	  	  
(E	  group	  in	  table	  1	  -­‐	  Regions	  with	  average	  
growth	  <0”)	  
	  
	  	  	  Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  	  	  LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  111.09	  
	  	  	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .0000	  
	  	  	  Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .54	  
	  	  Number	  of	  obs	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  	  	  LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  120.39	  
	  	  	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .0000	  
	  	  	  Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .58	  
	  
Model	   4a	   4b	  
	   dy/dx	   dy/dx	  
EQI	  Score	   -­‐.19***	  	  	  	  
[.038]	  
-­‐.18***	  	  	  
[.03]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  with	  Tertiary	  
Education	  
-­‐.006**	  	  	  	  
[.003]	  
-­‐.011***	  	  	  	  
[.003]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  Primary	  Education	  
or	  Less	  
	  	  -­‐.0001	  	  	  	  
[.002]	  
-­‐.001	  	  	  	  
[.002]	  
Investment	  in	  Industry	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.013	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Construction	  to	  GDP	   .007	  	  	  	  
[.03]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  non-­‐Market	  Services	  GDP	   	  	  -­‐.017	  	  	  	  
[.012]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Market	  Services	  GDP	   .005	  	  	  
[.008]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Agriculture	  to	  GDP	   .006	  	  	  	  
[.03]	  
	  
Average	  GVA	  Industry	   	   -­‐.016***	  	  	  	  
[.005]	  
Average	  GVA	  Construction	  	   	   	  	  -­‐.007	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
Average	  GVA	  non-­‐Market	  Services	   	   	  	  -­‐.011**	  	  	  	  
[.005]	  
Average	  GVA	  Market	  Services	  	   	   -­‐.012**	  	  	  	  
[.006]	  
Average	  GVA	  Agriculture	  	   	   	  	  -­‐.006	  	  	  	  
[.008]	  
***	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  	  **	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  5%	  	  *Statistically	  Significant	  at	  10	  /	  Standard	  Error	  in	  Brackets	  [	  ]	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5.7	  Robustness	  Check	  of	  the	  model:	  Institutions	  in	  the	  Short-­‐Run	  
In	  order	  to	  further	  investigate	  the	  role	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  institutions	  in	  shaping	  regional	  economic	  performances	  
in	  the	  EU-­‐15,	  I	  run	  the	  same	  model	  with	  annual	  data	  averaged	  during	  the	  period	  2001-­‐2008.	  
With	   this	  strategy	   it	  will	  be	  possible	   to	   insulate	   the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period	  and	  compare	   the	   long	  run	  and	  short	   run	  
results	   of	   the	   econometric	   analyses	   in	   order	   to	   assess	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   quality	   of	   government	   institutions	  
makes	  European	  regions	  more	  resilient	  to	  economic	  shocks.	  
As	  already	  mentioned	  the	  data	  for	  European	  Quality	  of	  Government	  Index	  (EQI	  score)	  developed	  by	  the	  Quality	  of	  
Government	  Institute	   are	   available	  only	   for	   the	  years	  2010,	  2013	  and	  2017.	  Given	   the	   fact	   that	   changes	   in	   the	  
quality	   of	   institutions	   occur	   very	   slowly	   it	   is	   plausible	   to	   suppose	   that	   the	   quality	   of	   government	   institutions	  
observed	  in	  2010	  in	  the	  European	  regions	  was	  not	  sensibly	  different	  from	  the	  quality	  of	  government	  institutions	  
that	  had	  characterised	  the	  period	  2001-­‐2008.	  As	  a	  consequence	  the	  EQI	  score	  of	  the	  year	  2010	  calculated	  on	  a	  
survey	  of	  34.000	  respondents	  is	  chosen	  as	  a	  predictor	  of	  regions	  economic	  performance.	  
Also	   the	  Quality	  of	  Government	  Institute	   remarks	   that	   “a	  relative	  stability	  in	  quality	  of	  government	  can	  be	  noted	  
across	   the	   three	   editions”	   of	   the	   database	   and	   such	   a	   stability	   further	   induces	   to	   confidently	   conjecture	   that	  
quality	   of	   government	   institutions	   in	   2010	  was	   nearly	   the	   same	   of	   the	   quality	   of	   regional	   institutions	   of	   the	  
pervious	  years.	  	  
The	  relationship	  between	  the	  quality	  of	  government	  institutions	  and	  economic	  performances	  in	  the	  short	  run	  is	  
expected	  at	  best	  weak	  or	  negligible.	  
Indeed	   countries	   or	   regions	   can	   experience	   short	   run	   fast	   economic	   growth,	   convergence	   or	   growth	  
accelerations	  regardless	  the	  quality	  of	  government	  institutions	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  episodes	  of	  speculation	  
on	  real	  estate,	  stock	  market	  and	  commodity	  prices	  that	  drive	  economic	  growth	  until	  the	  bubble	  bursts	  and	  the	  
subsequent	   macroeconomic	   adjustment.	   Furthermore	   during	   the	   periods	   of	   financial	   euphoria	   or	  
financial/housing	  bubbles	  regions	  or	  countries	  with	  lower	  income	  levels	  can	  experience	  short-­‐run	  periods	  of	  fast	  
economic	   growth	   and	   convergence	   because	   of	   high	   debt-­‐driven	   investment	   rates	   and	   decreasing	   returns	   to	  
physical	  capital.	  	  
Anyways,	   stable	   economic	   development	   is	   ensured	   in	   the	   long	   sun	   only	   by	   sound	   government	   institutions	   as	  
pointed	  out	  by	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  (2005).	  
The	  results	  of	  the	  regressions	  are	  reported	  in	  tables	  6,	  7,	  8	  and	  9.	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As	  it	  possible	  to	  note,	  the	  quality	  of	  institutions	  is	  the	  main	  factor	  behind	  a	  “taking-­‐off	  from	  above”	  experienced	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Table	  5.5:	  	  marginal	  effects	  on	  probability	  
Y=1|X	  
(A	  group	  in	  Table	  1-­‐	  	  “Taking	  off	  from	  
above”)	  
	  
	  	  Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  	  LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  79.86	  
	  	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  0.0000	  
	  	  Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  0.31	  
	  	  Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  	  LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  85.09	  
	  	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  0.0000	  
	  	  Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  0.26	  
Model	   6°	   6b	  
	   dy/dx	   dy/dx	  
EQI	  Score	  
	  
.29***	  	  	  	  
[.06]	  
	  	  .34***	  	  	  	  
[.06]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  with	  Tertiary	  
Education	  
.010***	  	  	  
[.003]	  
.011***	  	  	  	  
[.004]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  with	  Primary	  
Education	  or	  Less	  
.0028	  	  	  	  
[.003]	  
.002	  	  	  
[.003]	  
Investment	  in	  Industry	  to	  GDP	   .028**	  
[.012]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Construction	  to	  GDP	   .045	  	  	  	  
[.04]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  non-­‐Market	  Services	  GDP	   -­‐.067***	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Market	  Services	  GDP	   .03	  	  	  
[.02]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Agriculture	  to	  GDP	   	  	  -­‐.008*	  	  	  	  
[.05]	  
	  
Average	  GVA	  Industry	   	   .00080	  
	  	  	  [.005]	  
Average	  GVA	  Construction	  	   	   .028**	  	  	  
[	  .014]	  
Average	  GVA	  non-­‐Market	  Services	   	   -­‐.014*	  	  	  	  
[.008]	  
Average	  GVA	  Market	  Services	  	   	   -­‐.012	  	  	  	  
[.009]	  
Average	  GVA	  Agriculture	   	   -­‐.048**	  	  	  	  
[.02]	  
***	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  	  **	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  5%	  	  *Statistically	  Significant	  at	  10%	  
Standard	  Error	  in	  Brackets	  [	  ]	  
	  
Table	  5.6:	  	  marginal	  effects	  on	  probability	  
Y=1|X	  
(B	  group	  in	  table	  1-­‐	  “Diverging	  from	  below”)	  
	  
	  Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  33.38	  
	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  0.0000	  
	  Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .19	  
	  Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  64.4	  
	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .0000	  
	  Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .37	  
Model	   7°	   7b	  
	   dy/dx	   dy/dx	  
EQI	  Score	  
	  
-­‐.042	  	  	  	  
[.03]	  
-­‐.039	  	  	  	  
[.03]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  with	  Tertiary	  
Education	  
-­‐.005	  	  	  	  
[.004]	  
-­‐.008*	  	  	  	  
[.004]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  Primary	  Education	  
or	  Less	  
.003	  	  	  	  
[.002]	  
.0034*	  	  	  	  
[.001]	  
Investment	  in	  Industry	  to	  GDP	   .001	  
[.01]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Construction	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.04	  	  	  	  
[.03]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  non-­‐Market	  Services	  GDP	   .011	  	  	  
[.01]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Market	  Services	  GDP	   .008	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Agriculture	  to	  GDP	   .003	  	  	  .	  
[.03]	  
	  
Average	  GVA	  Industry	   	   -­‐.001	  	  	  	  	  
[.006]	  
Average	  GVA	  Construction	  	   	   .003	  	  	  	  	  
[.018]	  
Average	  GVA	  non-­‐Market	  Services	   	   	  	  	  .023***	  	  	  	  
[.008]	  
Average	  GVA	  Market	  Services	  	   	   -­‐.0083	  	  	  	  
[.009]	  
Average	  GVA	  Agriculture	  	   	   -­‐.008	  	  	  	  
[.009]	  
***	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  	  **	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  5%	  	  *Statistically	  Significant	  at	  10%	  
Standard	  Error	  in	  Brackets	  [	  ]	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Table	  5.7:	  	  marginal	  effects	  on	  probability	  
Y=1|X	  –	  Unsuccessful	  	  
(B	  group	  +D	  group	  in	  table	  1	  -­‐	  Regions	  
“Declining	  from	  above”	  and	  regions	  
“diverging	  from	  below”)	  
	  	  Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  	  LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  22.5	  
	  	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .004	  
	  	  Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .18	  
Number	  of	  obs	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  100.91	  
Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .0000	  
Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .19	  
	  
Model	   8°	   8b	  
	   dy/dx	   dy/dx	  
EQI	  Score	   .013	  
[.06]	  
.006	  	  	  	  
[.06]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  with	  Tertiary	  
Education	  
-­‐.016***	  
	  	  	  [.005]	  
-­‐.018***	  	  	  	  
[.004]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  Primary	  Education	  
or	  Less	  
.001	  	  	  	  
[.003]	  
.0062*	  	  	  	  
[.003]	  
Investment	  in	  Industry	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.01	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Construction	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.08	  	  	  	  	  
[.05]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  non-­‐Market	  Services	  GDP	   -­‐.01	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Market	  Services	  GDP	   -­‐.003	  	  	  	  
[.027]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Agriculture	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.09	  	  	  	  
[.06]	  
	  
Average	  GVA	  Industry	   	   -­‐.015**	  	  	  	  
[.006]	  
Average	  GVA	  Construction	  	   	   -­‐.072***	  	  	  	  
[.015]	  
Average	  GVA	  non-­‐Market	  Services	   	   -­‐.011	  	  	  
[.009]	  
Average	  GVA	  Market	  Services	  	   	   -­‐.021**	  	  	  	  
[.009]	  
Average	  GVA	  Agriculture	  	   	   -­‐.039**	  
[.018]	  
***	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  	  **	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  5%	  	  *Statistically	  Significant	  at	  10%	  
Standard	  Error	  in	  Brackets	  [	  ]	  
	  
	  
Table	  5.8:	  	  marginal	  effects	  on	  probability	  
Y=1|X	  –	  Failed	  	  
(E	  group	  in	  table	  1	  -­‐	  Regions	  with	  average	  
growth	  <0”)	  
	  
	  	  	  Number	  of	  obs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  	  	  LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  18.27	  
	  	  	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .0000	  
	  	  	  Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .54	  
	  	  Number	  of	  obs	  =	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  
	  	  	  LR	  chi2(8)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  12.26	  
	  	  	  Prob	  >	  chi2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .0000	  
	  	  	  Pseudo	  R2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  	  	  	  	  .41	  
	  
Model	   9°	   9b	  
	   	   	  
EQI	  Score	   .0008	  	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
.008	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  with	  Tertiary	  
Education	  
-­‐.001	  	  	  	  
[.001]	  
-­‐.001	  	  	  	  
[.001]	  
Working	  Age	  Population	  Primary	  Education	  
or	  Less	  
-­‐.0005	  	  	  	  
[.0007]	  
-­‐.00005	  	  	  	  
[.0009]	  
Investment	  in	  Industry	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.002	  	  	  	  	  
[.005]	  
-­‐.002	  	  	  	  
[.002]	  
Investment	  in	  Construction	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.003	  	  	  	  
[.01]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  non-­‐Market	  Services	  GDP	   .001	  	  	  	  	  
[.004]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Market	  Services	  GDP	   .010	  	  	  	  
[.006]	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Agriculture	  to	  GDP	   -­‐.016	  	  	  
[.02]	  
	  
Average	  GVA	  Industry	   	   -­‐.002	  	  	  	  
[.002]	  
Average	  GVA	  Construction	  	   	   .003	  	  	  	  
[.004]	  
Average	  GVA	  non-­‐Market	  Services	   	   -­‐.003	  	  	  	  
[.003]	  
Average	  GVA	  Market	  Services	  	   	   	  	  .0001	  	  	  
[.001]	  
Average	  GVA	  Agriculture	  	   	   -­‐.005	  	  	  	  
[.008]	  
***	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  1%	  	  **	  Statistically	  Significant	  at	  5%	  	  *Statistically	  Significant	  at	  10	  /	  Standard	  Error	  in	  Brackets	  [	  ]	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5.8	  Discussion	  of	  the	  Results	  
Despite	  the	  results	  of	  the	  model	  perfectly	  fit	  the	  expectations	  derived	  from	  the	  theory	  and	  the	  previous	  empirics	  
in	   the	   literature,	   it	   is	   surprising	   to	   empirically	   demonstrate	   how	   the	  quality	   of	   institution	   turns	   out	   to	   be	   the	  
most	   important	  determinant	  of	  regional	  performances	  even	  compared	  to	   investment	  rate	   in	  highly	  productive	  
sectors	   as	   manufacturing	   industry.	   In	   particular	   when	   controlling	   for	   sectorial	   investment	   rates	   to	   GDP,	   a	  
percentage	   point	   increase	   in	   EQI	   score	   is	   expected	   to	   determine	   an	   increase	   of	   27%	   in	   the	   probability	   that	   a	  
region	  will	  be	  “taking	  off	  from	  above”	  (Table	  2	  Model	  1a)	  while	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  reduce	  by	  15%	  the	  probability	  
that	  a	  region	  will	  be	  “diverging”	  from	  below	  (table	  3,	  Model	  1a).	  
The	  results	  of	  the	  model	  reported	  in	  Table	  4	  (Model	  1a)	  also	  tells	  that	  a	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  the	  EQI	  score	  will	  
reduce	  by	  27%	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  region	  will	  be	  “unsuccessful”	  either	  “declining	  from	  above”	  or	  “diverging	  
from	   below”.	   Symmetrically,	   a	   one	   unit	   increase	   in	   the	   EQI	   score	  will	   increase	   by	   27%	   the	   probability	   that	   a	  
region	  will	  be	  successful	  either	  in	  “taking	  off	  from	  above”	  or	  “converging”	  from	  below.	  	  
Beside	  the	  quality	  institutions,	  the	  role	  investment	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  to	  GDP	  seems	  to	  be	  very	  relevant	  
to	  increase	  in	  probability	  that	  a	  region	  will	  be	  “taking	  off	  from	  above”	  as	  reported	  in	  Table	  2	  and	  to	  reduce	  the	  
probability	  that	  a	  region	  will	  be	  “Diverging	  from	  below”	  or	  “unsuccessful”	  (Table	  3	  and	  Table	  4).	  Therefore	  the	  
results	  of	  this	  analysis	  indirectly	  confirms	  the	  empirics	  of	  chapter	  4	  where	  manufacturing	  activity	  is	  found	  to	  be	  
the	  engine	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  convergence	  across	  the	  European	  regions.	  
As	  regards	  the	  “failed”	  regions	  (table	  5),	  the	  industrial	  sector	  size	  plays	  a	  marginal	  role	  while	  the	  EQI	  score	  is	  the	  
main	  determinant	  of	  regional	  performances	  because	  a	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  the	  EQI	  score	  is	  expected	  to	  reduce	  by	  
19%	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  region	  will	  "fail”	  to	  grow.	  
Human	  capital	  proxied	  as	  the	  educational	  attainment	  of	  the	  working	  age	  population	  generally	  plays	  an	  effect	  in	  
shaping	   regional	   performances,	   in	   particular	   the	   labour	   force	   with	   primary	   education	   or	   less	   is	   expected	   to	  
increase	   the	  probability	   that	   a	   region	  will	   be	   “diverging	   from	  below”	  or	   “unsuccessful”	  while	   the	   labour	   force	  
with	  tertiary	  education	  is	  expected	  to	  reduce	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  region	  will	  fail	  to	  grow.	  
	  
5.9	  Conclusions	  
As	  in	  the	  most	  of	  the	  analyses	  on	  economic	  growth	  I	  provided	  a	  model	  that	  includes	  indicators	  for	  human	  capital	  
(proxied	   as	   the	   educational	   attainment	   of	   the	   working	   age	   population)	   and	   physical	   capital	   accumulation	  
(investment	   rate	   in	   the	   different	   sectors	   of	   the	   economy).	   The	   first	   noteworthy	   result	   is	   that	   manufacturing	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industry,	   either	   investment	   rate	  or	   its	   size,	  plays	  always	  a	  positive	   role	   in	   shaping	  positive	   regional	   economic	  
performances,	  thus	  confirming	  the	  empirical	  findings	  of	  Chapter	  3	  and	  4.	  
However,	   empirical	   evidence	   from	  Western	  European	  regions	   shows	   that	  preeminent	   role	   in	   shaping	   regional	  
economic	  performances	   is	   played	  by	   the	  quality	   of	   government	   institutions.	   	   The	   coefficient	   estimates	   for	   the	  
explanatory	   variable	   EQI	   are	   always	   statistically	   significant	   within	   a	   99%	   confidence	   interval	   and	   their	  
magnitude	   is	   always	   remarkably	   much	   larger	   than	   the	   magnitude	   of	   coefficient	   estimates	   for	   variables	   like	  
investment	  rate	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  (or	  the	  size	  of	  industrial	  sector)	  or	  the	  educational	  attainment	  of	  the	  
working	  age	  population.	  	  
According	   to	   the	   estimations,	   EQI	   score	   is	   the	  most	   relevant	   variables	   in	   explaining	  positive	   (“taking	  off	   from	  
above”	   or	   “successful”)	   and	   negative	   (“diverging	   from	  below”	   or	   “unsuccessful”)	   economic	   performances.	   The	  
results	   of	   the	  model	   clearly	   confirm	   the	   thesis	   of	   Acemoglu	   and	   Robinson	   (2012)	   about	   to	   the	   tight	   relation	  
between	   quality	   of	   institution	   and	   failures	   of	   nations,	   or	   regions	   in	   our	   case.	   As	   shown	   in	   the	   statistical	  map	  
(Figure	  4),	  most	  of	  the	  regions	  with	  very	  low	  indices	  of	  the	  Quality	  of	  Government	  Institutions	  are	  the	  regions	  of	  
Southern	  Europe,	   in	  particular	   the	   Italian	  and	   the	  Greek	  ones.	  Those	   regions	  were	  also	   the	  ones	   that	   suffered	  
more	  from	  the	  financial	  crisis	  and	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  (they	  have	  been	  regions	  “diverging	  from	  below”)	  while	  
most	  of	   the	  Northern	   Italian	  regions	  with	   income	  higher	   than	  EU	   income	   levels	   in	  2001	  have	  been	  “declining”	  
from	  above	  or	  unsuccessful.	  
According	  to	  the	  estimations,	  a	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  EQI	  score	  is	  expected	  to	  increase	  by	  27%	  the	  probability	  that	  
a	  region	  will	  be	  “taking	  off	  from	  above”	  (Table	  2,	  model	  1a),	  while	  it	  will	  reduce	  by	  12.5%	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  
region	   will	   be	   “diverging	   from	   below”	   (Table	   3,	   Model	   2a).	   Finally,	   a	   one	   unit	   increase	   in	   the	   EQI	   score	   is	  
expected	  to	  reduce	  by	  27%	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  region	  will	  be	  “unsuccessful”	  either	  by	  “diverging	  from	  below”	  
or	  “declining	  from	  above”	  (Table	  4,	  Model	  3a)55.	  	  
The	  empirical	   finding	  of	   this	  paper	  are	  very	   relevant	   for	  governments	   in	  diverging	  or	  declining	   regions	  of	   the	  
European	   Union,	  mainly	   in	   the	   peripheral	   countries	   of	   the	   EMU.	   Indeed	   the	   results	   show	   how	   the	   Quality	   of	  
Institutions	  ends	  up	  to	  be	  the	  most	  relevant	  determinant	  of	  regional	  economic	  performances.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  
regression	  output	  for	  “diverging	  from	  below”	  regions	  (Table	  3)	  clearly	  shows	  that	  for	  regions,	  whose	  per	  capita	  
income	  is	  lower	  that	  the	  per	  Capita	  income	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  quality	  of	  institutions	  is	  much	  
more	  important	  than	  other	  variables	  such	  as	  the	  investment	  rate	  in	  manufacturing	  sector	  or	  it	  size.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Symmetrically	  a	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  EQI	  score	  is	  expected	  increase	  by	  27%	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  region	  will	  be	  “successful”	  with	  a	  99%	  
confidence	  interval	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Indeed	  according	  to	  the	  coefficient	  estimates	  reported	  in	  Table	  3	  (Model	  2a),	  a	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  the	  EQI	  score	  
is	  expected	  to	  reduce	  by	  12.5%	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  region	  will	  be	  “diverging	  from	  below”	  while	  the	  coefficient	  
estimates	  investment	  rate	  in	  industry	  or	  the	  size	  of	  the	  industrial	  sector	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  
Quality	  of	  Government	  Institutions	  exerts	  a	  huge	  impact	  on	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  region	  will	  be	  “unsuccessful”	  by	  
either	   “diverging	   from	   below”	   or	   declining	   from	   above”.	   According	   the	   regression	   output	   reported	   in	   table	   4	  
(model	  3a),	  while	  a	  1%	  increase	  in	  investment	  rate	  in	  industry	  is	  expected	  to	  reduce	  by	  3.7%	  the	  probability	  that	  
a	  region	  will	  be	  “unsuccessful”,	  a	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  the	  EQI	  score	  is	  expected	  to	  reduce	  by	  27%	  (more	  than	  one	  
quarter)	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  region	  will	  be	  “unsuccessful”	  either	  by	  “declining	  from	  above”	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  all	  
the	  Northern	  and	  Central	  Italian	  regions)	  or	  “diverging	  from	  below”	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Greek	  regions.	  
Last	  but	  not	  least,	  according	  to	  the	  estimations	  reported	  in	  Table	  5,	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  the	  EQI	  index	  is	  expected	  
to	  reduce	  by	  19%	  (Model	  4a)	  or	  18%	  (Model	  4b)	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  region	  will	  fail	  to	  grow.	  	  
During	  the	  period	  under	  analysis	  20	  Italian	  regions	  out	  of	  21	  and	  10	  Greek	  regions	  out	  of	  13	  recorded	  negative	  
average	  GDP	  per	  capita	  growth,	  meaning	  that	  over	  the	  same	  period,	  31	  regions	  out	  of	  44	  European	  Regions	  that	  
recorded	  negative	  economic	  growth	  were	  Greek	  or	   Italian.	   	  The	   two	  countries	  are	  also	   the	   countries	  with	   the	  
lowest	  quality	  of	  regional	  institutions	  in	  terms	  of	  EQI	  score.	  Given	  these	  further	  considerations	  and	  the	  empirical	  
evidence	   provided	   by	   the	   econometric	   estimations,	   it	   is	   straightforward	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   quality	   of	  
institutions	  is	  the	  main	  determinant	  of	  regional	  economic	  performances	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  As	  a	  consequence	  it	   is	  
possible	   to	   assert	   that	   the	   weak	   quality	   of	   institutions	   has	   hampered	   both	   the	   resilience	   of	   Northern	   Italian	  
regions	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  “take-­‐off	  from	  above”	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  most	  industrialized	  
regions	   located	   in	   Germany.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   weak	   quality	   of	   government	   institutions	   has	   remarkably	  
contributed	   to	   the	  process	  of	   “divergence	   from	  below”	  observed	   in	   the	  Greek	  and	  Southern	   Italian	  regions.	  As	  
empirically	  estimated	  and	  reported	  in	  Table	  3,	  the	  quality	  of	  government	  institutions	  is	  much	  more	  relevant	  than	  
the	  investment	  rate	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  industry	  for	  lower	  income	  regions	  to	  avoid	  further	  divergence	  from	  the	  
EU	  income	  levels.	  
Furthermore,	  by	  comparing	  the	  results	  estimated	  for	  the	  same	  model	  in	  the	  long	  run	  and	  in	  the	  short	  run,	  it	   is	  
also	  possible	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  soundness	  of	  government	  institutions	  makes	  regions	  more	  resilient	  to	  financial	  
crisis	  or	  macroeconomic	  shocks.	  As	  matter	  of	  facts	  Greek	  regions,	  that	  recorded	  high	  rates	  of	  economic	  growth	  
before	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   have	   recorded	   the	  worst	   economic	   performances	   in	   Europe	   over	   the	   period	   2001-­‐
2015	  together	  with	  the	  Italian	  regions.	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According	  to	  Rothstein	  and	  Uslaner	  (2005),	  the	  quality	  of	  government	  institutions	  mainly	  reflects	  the	  social	  trust	  
that	   characterizes	   a	   local	   community	  and	  many	  empirical	   studies	   show	   that	  higher	  degrees	  of	   social	   trust	   are	  
generally	  associated	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  quality	  of	  government	  institutions.	  
Lack	  of	  social	  trust	  within	  a	  community	  means	  that	  citizens	  have	  faith	  only	  in	  their	  family,	  clan	  or	  social	  group	  
and	   this	  makes	   them	   less	   eager	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   provision	   of	   general	   public	   goods,	   such	   as	   paying	   taxes,	  
respecting	   and	   protecting	   public	   spaces	   and,	   very	   importantly,	   engaging	   in	   social	   and	   political	   mobilisations	  
asking	  for	  improvements	  in	  quality	  of	  government.	  Generally	  speaking,	  free-­‐riding	  becomes	  more	  frequent	  at	  all	  
social	   levels.	   In	   turn,	   public	   authorities	   lack	   both	   adequate	   resources	   and	   incentives	   to	   deliver	   policies,	  
consolidating	  a	  “vicious	  cycle”	  (Charron	  et	  all,	  2012:10).	  
In	   this	   framework,	   central	   governments	   in	   peripheral	   countries	   (especially	   in	   Italy	   and	   Greece)	   should	   focus	  
their	   efforts	   on	   promoting	   a	   set	   of	   institutional	   reforms	   aimed	   at	   breaking	   up	   the	   nexus	   between	   the	   lack	   of	  
social	  trust	  in	  local	  communities	  and	  political	  clientelism,	  thus	  reforms	  aimed	  at	  breaking	  the	  linkages	  between	  
decentralised	  governance	  and	  rent	  extraction	  by	  private	  parties,	  social	  groups	  or	  local	  bureaucrats.	  These	  sets	  of	  
reforms	   would	   be	   very	   effective	   especially	   in	   countries	   like	   Italy	   where	   central	   government	   assigns	   large	  
autonomy	  to	  regional	  governments	  in	  the	  management	  and	  provision	  of	  costly	  public	  services	  in	  the	  framework	  
of	  a	  process	  of	  progressive	  devolution	  of	  the	  power	  from	  the	  State	  to	  regions.	  
However,	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  no	  a	  “one-­‐size	  fits	  all”	  approach	  to	  curbing	  corruption,	  any	  measures	  must	  
take	  into	  consideration	  the	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  environment	  of	  a	  country	  and	  address	  the	  root	  causes	  
of	  corruption	  rather	  than	  adopting	  a	  symptomatic	  approach	  (Lee-­‐Jones,	  2018).	  
Such	   tailor-­‐made	   institutional	   reforms	   should	   be	   accompanied	   by	   both	   the	   set	   up	   of	   national	   independent	  
authorities	  responsible	  for	  monitoring	  and	  combatting	  corruption	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  more	  stringent	  code	  
of	  laws	  to	  prosecute	  episodes	  of	  corruption	  of	  public	  officials	  or	  policy-­‐makers.	  	  
Besides	   reforms	  at	  national	   level,	  quality	  of	  government	   institutions	   should	  also	  be	  enforced	  by	   the	  European	  
Commission	  through	  a	  system	  of	   incentives	  and	  penalties	  for	  the	  allocation	  of	  regions	  Structural	  and	  Cohesion	  
Funds.	   In	   particular	   funds	   should	   be	   granted	   to	   regions	   also	   on	   the	   basis	   on	   their	   progress	   in	   implementing	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Appendix	  5.1.	  Composition	  and	  Definition	  of	  the	  EQI	  score	  
EQI	   score	   is	   developed	   by	   the	  The	  Quality	  of	  Government	   Institute	  of	   the	  University	   of	   Gothenburg	  within	   the	  
framework	  of	  a	  European	  Commission-­‐funded	  project	  on	  measuring	   the	  Quality	  of	  Government	   Institutions	   in	  
the	  European	  Regions.	  
The	  index	  is	  built	  on	  the	  largest	  survey	  ever	  undertaken	  to	  measure	  the	  Quality	  of	  Government	  (EQoG)	  at	  sub-­‐
national	  level.	  
In	  order	  to	  capture	  the	  most	  relevant	  sub	  national	  variation	   in	  EQoG,	  surveyors	   focus	  on	  three	  public	  services	  
that	   are	   often	   financed,	   administrated	   and	   politically	   accounted	   for	   by	   subnational	   authorities:	   Education,	  
Healthcare	  and	  Law	  Enforcement.	  
Surveyors	  asked	  respondents	  “to	  rate	  these	  three	  public	  services	  with	  respect	  to	  three	  related	  concepts	  of	  QoG	  –	  the	  
quality,	  the	  impartiality	  and	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  of	  said	  services”.	  
The	  regional	  data	  combine	  16	  survey	  questions	  about	  the	  Quality	  of	  Government	  in	  a	  region.	  	  
To	   construct	   the	   regional	   index,	   surveyors	   followed	   carefully	   the	   guidelines	   provide	   in	   the	   “Handbook	   on	  
Constructing	  Composite	  Indicators;	  Methodology	  and	  User	  Guide”	  published	  in	  2008	  by	  the	  OECD.	  
All	   the	   QoG	   questions	   are	   aggregated	   from	   the	   individual	   to	   regional	   level.	   Next	   the	   16	   regional	   scores	   are	  
standardised	  so	  as	  to	  obtain	  a	  common	  range	  via	  standardisation.	  
Then	  the	  standardised	  scores	  are	  assigned	  to	  three	  different	  groups	  named	  “pillars”	  containing	  scores	  related	  to	  
question	  about	  impartiality,	  corruption	  and	  quality.	  Each	  variable	  is	  given	  the	  same	  weight	  in	  each	  pillar.	  Finally	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Appendix	  5.2:	  Analysis	  of	  Eventual	  Presence	  of	  Multicollinearity	  in	  the	  Model	  
	  
Multicollinearity	  occurs	  when	  a	  high	  correlation	  is	  detected	  among	  the	  predictors	   in	  a	  regression	  model.	  More	  
precisely,	   multicollinearity	   arises	   when	   one	   of	   the	   regressors	   is	   a	   perfect	   linear	   combination	   of	   the	   other	  
regressors.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  model	  specified	  in	  this	  article,	  investment	  rates	  in	  the	  different	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy	  (or	  the	  
share	  of	  a	  sector	  of	  the	  total	  GVA)	  may	  be	  correlated,	  especially	  averaged	  over	  the	  long	  period.	  For	  example	  an	  
increase	  in	  investment	  in	  the	  constructions,	  a	  very	  important	  steel-­‐using	  sector,	  may	  be	  positively	  correlated	  to	  
an	  increase	  in	  the	  investment	  rate	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  activity	  involved	  in	  the	  production	  of	  steel.	  
A	   first	   possible	   strategy	   to	   check	   for	  multicollinearity	   is	   to	   examine	   the	   correlation	  matrix	   of	   the	   predictors,	  
where	   correlation	   coefficients	   would	   indicate	   the	   presence	   of	   multicollinearity.	   	   Therefore	   the	   pairwise	  
correlation	  coefficients	  between	  two	  explanatory	  variables	  would	  be	  close	  to	  1	  if	  a	  regressor	  is	  a	  linear	  function	  
of	  another	  regressor.	  
Tables	   10	   and	   11	   report	   respectively	   the	   pairwise	   correlations	   between	   the	   classes	   of	   investment	   rates	   and	  
between	  the	  sectorial	  components	  of	  the	  total	  Gross	  Value	  Added.	  
	  
Table	  5.2.1:	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   Investment	   in	  
Industry	  to	  GDP	  
Investment	   in	  
Construction	  to	  GDP	  
Investment	   in	   non-­‐
Market	   Services	  
GDP	  
Investment	   in	  
Market	   Services	  
GDP	  
Investment	   in	  
Agriculture	  to	  GDP	  
Investment	   in	  
Industry	  to	  GDP	  
1	   	   	   	   	  
Investment	   in	  
Construction	  to	  GDP	  
0.0491	   1	   	   	   	  
Investment	   in	   non-­‐
Market	   Services	  
GDP	  
-­‐0.0230	   0.5567	   1	   	   	  
Investment	   in	  
Market	   Services	  
GDP	  
-­‐0.1743	   -­‐0.2238	   -­‐0.1493	   1	   	  
Investment	   in	  
Agriculture	  to	  GDP	  
0.0880	   -­‐0.0676	   0.1690	   0.2020	   1	  
	  
Table	  5.2.2:	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   GVA	   Average	   GVA	  
Industry	  
Average	   GVA	  
Construction	  
Average	   GVA	   non-­‐
Market	  Services	  
Average	   GVA	  
Market	  Services	  




1	   	   	   	   	  
Average	  GVA	  
Construction	  	  
-­‐0.1947	   1	   	   	   	  
Average	  GVA	  non-­‐
Market	  Services	  
-­‐0.3552	   0.1765	   1	   	   	  
Average	  GVA	  
Market	  Services	  	  
-­‐0.6467	   0.0798	   -­‐0.2434	   1	   	  
Average	  GVA	  
Agriculture	  
-­‐0.0350	   0.3607	   	  	  0.1267	   -­‐0.0578	   1	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According	  to	  the	  correlation	  coefficients	  reported	  in	  Tables	  5.2.1	  and	  5.2.2	  (and	  their	  graphical	  representations),	  
the	  predictors	   included	   in	   the	  models	  do	  not	   seem	  be	   collinear	  or	   linearly	  dependent.	   Indeed	   in	  Table	  10	   the	  
larger	  correlation	  coefficient	  in	  absolute	  terms	  is	  the	  one	  detected	  between	  investment	  rate	  in	  construction	  and	  
investment	  rate	  in	  non-­‐market	  services	  (-­‐.55).	  In	  Table	  11	  the	  larger	  correlation	  coefficient	  in	  absolute	  terms	  is	  
the	  one	  detected	  between	  industry	  GVA	  and	  GVA	  in	  market	  services	  (-­‐.64).	  
All	  the	  correlation	  coefficients	  in	  absolute	  values	  lay	  below	  the	  threshold	  of	  0.50.	  
Despite	  the	  correlation	  matrix	  analysis	  indicates	  that	  there	  exists	  no	  a	  multicollinearity	  problem	  in	  the	  model,	  I	  
also	  perform	  the	  Inflation	  Variance	  Factor	  (IVF)	  test.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   perform	   this	   test	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   perform	   an	   OLS	   regression	   because	   the	   IVF	   is	   an	   index	   that	  
measures	   to	  what	  extent	   the	  variance	  of	   the	  estimated	  regression	  coefficient	   is	   increased	  as	  a	   consequence	  of	  
multicollinearity.	  
Let	  Rj2	  indicates	  the	  coefficient	  of	  determination	  of	  a	  regression	  equation	  in	  which	  xj	  is	  regressed	  on	  all	  the	  other	  
predictors	  of	  the	  model.	  
Let	  VIFj	  be	  determined	  as	  VIFj	  =1/	  (1-­‐Rj2)	  for	  j=1,2,…p-­‐1.	  Therefore	  when	  Rj2	  is	  equal	  to	  0	  the	  VIFj	  would	  be	  equal	  
to	  1	  (=1/	  (1-­‐02),	  meaning	  that	  the	  jth	  is	  not	  linearly	  related	  with	  the	  other	  predictors.	  Symmetrically	  when	  Rj2	  is	  
equal	  to	  1	  (the	  highest	  possible	  coefficient	  of	  determination),	  the	  VIFj	  would	  be	  equal	  to	  ∞	  	  (=1/	  (1-­‐12),	  meaning	  
the	  jth	  is	  linearly	  related	  with	  the	  other	  predictors.	  
The	  rule	  to	  establish	  whether	  there	  exists	  multicollinearity	  within	  a	  model	   is	  provided	  by	  Montgomery	  (2001)	  
that	   individuates	   VIF	   threshold	   values.	   If	   the	   VIF	   values	   exceed	   5	   or	   10	   it	   means	   that	   the	   model	   is	   poorly	  
estimated	  because	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  multicollineriaty.	  
Once	  the	  OLS	  model	  has	  been	  estimated	  as	  in	  equations	  5.2	  and	  5.3	  (Table	  5.2)	  of	  Paragraph	  5.7,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	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Table	  5.2.4:	  VIF	  
	  
	   	   	  
IVF	  Model	  9a	  
	  
IVF	  Model	  9b	  
EQI	  Score	  
	  
4.05	   GVA	  Manufacturing	  Industry	   4.44	  
Working	   Age	   Population	   with	  
Primary	  Education	  or	  Less	  
3.48	   Log	  of	  GDP	  pc	  in	  2001	   4.10	  
	  






















Working	   Age	   Population	  

















Construction	  GVA	   2.11	  
	  












Agriculture	  GVA	   1.77	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
The	  estimation	  of	  the	  VIFj’s	  confirms	  the	  absence	  of	  multicollinearity	  in	  the	  model.	  Furthermore	  when	  running	  
regression	   analysis	   with	   the	   econometric	   software,	   variables	   that	   are	   perfectly	   correlated	   are	   always	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Motivated	  by	  the	  increasing	  public	  interest	  for	  the	  economic	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  EMU	  arisen	  after	  the	  outbreak	  
of	   the	   Global	   Financial	   Crisis	   and	   the	   sovereign	   debt	   crisis	   accompanied	   by	   the	   double	   dip	   recession,	   this	  
dissertation	  has	  contributed	  to	  shed	  a	  light	  on	  the	  determinants	  of	  the	  economic	  trends	  observed	  in	  Europe	  since	  
the	  intensification	  of	  the	  process	  of	  European	  economic	  integration.	  In	  particular	  I	  have	  highlighted	  the	  different	  
aspects	  that	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  progressive	  weakening	  and	  the	  consequent	  reversal	  of	  the	  process	  of	  
convergence	  across	  Western	  countries	  and	  regions	  in	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union.	  
Within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   Neoclassical	   Theory,	   in	   the	   first	   chapter	   of	   the	   thesis	   I	   have	   showed	   that	  
convergence	   between	   the	   “Western”	   member	   states	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   has	   gradually	   reversed	   with	   the	  
intensification	  of	  the	  process	  of	  economic	  and	  monetary	  integration	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s.	  This	  reversal	  of	  
catching	  up	   in	   the	   “West”	  of	   the	  EU	  has	  been	  matched	  by	  a	   shift	  of	   the	   convergence	  process	   towards	  East.	  As	  
matter	  of	  facts	  convergence	  in	  the	  EU	  during	  the	  period	  1995-­‐2018	  is	  observed	  only	  thanks	  to	  the	  progressive	  
integration	  of	  the	  CEE	  economies	  within	  the	  economic	  area.	  
In	  this	  framework	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  assert	  that,	  while	  the	  EU-­‐15	  no	  longer	  configures	  as	  a	  convergence	  club	  as	  it	  
did	  until	  the	  mid	  of	  the	  1990s,	  only	  CEE	  economies	  (especially	  the	  Visegrad	  group)	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  converge	  
towards	  the	  incomes	  per	  capita	  of	  the	  richer	  countries	  of	  the	  EU.	  
Given	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  shown	  in	  the	  First	  Chapter,	   in	  Chapter	  2	   I	   initially	  compared	  the	  rates	  of	  growth	  
and	   the	   primary	   government	   balances	   observed	   in	   the	   aggregate	   Euro	   Area	   and	   in	   the	   US	   during	   the	   period	  
1995-­‐2018	  and	  the	  sub-­‐period	  2008-­‐2018	  that	  has	  followed	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis.	  Starting	  
from	   the	   empirical	   observation	   that,	   during	   the	   period	   1995-­‐2018,	   the	   US	   and	   the	   Euro	   Area	   have	   followed	  
opposite	  strategies	  of	  fiscal	  policies,	  I	  have	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  growth	  performances	  observed	  in	  
the	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  could	  be	  ascribed	  to	  the	  contractionary	  fiscal	  policy	  pursued	  by	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  
EMU.	  
The	   difference	   in	   the	   approach	   to	   government	   fiscal	   policy	   has	   been	   particularly	   relevant	   during	   the	   period	  
2009-­‐2018	  when	  the	  US	  recorded	  an	  average	  primary	  deficit	  at	  values	  around	  -­‐5%	  while	  the	  Euro	  Area	  recorded	  
an	  average	  primary	  surplus	  (Fig,	  2.4,	  Chapter	  2).	  As	  matter	  of	  facts,	  in	  2009	  immediately	  after	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  
Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  the	  Euro	  Area	  started	  to	  consolidate	  its	  primary	  fiscal	  balance	  while	  the	  in	  the	  US	  opted	  to	  
pursue	  expansionary	  fiscal	  policy	  to	  support	  the	  economic	  recovery.	  
Then,	  I	  tested	  the	  hypothesis	  whether	  the	  permanent	  fiscal	  consolidation	  and	  the	  monotonic	  fiscal	  rules,	  entailed	  
by	   the	  Maastricht	   convergence	   criteria	   and	   EMU	  membership,	  may	   have	   undermined	   economic	   growth	   in	   its	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member	  states	  and	  contributed	  the	  progressive	  deterioration	  of	  the	  process	  convergence	  between	  countries	  that	  
joined	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	  between	  1999	  and	  2001.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  longitudinal	  panel	  analysis	  
during	   the	   period	   1995-­‐2018	   are	   remarkably	   interesting	   because	   they	   show	   that	   the	   strict	   fiscal	   discipline	  
(reflected	   by	   the	   government	   primary	   surplus)	   entailed	   by	   the	   EMU	   membership	   have	   penalized	   economic	  
growth	   in	   particular	   in	   the	   countries	   that	   were	   supposed	   to	   catch-­‐up	   with	   the	   ricer	   ones.	   As	   a	   consequence	  
permanent	  fiscal	  consolidation	  and	  austerity,	  that	   in	  some	  countries	  got	  harsher	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Global	  
Financial	  Crisis,	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  the	  major	  cause	  behind	  the	  divergence	  in	  income	  per	  capita	  observed	  since	  
the	  mid	  of	  the	  1990s	  in	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union.	  
Starting	   from	   the	   evidence	   that	   central	   government	   fiscal	   consolidation	   to	   be	   pursued	   through	   the	   annual	  
accumulation	   of	   primary	   government	   surpluses	   has	   been	   detrimental	   for	   convergence	   since	   the	   mid	   of	   the	  
1990s,	  in	  Chapter	  3	  I	  tested	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  whether	  fiscal	  consolidation	  as	  policy	  response	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  
the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  has	  also	  been	   the	  cause	  of	   the	  double	  dip	   recession	  observed	   in	  Europe	  during	   the	  
period	  2007-­‐2015,	  and	  therefore	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  patterns	  of	  regional	  divergence	  observed	  since	  the	  year	  2007-­‐
08.	  
Thanks	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  econometric	  models	  specifically	  suited	  to	  build	  and	  estimate	  regression	  equations	  
on	   data	   linked	   by	   a	   hierarchical	   relationship,	   namely	   Multilevel	   Mixed	   Effects	   Models,	   I	   have	   been	   able	   to	  
estimate	   the	   effect	   of	   government	   fiscal	   austerity	   and	   consolidation	   on	   “within	   country”	   regional	   economic	  
growth.	  
The	  results	  of	  the	  Multilevel	  Mixed	  Effects	  Model	  estimated	  on	  a	   longitudinal	  panel	  dataset	  built	  on	  three-­‐year	  
non-­‐overlapping	   averages	   confirm	   at	   regional	   level	   the	   analysis	   Heimberger	   (2016)	   according	   to	  which	   fiscal	  
consolidation	  or	  austerity	  as	  policy	  response	  has	  been	  the	  main	  culprit	  for	  the	  double	  dip	  recession	  observed	  in	  
Europe	   after	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis.	   The	   results	   of	   the	  model	   are	   very	   interesting	   for	   two	  
reasons.	  	  
First,	   it	   is	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   objective	   to	   pursue	   fiscal	   consolidation	  was	   a	  misleading	   policy	   strategy	   for	  
economic	  recovery	  in	  most	  of	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  EMU	  after	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis.	  	  In	  other	  
words	  austerity	   is	  generally	  not	  expansionary.	  Second,	   the	  effects	  of	   fiscal	   consolidation	  on	  regional	  economic	  
growth	  in	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	  have	  varied	  and	  vary	  from	  country	  to	  country.	  
Indeed	  with	  the	  multilevel	  regression	  technique	  I	  have	  been	  able	  to	  estimate	  the	  random	  slopes	  to	  be	  added	  up	  
to	   the	   fixed	   slope	   for	   the	   whole	   sample	   of	   regions	   and	   I	   showed	   that	   fiscal	   consolidation	   has	   penalized	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particularly	  within	  country	  regional	  growth	  in	  the	  periphery,	  where	  each	  percentage	  point	  of	  austerity	  or	  fiscal	  
consolidation	  has	  been	  associated	  to	  a	  drop	  of	  regional	  GDP	  per	  capita	  larger	  that	  1	  percentage	  point.	  
Conversely,	  fiscal	  consolidation	  has	  been	  associated	  to	  within	  country	  regional	  economic	  growth	  in	  Germany	  and	  
Austria	  and	  with	  negligible	  drops	  of	  economic	  activity	  in	  Belgium	  and	  Finland.	  
The	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  post-­‐2008	  fiscal	  consolidation	  has	  penalized	  regional	  growth	  more	  in	  the	  peripheral	  
countries	   than	   the	  “core”	  countries	  explains	   the	  paths	  of	   regional	  divergence	  observed	  during	   the	  sub-­‐periods	  
2007-­‐2009,	  2010-­‐2012	  and	  2015-­‐2015	  as	  shown	   in	  Figure	  3.6	  of	  Chapter	  3.	  At	   the	  same	  time	   the	  asymmetric	  
effects	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  also	  explain	  the	  process	  of	  regional	  divergence	  observed	  during	  the	  period	  2001-­‐
2015.	  
Therefore,	   in	   chapters	  2	  and	  3	   it	  has	  been	  shown	   that	  both	  programs	  of	   fiscal	   consolidation	   to	  qualify	   for	   the	  
EMU	   membership	   in	   1999	   and	   fiscal	   austerity	   after	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   have	   been	  
detrimental	  to	  convergence	  both	  between	  countries	  and	  regions.	  
Besides	  putting	   into	  evidence	   the	  role	  of	   fiscal	   consolidation	   in	  shaping	  regional	  economic	  performances	  after	  
the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis,	  the	  results	  Chapter	  3	  also	  show	  the	  remarkable	  effect	  of	  investment	  in	  
manufacturing	   industry	   as	   driver	   of	   regional	   economic	   growth	   during	   the	   period	   2007-­‐2015	   (Model	   3.1a,	  
Chapter	   3).	   As	   matter	   of	   facts	   aggregate	   investment	   rate	   exerts	   no	   effect	   on	   GDP	   but,	   if	   the	   variable	   is	  
disaggregated	  in	  its	  main	  components	  (manufacturing	  industry,	  market	  services	  and	  non-­‐market	  services),	  it	  is	  
possible	  to	  find	  out	  that	  only	  the	  variable	  investment	  rate	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  has	  statistically	  significant	  
effects	  on	  the	  economic	  activity.	  
Starting	   from	   the	   empirical	   evidence	   that	   investment	   in	   manufacturing	   industry	   was	   the	   driver	   of	   economic	  
growth	   during	   the	   period	   that	   encompasses	   the	   fiscal	   austerity-­‐induced	   double	   dip	   recession	   in	   Europe,	   in	  
Chapter	   4	   I	   have	   conducted	   an	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   geographical	   distribution	   of	  
manufacturing	   industry	   and	   regional	  development	   in	   the	  European	  Union.	   	  The	   empirical	   evidences	   from	   this	  
chapter	  essentially	  complement	  the	  results	  of	  Chapters	  2	  and	  3	  to	  explain	  the	  shift	  of	  convergence	  process	  from	  
the	  periphery	  of	   the	  EMU	   to	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   tight	  government	   fiscal	  policy	  and	  
austerity	  have	  undermined	  convergence	  both	  between	  countries	  and	  regions	  in	  the	  EU-­‐15.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  
European	   enlargement	   has	   favoured	   the	   progressive	   relocation	   of	   manufacturing	   activity	   around	   the	   core	  
European	   regions	   located	   in	   Germany	   and	   Austria	   and	   this	   process	   benefited	   in	   particular	   the	   regions	   of	   the	  
Visegrad	  Group	  that	  actually	  experienced	  an	  exceptional	  process	  of	  catching-­‐up	  that	  has	  not	  precedents	   in	   the	  
economic	   history	   (Friedrich	   et	   al,	   2010).	   In	   fact,	   as	   shown	   in	   Fig	   4.3.1	   (Appendix	   4.3,	   Chapter	   4),	   during	   the	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period	  2001-­‐2015	   there	  was	   a	   relevant	   tendency	   of	  manufacturing	   activity	   to	   relocate	   towards	  Northern	   and	  
CEE	  regions	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  while	  the	  manufacturing	  contribution	  to	  total	  GVA	  shrank	  
in	  almost	  all	   the	  French,	   Italian	  and	  British	   regions	  or	   remained	  stable	   in	  most	  of	   Spanish	   regions,	  during	   the	  
period	  2001-­‐2015	  it	  has	  been	  possible	  to	  observe	  a	  remarkable	   increase	   in	  the	  size	  of	  manufacturing	   industry	  
GVA	  in	  the	  rage	  of	  3-­‐12%	  in	  almost	  all	  the	  German,	  Austrian	  and	  Visegrd	  regions.	  
The	   shift	   of	  manufacturing	   industry	   towards	   CEE	   regions	   located	   around	   the	   German	   and	   Austrian	   core	   also	  
determined	  a	  strong	  convergence	  in	  the	  labour	  productivity	  in	  manufacturing	  industry	  itself	  that	  in	  turn	  led	  to	  
remarkably	   strong	   convergence	   rates	   in	   labour	  productivity	   and	   income	  per	   capita	  of	   the	   former	   towards	   the	  
levels	  of	  latter	  ones	  (Table	  4.2	  and	  Figure	  4.4a	  and	  4.4b	  Chapter	  4).	  
Therefore,	  tight	  government	  fiscal	  policy	  since	  the	  mid	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  fiscal	  austerity	  since	  2008	  in	  the	  EMU	  
together	  with	  the	  progressive	  relocation	  of	  manufacturing	   industry	   from	  most	  of	   the	  peripheral	  regions	  of	   the	  
EMU	  and	  France	  towards	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  European	  regions	  can	  be	  individuated	  as	  the	  two	  complementary	  
determinants	  of	  the	  shift	  of	  the	  convergence	  process	  from	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  EMU	  towards	  the	  CEE	  countries	  
as	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  As	  also	  Stollinger	  et	  al	  (2013)	  remark,	  the	  economic	  crisis	  of	  2008	  has	  caused	  a	  change	  
in	   the	   perception	   of	   the	  manufacturing	   sector	   in	  many	   countries	   among	   both	   economists	   and	   policy-­‐makers.	  
Manufacturing	  has	  redeemed	  its	  reputation	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  a	  comparatively	   large	  manufacturing	  sector	   is	  no	  
longer	  considered	  to	  reflect	  an	  outdated	  economic	  structure,	  inadequate	  for	  a	  postindustrial,	  services-­‐dominated	  
economy	  such	  as	  the	  EU.	  Rather,	  nurtured	  by	  the	  observation	  that	  within	  the	  EU,	  countries	  that	  have	  maintained	  
a	   larger	  manufacturing	  base	   fared	   better	   during	   and	   after	   the	   crisis,	   a	   dynamic	  manufacturing	   sector	   is	   again	  
considered	  to	  be	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  an	  innovative	  and	  fast-­‐growing	  economy.	  
Finally	   in	   the	  5th	  Chapter	   I	  have	   tested	   the	  hypothesis	   that	  also	   the	  quality	  of	   government	   institutions	  plays	  a	  
very	  relevant	  role	   in	  shaping	  regional	  economic	  performances,	   thus	   in	  determining	  economic	  performances	  at	  
country	  level.	  
In	   particular	   in	   this	   chapter	   I	   have	   quantified	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	   quality	   of	   government	   institutions	   has	  
determined	  patterns	  of	  regional	  convergence	  and	  divergence	  in	  the	  EU-­‐15.	  
The	   results	   of	   this	   analysis	   are	   very	   relevant	   because	   it	   is	   shown	   that,	   besides	   factors	   beyond	   government	  
control	   such	   as	   fiscal	   policy	   in	   the	  Economic	   and	  Monetary	  Union	   and	   tendency	  of	  manufacturing	   industry	   to	  
relocate	   around	   the	   core	   regions,	   there	   is	   still	   a	   margin	   for	   domestic	   political	   authorities	   in	   the	   peripheral	  
countries	   like	   Italy	   at	   least	   to	   soothe	   the	   severity	   of	   divergence	   experienced	   by	   the	   poorest	   regions.	   In	   fact,	  
according	  to	  the	  regression	  output	  reported	  in	  Table	  5.3	  one	  per	  cent	  improvement	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  government	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institutions	  is	  expected	  to	  reduce	  by	  12.5%	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  “poor”	  region	  will	  underperform	  the	  European	  
Union.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   one	   per	   cent	   improvement	   in	   the	   quality	   of	   government	   institutions	   is	   expected	   to	  
reduce	  by	  19%	  the	  probability	   that	  a	  region	  will	   “fail	   to	  grow”	  as	   it	  happened	   in	  almost	  all	   the	   Italian	  and	  the	  
Greek	  regions,	  in	  six	  French	  regions	  and	  a	  couple	  of	  Spanish	  regions	  during	  the	  period	  2001-­‐2015.	  
In	  summary,	  although	  the	  process	  of	  convergence	  in	  the	  EU-­‐15	  started	  to	  deteriorate	  during	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  in	  
coincidence	  with	   the	  Maastricht	   Treaty,	   it	   is	   not	   theoretically	   and	   empirically	   possible	   to	   individuate	   a	   direct	  
relationship	  between	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Single	  Currency	  per	  se	  and	  the	  deterioration	  and	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  
convergence	  process	  in	  the	  EU-­‐15.	  Rather	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  individuate	  two	  major	  groups	  of	  drivers	  of	  divergence	  
that	   have	   accompanied	   the	   process	   of	   European	   monetary	   integration	   and	   that	   have	   to	   be	   analysed	   from	  
different	  theoretical	  perspectives	  and	  with	  different	  econometric	  approaches.	  	  
A	   first	   dimension	   of	   the	   process	   of	   divergence	   in	   the	   EU-­‐15	   pertains	   to	   the	   branch	   of	   fiscal	   policy	   and	   its	  
relationship	  with	  economic	  growth,	   that	   is,	   to	   the	   fiscal	  consolidation	  underlying	   the	  EMU	  membership	  and	  to	  
the	  fiscal	  austerity	  as	  policy	  response	  to	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  outbreak.	  In	  fact	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  assert	  that	  it	  
was	   the	   contractionary	   fiscal	   policy,	   in	   particular	   after	   the	   financial	   crisis	   outbreak,	   rather	   than	   the	   Single	  
Currency	  per	  se	  to	  generate	  divergence	  across	  countries	  and	  regions	  in	  the	  EU-­‐15.	  
The	  second	  dimension	  of	  the	  process	  of	  divergence	  pertains	  to	  the	  branch	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  trade	  and	  economic	  
geography.	  	  As	  Krumgan	  (2020:3)	  points	  out,	  analytical	  papers	  about	  economic	  geography	  represent	  an	  attempt	  
to	  make	  sense	  of	  global	  patterns	  of	  trade	  and	  the	  location	  of	  industries.	  	  
In	   fact,	   the	  process	  of	  European	  monetary	   integration	  has	  proceeded	   in	  parallel	  with	   the	  process	  of	   economic	  
globalization	   that	   entailed	   the	   progressive	   reduction	   of	   trade	   barriers	   and	   increasing	   cross-­‐boarders	   capital	  
mobility	  in	  the	  World	  economy.	  The	  rise	  of	  a	  global	  market	  for	  goods	  and	  services	  following	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  
of	  the	  WTO	  agreement	  in	  1995	  and	  the	  manufacturing	  firms’	  search	  for	  competitive	  advantages,	  to	  be	  achieved	  
through	  scale	  economies,	  has	  naturally	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  global	  value	  chain	  based	  on	  the	  regionalization	  
of	  industrial	  activity	  also	  favoured	  by	  regional	  economic	  agreements	  like	  the	  EU	  or	  NAFTA	  (Stollinger	  et	  a,	  2015;	  
Ravenhill,	  2011;	  Hill,	  2011;	  Held	  at	  all,	  2010;	  Gilpin,	  2008).	  	  
As	  matter	  of	  facts,	  also	  a	  report	  published	  by	  the	  Vienna	  Institute	  of	  International	  Economic	  Studies	  (Stollinger,	  
2016:1)	   confirms	   that	   the	   manufacturing	   activity	   in	   the	   EU	   has	   increasingly	   agglomerated	   in	   a	   European	  
manufacturing	  core	  centred	  on	  Germany	  and	  comprising	  Austria	  as	  well	  as	  the	  four	  Visegrad	  countries	  and	  this	  
agglomeration	  within	  and	  around	  particular	  EU	  regions	  depends	  on	  the	  international	  production	  integration	  that	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has	  determined	  a	  German-­‐Central	  European	  supply	  chain	   that	   is	  exporting	  manufacturing	  goods	   to	   the	  rest	  of	  
Europe	  and	  the	  world.	  	  	  
In	  the	  light	  of	  these	  empirical	  evidences	  and	  considerations,	  it	  appears	  evident	  the	  urgent	  need	  for	  an	  upgrade	  of	  
the	  European	  “convergence	  machine”	  in	  order	  to	  restore	  convergence	  in	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union.	  
A	  set	  of	   reforms	  should	  be	  aimed	  at	  alleviating	   the	  grip	  of	   fiscal	  austerity	   in	   the	  weaker	  countries	  of	   the	  EMU	  
through	   the	   introduction	   of	   risk-­‐sharing	   mechanisms	   on	   the	   sovereign	   debts.	   As	   also	   Bernoth	   and	   Engler	  
(2015:1)	  have	  pointed	  out,	  one	  problem	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  longer-­‐term	  stability	  of	  the	  euro	  area	  is	  the	  absence	  
of	   mechanisms	   to	   adequately	   absorb	   asymmetric	   cyclical	   shocks	   in	   the	   individual	   member	   states.	   Such	   an	  
instrument	  is	  essential	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  implement	  a	  single	  monetary	  policy	  suitable	  for	  all	  countries.	  	  
As	   a	   consequence	   of	   this	   evidence,	   it	   has	   been	  produced	   a	  wide	   set	   of	   proposals	   that	   entail	  mechanisms	   that	  
range	   from	  the	   introduction	  of	  a	  European	  stabilization	   fund	  (De	  Grauwe	  and	   Ji,	  2016;	  Pasimeni,	  2015)	   to	   the	  
mutualisation	  of	   the	  portion	  government	  debt	   ratio	  exceeding	   the	  60%	  or	   the	  90%	  of	   the	  GDP	   (Corsetti	   et	   al,	  
2015;	  Parello	  and	  Visco,	  2012).	  However	  the	  implementation	  of	  such	  measures	  would	  entail	  a	  very	  high	  degree	  
of	   political	   integration	   and	   “solidarity”	   as	   in	   the	   case	  of	   the	  US	   after	   the	   adoption	  of	   the	  Constitution	   in	  1790	  
(Steinbach,	  2015)	  and	  does	  not	  appear	  a	  feasible	  option	  at	  least	  in	  the	  short-­‐medium	  term	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Europe.	  	  
As	   matter	   of	   facts	   most	   of	   the	   proposals	   under	   evaluation	   by	   the	   EU	   institutions	   are	   primary	   focused	   on	  
strengthening	   and	   fostering	   market	   discipline	   for	   governments	   of	   the	   member	   states	   of	   the	   currency	   area	  
(Morlino	  and	  Sottilotta,	  2020;	  Rehn,	  2018;	  Meyland	  and	  Schäfer,	  2017).	  Such	  enhanced	  market	  discipline	  would	  
be	  preordained	   to	   the	  completion	  of	   the	  European	  Banking	  Union	  but	  would	  also	  entail	   the	   transformation	  of	  
government	  bonds	  held	  by	  the	  domestic	  banking	  systems	  in	  “risk-­‐weighted”	  assets	  for	  the	  levels	  of	  banks’	  capital	  
requirement.	  The	  eventual	   implementation	  of	   this	  reform	  proposal	  of	   the	  European	  financial	  regulation	  would	  
force	  countries	  with	  high	  level	  of	  debt	  to	  GDP	  ratio	  to	  further	  tighten	  fiscal	  austerity	  for	  two	  reasons.	  
On	   the	   one	   hand,	   domestic	   governments	  would	   be	   forced	   to	   recapitalize	   banks	  whose	   capital/asset	   ratio	   has	  
shrunk	  because	   of	   the	  weight	   assigned	   to	   government	   bond	  held	   in	   their	   balance	   sheets.	  On	   the	   other	  hands,	  
domestic	   banks	  would	   be	   pushed	   get	   rid	   of	   government	   bonds	   causing	   an	   increase	   of	   interest	   rates	   on	   those	  
government	   bonds.	   In	   this	   framework,	   governments	   in	   the	   peripheral	   countries,	   whose	   debt	   to	   GDP	   ratio	  
increased	  sharply	  after	   the	  outbreak	  of	   the	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis,	  would	  be	  obliged	  to	   implement	   further	  and	  
harsher	  fiscal	  austerity	  measures	  aimed	  at	  the	  reduction	  of	  government	  debt	  in	  order	  not	  to	  put	  bank	  deposits	  
and	  private	  savings	  at	  risk56.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Such	  a	  proposal	  has	  been	   contested	  by	   the	   Italian	  Ministry	  of	  Economy	  and	  Finance	  during	  a	  2016	  ECOFIN	   (Wall	   Street	   Journal,	  2016;	  
Reuters,	  2016)	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As	   it	   is	   appears	   clear,	   the	   implementation	   of	   such	   proposal	   and	   the	   consequent	   implementation	   of	   further	  
austerity	   measures	   in	   the	   peripheral	   member	   states	   with	   high	   debt	   to	   GDP	   ratios	   would	   further	   exacerbate	  
divergence	  across	  the	  countries	  and	  regions	  of	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union.	  
However	   these	  considerations	  pertain	   to	  political	  debate	  and	   to	   the	  European	   intergovernmental	  negotiations	  
surrounding	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  EMU,	  and	  such	  a	  debate	  is	  not	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  
Rather,	   the	   debate	   surrounding	   the	   upgrade	   of	   the	   European	   “convergence	  machine”	   should	   be	   focused	   with	  
equal	   intensity	  on	  a	   “manufacturing	  imperative”	  (Rodrik,	   2016	  and,2011).	  Indeed,	  deindustrialization	  has	   long	  
been	   a	   concern	   in	   rich	   nations,	  where	   it	   is	   associated	   in	   public	   discussions	  with	   the	   loss	   of	   good	   jobs,	   rising	  
inequality,	  and	  a	  potential	  decline	  in	  innovation	  capacity.	  	  
For	   this	   reason	   Myro	   (2019)	   outlines	   the	   need	   of	   a	   European	   policy	   for	   a	   new	   industrial	   revolution	   where	  
cooperation	   between	   countries	   must	   also	   be	   reinforced	   towards	   a	   more	   effective	   and	   wider	   common	   EU	  
industrial	  policy.	  As	  also	  Stollinger	  et	  al	   (2013)	   remark,	   industrial	  policy,	  understood	  as	   selective	  government	  
interventions	  attempting	  to	  alter	  the	  structure	  of	  production	  towards	  industries	  that	  are	  expected	  to	  offer	  higher	  
growth	   prospects,	   can	   in	   principle	   try	   to	   foster	   structural	   change	   towards	   any	   sector	   or	   industry	   that	  
government	   authorities	   consider	   to	   be	   ‘strategic’	   or	   supportive	   of	   growth.	   Viewed	   through	   the	   lenses	   of	   a	  
“manufacturing	   imperative”	   perspective,	   the	   particular	   characteristics	   of	   manufacturing	   industries	   (such	   as	  
externalities	   and	   increasing	   returns	   to	   scale)	   call	   for	   industrial	   policies	   that	   redirect	   the	   European	   economy	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